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The aim of the study is to examine the ideological 
content and practices of welfare provision among Greek and 
Lebanese immigrants in Sydney, and the role of state 
welfare funding related to this provision. The study 
examines ethno-specific welfare structures in the two 
communities as sites in which the concepts of ethnicity and 
welfare are articulated. 
The community structures encompass such key liquifying 
practices in the constitution/construction of social 
reality as their symbolizations of the primordial 
community, the praxis of welfare/social workers and their 
relations to both 'community' and state. 
I was led to this study from a growing concern about 
the serious social problems faced by 'unskilled' working 
class immigrants. For instance, studies on Lebanese and 
Turkish immigrants have highlighted problems of social 
inequality faced by them and other immigrant groups in the 
labour market, on the basis of education, age sex, racial 
discrimination and economic marginalisation [Hiimphrey 1984, 
Mackie 1982]. 
On the other side the state at the Federal level has 
been arguing that immigrants' social problems stem from 
cultural inequality. The welfare services provided to 
immigrants under the social policy of multiculturalism were 
said to have contributed significantly to the improvement 
of the immigrants' welfare [Galbally Report 1978, AIMA 
Report 1982]. 
A comparative study of the Greek and Lebanese social 
collectivities in Sydney allowed me to explore the 
different structures and ideologies of welfare, and trace 
out some of the key factors affecting these structures and 
ideologies. The Greek community was 'well established', 
large, diverse with few recent immigrants. The Lebanese 
communities, while more diverse, - primarily due to 
religious differences and the comparative recency of the 
concept of Lebanese nationality - were smaller, with a less 
developed bourgeoisie amongst the more recent arrivals, 
who, in turn, formed a much more significant proportion of 
the communities. 
It would therefore be valuable to compare factors 
involved in the communal structures to the differing 
ideological, socio-cultural, political and economic periods 
of their migration and settlement as a means to better 
understanding. Their social position, the basis of the 
inequalities they experienced, and the strategies they 
have evolved in response to this environment. 
While the differences are important it is also 
necessary to explore the similarities/commonalities 
experienced by Greek and Lebanese immigrants. Both 
immigrant groups are classified as Southern European, which -
in the Australian social milieu denotes the presence of a 
comparatively large number of unskilled workers. They also 
share some important characteristics with other NES 
immigrants, namely social class strueturation, social 
inequalities and an ethnic dimension in Australian society. 
Thus, the study raises the following questions in 
relation to the social inequalities faced by greek and 
Lebanese immigrants: 
1). Why axe Greek and Lebanese working class people 
disadvantaged in the labour market? 
2). What is the welfare provision role of Greek and 
Lebanese ethno-specific institutions and 
professionals? 
3). What are the consequences of ethnic welfare 
ideologies and practices, and social inequalities 
on the Greek and Lebanese working class? 
Given the central role of the labour market and 
employment as the providers of welfare for the mass of the 
population, welfare practices can only be radically 
addressed through a preliminary investigation of work, and 
the social process involved in the production of labour 
power. An explanation of their relationship can only be 
carried out through the application of class analysis, a 
perspective which is not a feature of mainstream migrant 
research studies on social policy, e.g. the ROMMPAS Report 
1986. 
However, a class analysis would argue that ethnic 
welfare and the social inequalities of working class 
migrants are outcomes of the interrelations between capital 
accumulation, state social policies, of the migration and 
settlement process, and of systems of cultural practices 
and domination [de Lepervanche in 'Australian Society' 
1984: 217]. 
The underlying theme of the study is that social 
concepts and practices, like ethnicity and welfare, have to 
be seen as ideological constructs, as socially created 
phenomena, and not as innate or natural manifestations of 
the social world. For this reason in the study ideology is 
treated from the perspective of its construction of the 
class and social relations of people, the values and 
beliefs that mediate the social world for the individuals 
and affect their everyday relations and social 
consciousness. 
Moreover, ideology in the study is treated more in 
terms of its social control role, than its social cohesion 
potential. The social control aspect of ideology 
concentrates on the ways and forms is mobilised by class 
and non-class interests to inhibit the development of 
alternative ideologies, and thus maintain social 
inequalities in capitalist society. An understanding of the 
operation of the social control aspect of ideology can, 
therefore, lead to an understanding of how to affect social 
change. 
The discussion in the study is directly related to the 
current class-ethnicity debate over the applicability of 
each of the two concepts in interpreting migrants' 
experiences and social needs in Australia. Various social 
studies based on class analysis have identified as sources 
of inequalities for NES working class men and women the 
process of capital accumulation, their particular position 
in the labour market, their limited political 
representation, while their cultural diversity exacerbates 
these inequalities [de Lepervanche et al., 1984; 
Jakubowicz, 1983, 1984,1985; Collins, 1978, 1984; Lever-
Tracy, 1981, 1983; Bottomley 1984]. 
On the other hand authors who have used the concept 
of ethnicity as an analytical and methodological tool have 
argued that NES immigrants' social inequalities stem from 
various factors like cultural intolerance, status closure, 
occupational disadvantages or lack of accessible welfare 
services [Encel 1981, 1984, 1985; Cox 1975, 1982; Birrells 
1981; Bostock 1977]. 
Most literature on migrant welfare has treated the 
concept of welfare in its very limited interpretation of 
efficiency, effectiveness, accessibility and equity. These 
issues are important and the study attempts to address some 
of them. Nevertheless, the interpretation and use of the 
concept of welfare in the study is not limited to that of 
social welfare, but it implicitly treats welfare as: 
"...satisfaction of human needs - defined 
initially as those necessary for the physical, 
psychological and social integrity of the 
individual". [Jakubowicz in 'Australia in 
Transition' et.al. 1985: 272] 
Thus, the study of Greek and Lebanese ethno-specific 
institutions and professionals can provide many insights on 
the operation and impact of class, state and primordial 
ideologies on the lives of the working class people of the 
two groups. 
Gramsci's model of ideology has seorved as both 
analytical and methodological tool of analysis in the 
study. His concepts of hegemonic classes, the impact on the 
everyday lives of people by the institutions of the civil 
society (non-state institutions), and the role of 
intellectuals as articulators and organisers os the 
hegemonic classes, have been used to interpret the data. 
On the basis of this model then it would be argued 
that social work approaches by ethnic organizations and 
professionals perform a very important social control role, 
because of their daily contact with the 'grass-roots'. It 
is at this level of social organization where class, 
primordial, and state social policy values and practices 
continuously and directly affect the personal and 
perception of social reality by Greek and Lebanese working 
class men and women. 
The first four chapters comprise the theoretical part 
of the study. Chapters One and Two deal with the concept of 
ideology, Gramsci's theory of civil institutions and 
intellectuals, and with the social policy formulation and 
practices of the welfare state. The next two chapters refer 
to the experiences of migrants in Australia and the social 
policies related to that under different ideological 
periods (assimilation-multiculturalism). 
Chapter Five outlines the methodology of the study. 
Chapters Six to Nine discuss the data. Chapter Six 
discusses the formation of the Greek National ideology and 
the pre-war migration and settlement of Greek and Lebanese 
migrants. Chapter Seven looks at the community development 
and welfare practices of the two groups during the 
assimilation period. Chapter Eight is divided into three 
sections - secular ethno-specific, religious ethno-specific 
and generalist institutions - and examines the community-
relations and welfare provision to Greeks and Lebanese 
during the multicultural period. 
The statistical data of the study on Greeks and 
Lebanese is at the national level in order to get a general 
impression of their position in the Australian society. 
Finally, the conclusions drawn in the study and their 
interpretation reflect the researcher's views, and in a 
number of instances the respondents may disagree with them. 
Nevertheless, the contribution of the respondents was 
incalculable for the realisation of the study. 
CHAPTER 1 
IDEOLOGY 
1.1: Definition of Ideology 
The relationships between ideas and events are never 
direct; they are always mediated by consciousness, by 
conceptions of appearances of real relations. The system 
of ideas and beliefs produced by consciousness to interpret 
and understand the social and natural world forms ideology. 
Rader argues that Marx perceived ideology as being a 
'false body of ideas used, perhaps unconsciously, to 
conceal or excuse vested interests' [Rader 1979:42]. In 
this context Marx saw ideology in the sense of false 
consciousness in defence of class interests. By false 
Marx did not mean outright false, but rather false in the 
sense of illusory or distortion as ideology refers to 
something in reality. 
For instance, one Marxist definition of ideology is 
that of Althusser's as given by Thompson: 
"(Ideology is) a system of representations-
composed of concepts, ideas, myths, and images in 
which people live their imaginary relations to 
the real conditions of existence" [Thompson 1986: 
44]. 
However, some Marxist authors like Althusser himself, 
Gramsci, and Thompson, have dismissed as simplistic the 
interpretation of ideology as merely being false 
consciousness. The main reason for that is: 
"Ideologies are seen as systems of repre-
sentations, which signify a set of relation-
ships which are real, but hide another set of 
relations which are less real". [Sharp 1980: 92]. 
Marx's meaning of ideology is not confined only in its 
characterisation of all ideas in support of economic and 
political interests, but it has a rather wider 
interpretation [Rader op.cit: 42]. The formation of 
ideologies involves a more complex process. Ideologies are 
not necessarily class determined or products of the class 
struggle; they may assume some independent formation from 
the means of production. 
As Thompson points out beliefs and values are 
important in class relations and domination if they: 
"...can be examined in terms of their ideological 
effects and for their relationships to other 
discourses and discursive practices that are more 
directly class related". [Thompson op.cit: 23]. 
Within this context then, the efficacy of ideology 
does not lie in its intrinsic values, but rather in its 
ability to mobilise material and intellectual resources to 
gain or maintain power in society. 
From a Marxist perspective then the central role of 
ideology, as well as its importance as a sociological 
issue, is to be found in its operation in the 
•organization, maintenance and transformation of power in 
society' [ibid: 15]. 
Generally the concept of ideology is treated as 
meaning a form of belief, despite arguments against this 
interpretation as being rather limited, and most theorists 
on ideology tend to agree that it contains the element of 
distortion of the real social conditions and relations of 
men [ibid: 22]. 
Thus, the role of ideology in the everyday life of 
individuals is important, not because it only interprets 
social reality, but it also forms the basis for social 
action towards that reality. As the social positions 
occupied by individuals, groups or classes, are based on 
unequal distribution of power, rather than free choice, 
ideology operates in underlying values of domination and 
subordination [Sharp op.cit: 102]. For this reason people's 
ideologies become their lives, and therefore extensions of 
themselves and that is why they are difficult to transform. 
1.2: Ideology and Capitalism 
Capitalism is based on the private ownership and 
control of the means of production. The social relations 
emanating from this organization of production are 
expressed in the formation of classes, with the bourgeoisie 
and the working-class being the two fundamental ones. 
The object of capitalist economic activity is the 
accumulation of capital, the concentration of value 
creating commodities. Capital accumulation is realised 
through profit, which is achieved from the purchase and 
sale of commodities. 
Profit is realised in the sale of goods and services, 
and in the surplus value generated by human labour, which 
is privately appropriated. This private appropriation of 
surplus value, and the increasing socialization of the 
means of production, constitute the main sources of 
conflict between capital and labour. 
The bourgeoisie in its desire to increase the volume 
and rate of capital accumulation changes continuously the 
methods of production and with them the social relations. 
This continuous division of labour renders existing social 
relations obsolete, and creates new ones together with new 
ideological constructs to interpret them. 
On the question of the role of ideology in class 
societies Marx was definite as to what purpose it served: 
" The ideas of the ruling class are in every 
epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is 
the ruling material force of society is at the 
same time its ruling intellectual force". 
[McLellan 1977: 176]. 
Marx went on to explain that in capitalist societies, 
the bourgeoisie have control over the means of material 
production, and therefore of the mental production. The 
working class by lacking the latter, is subject to it. 
An understanding of the significance of the role of 
ideology in capitalist societies and its critique is, 
therefore, imperative because: 
"If, for instance, the fundamental contradictions 
in a capital social formation can be shown to 
derive from an inherent tendency of that mode of 
production to depend on the exploitation of one 
class by another, and ideology serves the 
function of distorting a perception of that 
exploitation, then sociological analysis should 
include a critique of that ideology". [Thompson 
op.cit: 23]. 
The definition of the concept of ideology itself, and 
its role in advanced capitalist societies has been a 
subject of continuous and intense debate. The apparent 
ability of post-war advanced capitalist societies to 
survive successfully periodic crises and avoid open class 
conflict, has led various neo-Marxist theorists to 
concentrate more on the role of ideology in the maintenance 
of social order [Abercrombie 1981: 1]. 
For neo-Marxists like Marcuse, Habermas, Poulantzas, 
Milliband, the economic contradictions encountered at the 
economic base of capitalism, did not or have not yet proven 
sufficient factors to undermine or destroy capitalist 
societies [Loc.cit]. 
To these neo-Marxist theorists the role of ideology, 
as is expressed in the superstructures of capitalist 
society, plays a central role in the maintenance and repro-
duction of that society. Moreover, the emphasis on 
ideology is partly a response to counter-balance the 
economism of pre-war Marxist literature, and thus to offer 
a more dynamic analysis of capitalism. 
One contentious argument over the role of ideology, is 
to what extent ideology derives from class relations, and 
represents class interests. Abercrombie in his book 'The 
Dominant Ideology Thesis', criticises Poulantzas, Marcuse, 
Habermas, for over-emphasising the role of dominant 
ideology in the reproduction of present capitalist 
societies [ibid: ix-x]. 
The dominant ideology thesis is based on the 
assumption that it has incorporated the working-class into 
the values of the capitalist system, thereby perpetuating 
its subordination [ibid: 1-2]. Abercrombie argues that 
Marx himself and Marxist theorists like Gramsci and 
Althusser, did not pay much attention to the incorpo-
rationist aspect of dominant ideology. He then proceeds to 
say that the dominant ideology thesis is false and 
misleading, lacking any empirical proof. 
At the same time, Abercrombie draws parallel 
comparisons between the dominant ideology thesis, and the 
common culture approach employed by functionalist 
theorists. He argues that both theories share a view of 
dominant set of values which act to provide a cohesive 
social order. 
In the case of Durkheim and his followers, their 
concern is in the creation of a collective conscience, 
expressed in the form of organic solidarity in order to 
maintain the social order [ibid:30-58]. Parsons developed 
the theory of 'common culture', which culture is 
internalised by all individuals through the process of 
socialization, and thus the social order is retained. These 
core cultural values also play the role of prohibiting the 
rise of conflict and instability. 
The subject of the dominant ideology thesis does not 
constitute the main issue of discussion of the study. It 
has been brought into attention, among other things, to 
clarify the operational use of the concept of ideology. 
Suffice to say, that historically every ruling class has 
tried to incorporate sections of other classes to its own 
value system, to strengthen and justify its own existence 
and claim for power. 
Thus within the context of the present study there 
would be more bias towards the role of ideology in 
exercising social control over subordinate classes, than in 
its incorporationist role. In the words of Abercrombie, 
ideology will be treated as being able to: 
"... inhibit and confuse the development of the 
counter ideology of a subordinate class", [ibid., 
X]. 
1.3: Gramsci's theory of Ideology. 
Gramsci is one important Marxist theorist who 
articulated successfully the role of ideology in mobilising 
intellectual and material resources in society. He based 
his theory on "rather complex forms of interaction of 
political, cultural and ideological negotiation within and 
between classes" [Thompson op.cit: 79]. Gramsci saw the 
role of ideology as: 
"To the extent that ideologies are historically 
necessary they have a validity which is 
'psychological'; they 'organize' human masses and 
create the terrain on which men move, acquire 
consciousness of their position, struggle, 
etc...". [Rader op.cit: 43]. 
Gramsci did not perceive ideology as a mere reflection 
of man's material existence. He treated ideology as having 
a certain degree of autonomy from the economic relations of 
society, though he acknowledged that in the final analysis, 
the economic relations between classes, are the determining 
ones. 
According to the Gramscian theory, there are two 
fundamental classes in every society. In capitalist society 
these classes are bourgeoisie and the worlcing class. Their 
relations to the means of production are conflicting, 
contradictory and unequal. The constant struggle between 
the two classes takes place as well at the ideological 
level, with the social order of society at stake. 
This ideological struggle between the two fundamental 
classes takes a broader character, as they forge alliances 
with other social classes or groups, The fundamental 
classes articulate the interests of the alliance to their 
own by means of ideological struggle, and thus become the 
hegemonic classes of society. 
The ideological struggle between and within the 
hegemonic classes is a process of gradual transformation, 
as the existing ideologies are reinterpreted and combined 
in different ways, within the historical conditions of the 
period in question. 
The aim of a hegemonic class is to become the ruling 
one, and to achieve this it must create a collective will, 
a moral and intellectual transformation, a common new world 
view. In Mouffe's words: 
"Hegemony is the indisputable union of political 
leadership and intellectual and moral leadership, 
which clearly goes beyond the idea of a simple 
class alliance...[Gramsci] is using hegemony not 
only as a strategy for the proletariat, but uses 
it to think of the practices of the ruling class 
in general". [Mouffe 1979: 179]. 
A hegemonic principle becomes dominant, if it becomes 
a 'popular religion', gains the appeal and acceptance of 
the masses. "By dominant it is meant that it rules the 
allied classes and exercises domination over the opposing 
classes", [Loc.cit]. Such popular ideologies create the 
conditions whereby, class rule and the whole process of 
social reproduction is controlled. 
The Gramscian model of hegemony and popular world-
view, therefore, has the dual roles of achieving social 
cohesion, and imposing social control. On the one hand in 
the formation of a common world-view, ideology plays a 
socially cohesive role, by binding together contradictory 
or opposing class interests to form one entity, to form an 
ideological community. This means that the dominant 
ideological community is projected as a social reality 
whose values, beliefs and norms, are perceived as 
comprising an inevitable social order, and consequently 
adherence to them is necessary for its function. 
On the other hand, the social control aspect of 
ideology is found in the imposition of the dominant 
ideological world-view, that of the bourgeoisie, on the 
subordinate working-class as the only social reality. That 
is to say, the subordinate class is said to be living, or 
ought to be living, its social existence, according to the 
social relations and values expressed in the dominant 
ideological community, thus justifying its own preservation 
and domination. 
As Mouffe points out: 
"Expression of general interest does exist, but 
it is always limited to the interests of the 
fundamental class", [ibid., 10]. 
In this way unequal class relations are masked and 
mystified, and as a consequence inhibit the development of 
alternative ideologies to those of the dominant one. 
However, the victory of the dominant ideology is never 
definite in controlling social antagonism, so the 
ideological struggle continues, [ibid: 131]. 
As ideological constructs are not expressed directly 
in class terms nor by class interests, to be operative, 
they have to mediated and mobilised in specific forms of 
processes and institutions [Thompson op.cit: 66]. Gramsci 
concentrated more on the role of the institutions of what 
he called Civil Society. Civil society is comprised of non-
state institutions, lilce the church, media, political 
parties, trade unions, and social formations like the 
family. 
For Gramsci the importance of those institutions 
rested on the fact that they are the social formations that 
consolidate the rule of the hegemonic classes. In 
capitalist society the bourgeoisie exercises its power by 
means of consent and coercion. Consent is generally 
practiced at the civil society level, which refers to the 
realm of culture, while coercion and force are exercised by 
the state, which belongs to the realm of power. 
So the emphasis on the ideological importance of civil 
institutions over the state ones, is due to their generally 
consensus approach in comparison to that of the latter. 
The institutions of the civil society represent the culture 
of the hegemonic classes, their world-view, as it is 
expressed and lived in the everyday lives of people. 
The political struggle between the opposing hegemonic 
classes, is to achieve control over the civil institutions, 
and hence ideological control of a part of the cultural 
milieu of a hegemonic class. Although the civil society is 
not the only field where class hegemony is exercised; as 
Baci-Glucksman says "ideological practices appear already 
in the apparatus of economic production, in the factory", 
[1980: 67]. 
In the case of the subordinate classes in society 
Gramsci believed that their conception of the social world 
is at the level of common sense [Abercrombie op.cit:13]. 
For this reason he saw the role of civil institutions as 
crucial, not only in their capacity as social control 
agents, but also as vehicles of educating the working class 
in order to bring about social transformation. 
Gramsci believed that in the case of the subordinate 
classes in capitalist society, especially for the working 
class, their conception of the world operates as 
"fragmented, incoherent and inconsequential, in conformity 
with the social and cultural position of those masses whose 
philosophy it is", [Abercrombie op.cit: 14]. This is where 
the working class encounters a discontinuation of its 
consciousness, between the experience from its daily 
economic activity, and preconceived ideas about the social 
world. 
Therefore the institutions of the civil society are 
the principal media in transmitting and practicing 
ideologies, and in the case of the bourgeoisie to exercise 
their social control. Because of the dominance of the 
bourgeoisie on these institutions, it appears that there 
are no other alternative ideologies or institutions than 
those of the bourgeoisie. Civil institutions are also 
organizational formations, the arenas of ideological 
struggle, which can raise the class consciousness of the 
working class, they can modify the common sense of workers, 
mobilise them politically. 
For Gramsci the elaboration, interpretation and 
spreading of class and institutional ideologies is the 
function of the intellectuals. Mouffe explains in the 
following passage what Gramsci meant by intellectuals: 
"Eve:^ social group coming into existence on the 
original terrain of an essential function in the 
world of economic activity, creates together with 
itself, organically, one or more strata of 
intellectuals which gives it homogeneity and 
awareness of its own function, not only in the 
economic but also in the social and political 
fields", [op.cit: 140]. 
Thus for Gramsci the intellectuals do not constitute 
independent social formations, but are in fact representing 
the particular ideology of a hegemonic class. In 
articulating these ideologies the intellectuals organise 
and realise the interests of the hegemonic class. The 
intellectuals are characterised by the function they 
perform, which is essentially organizational: 
"Within the realm of the superstructures the 
intellectual perform 'organizational and 
connective' functions within both the area of the 
civil society, or hegemony and the area of 
political society or the state". [Sassoon 1980: 
136]. 
Gramsci identified two types of intellectuals, the 
traditional and the organic, each performing different 
functions at different historical periods [Buci-Glucksman 
1980: 49]. The traditional intellectuals belong to a 
different historical period than that of the new hegemonic 
class. They belong to pre-industrial societies, and usually 
these intellectuals are of the rural type, priests, 
teachers, lawyers and others who are linked to the 
peasantry [Sassoon op.cit: 142-146]. This type of 
intellectuals always claim to be independent and autonomous 
from the dominant social classes and institutions, but this 
evaluation is subjective. 
In the new mode of production, in the capitalist 
society, the traditional intellectuals often become 
irrelevant to the the demands of the new class. However, if 
they are won over by the new dominant class they perform 
for it a different organic function than that of the 
organic intellectuals. And this function has important 
consequences for the political role of the traditional 
intellectuals and the new class [Loc.cit]. This change of 
function happens often with the clergy, whereby it 
consolidates the ideological power of the new class by 
appealing to religious beliefs and ancestral values of the 
masses. 
On the other hand the organic intellectuals are those 
who belong to the same historical period as that of the 
dominant class [Mouffe op.cit: 187]. They constitute the 
organizational and leading elements of the hegemonic 
institutions, and their skills are specialised and 
directive. 
In capitalist society the organic intellectuals are 
technicians, professionals, entrepreneurs and other 
specialists. However, due to the various professional, 
status and class positions they occupy in society, they can 
be non-organic for the dominant class, and ally with the 
subordinate hegemonic class. 
In conclusion then, ideology from a Marxist 
perspective is treated in terms of its operation in the 
transformation of power in society, and its impact on the 
social class relations of individuals and structures. And 
for the concept of ideology to be approached in such a 
way, it has to be placed and analysed within the context of 
the particular social order it operates, and produced. 
At the Scime time Gramsci ' s model provides a 
methodological and analytical approach in understanding the 
operation and impact of ideology at the Civil society 
level. The institutions of the Civil Society are nothing 
else but the materialisation of hegemonic principles in 
institutional formations. The importance of these 
formations lies in their actual and potential ability of 
political mobilization of classes and groups, and in the 
direct role these structures have in transfiguring the 
every day social relations of people. 
The following chapter will deal with the role of 
ideology at the state level, with particular emphasis paid 
t^ the formulation of social policy - for the 
definition and control of social relations. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE STATE, SOCIAL POLICY AND WELFARE 
2.1: The State and Social Policy 
In advanced capitalist societies there are permanent 
structural and social inequalities. These inequalities stem 
from the unequal access and control over the means of 
production, and the means of organization and communication 
of social institutions and other social formations. 
These inequalities can not be resolved in the 
imperfect free market, so the state has been increasingly-
involved in regulating economic and social relations. The 
state can be defined as the sum total of institutions and 
practices, involved in the maintenance and reproduction of 
socio-economic, political and ideological conditions and 
relations, necessary for the survival of a particular 
society [Jakubowicz et.al.l984: 3]. 
In capitalist society, the state performs an important 
ideological function, as it must fulfill two basic and 
often contradictory requirements, the growth of capital 
accumulation and legitimation [George 1984: p.236]. To 
achieve these goals, the state employs various policies, 
which can be defined as economic and social policies 
[Mishra 1981: 78]. 
The economic policies refer to state actions that 
facilitate economic growth, e.g. policies related to 
employment, industry, investment, taxation, etc. Economic 
and social policies are mutually interdependent, and each 
one encompasses elements of the other. 
Social policies refer to concepts and strategies, 
designed to address the conflicting social relations in 
society, and the social inequalities they generate 
[Jakubowicz et.al 1984: op.cit.3]. The social policies' 
purpose is to create a harmonious social environment, 
whereby capital acciimulation can continue uninterrupted. 
Jakubowicz distinguishes four broad goals of social 
policy [ibid., 3-9]: 
1. To improve the living conditions of the population. 
2. To create a cohesive and harmonious social order by 
reducing alienation. 
3. To maintain the existing social order of capitalist 
society. 
4. To exercise social control over elements or 
ideologies that can be disruptive to the system. 
Though all four goals of social policy are 
interrelated the one on social control is the most 
significant because it is in the formulation of social 
policies, where the social control function of state and 
class ideologies is highlighted. It is at this level, where 
various dominant ideologies are expressed and materialised 
in state social policy concepts and strategies. 
Social policy formulation is expressed in the creation 
of pathology models, like poverty, delinquency, ethnicity, 
etc., which contribute to the political stability of the 
social order. The consequences of adoption and 
reinforcement of such pathology models in defining social 
problems is that they: 
"...see such problems as individual, family, or 
group terms rather than in terms of the 
malfunctioning of the economic or social system. 
Challenge to the existing political order is thus 
minimised or avoided. Dominant values and problem 
definitions are strengthened". [George op.cit: 
194] 
The processes of development and selection of social 
policy and strategies, is characterised by continuous 
debates about the values and concepts involved. The debates 
about the values of social policy are in effect ideological 
differences, as to the extent and form of allocating 
resources, the level of appropriation of the social surplus, 
Gough argues that debates over social policy values 
and issues, have more to do with developing ideological 
constructs to interpret a given economic situation, than 
what the situation itself determines: 
"The economic situation dictates nothing. What is 
crucial is how the economic situation is 
interpreted and the priority given to particular 
policies". [Gough 1981, 15]. 
Social policies in post-war advanced capitalist 
societies, have been directed towards the general 
improvement of the welfare of their population. Social 
welfare and the rise of the welfare state are regarded as 
having contributed to the general improvement of living 
conditions in these societies, and to these two issues the 
discussion would now turn. 
2.2: Welfare and the Welfare State 
Marx had found capitalist society antithetical to 
welfare. He believed that in a welfare society, there has 
to be equitable distribution of power and control over the 
the means of production and resources [Mishra op.cit: 72-
74]. This was seen as necessary to satisfy the social and 
human needs of everybody, and to maintain social cohesion 
and solidarity. 
Capitalist society by being unable to provide such a 
form of welfare, has developed its own ideological 
construction of welfare. Mishra has distinguished two 
ideological approaches of social policy to welfare, the 
residual and the institutional [ibid.: 110]. These two 
welfare types provide different ideological explanations of 
the concept of welfare, the definition of welfare needs of 
the individual, and the extent of state intervention. 
The ideological assumptions of the residual type of 
welfare, emphasises minimum state intervention in the 
provision of welfare, usually only for the very needy. The 
mechanisms of the free market are seen as the major source 
of welfare for individuals and groups. 
The concepts of individual initiative and competition 
are reinforced as the necessary primary characteristics to 
take advantage of the opportunities provided in the free 
free market. Under the politically conservative residual 
type, welfare provision is delivered mostly through 
voluntary organizations, while the family and the community 
are encouraged to look after the welfare needs of their 
members. 
For instance in the USA welfare social policy has 
retained a strong residualist form, which has had a drastic 
and painful impact on the American working class. Anderson 
in comparing the impact of the American and W. European 
welfare systems notes, among other things, that the working 
class of the European welfare states has at least been 
spared of the destitution, humiliation and physical neglect 
of their American counterparts [Anderson 1974: pp.257-265]. 
The ideology behind the institutional approach to 
welfare, espouses greater state intervention for the 
allocation of resources which are not easily accessible 
through the free market. These resources are designed to 
guarantee a minimum standard of living, and a greater 
distribution of the social surplus, and at the same time 
preserve the capital accumulation at a profitable level. 
These are the very basic assumptions upon which the 
welfare state has been established, and which will be dealt 
with in more detail, as it is closer to the Australian 
experience. 
The emergence of the welfare state is a phenomenon of 
the post-war economic growth of advanced capitalist 
societies, notably of Britain and N. Europe, and of Social 
Democracy. The creation of the Welfare state represents one 
attempt by the above capitalist countries to address, on 
the one hand the functional needs of capitalism, capital 
accumulation, and on the other hand the issue of 
legitimation by attempting to meet the welfare demands of a 
well organised and unionised working class [Gough op.cit: 
55-74]. 
To achieve the dual goals of capital accumulation and 
legitimation the welfare state has undertaken the 
responsibility of two important functions of capitalist 
society, [a] The production and reproduction of the working 
population, and [b] the maintenance of the non-working 
population [Gough op.cit: pp.44-5]. This responsibility is 
performed by the provision and distribution of the social 
wage. The social wage includes provision for social 
welfare [employment, health, housing, social security, 
personal care services], public education, public utilities 
and transport [Jones 1980: p.3]. 
To the Keyrfsian/Liberal social scientists the welfare 
state has been identified with social justice, equity, and 
a humane response to people's needs, primarily based on the 
rights of citizens to demand this from the state [Misîira 
op.cit:21]. As the welfare state has grown up, it has come 
to be perceived for the general and common interest. 
The welfare state has been responsible for creating an 
image of a capitalist society that enhances human and social 
welfare, so to help to recreate a sense of social relations 
based on common bonds, -to re-establish the community 
spirit- and thus to achieve a more solidary and cohesive 
society. This impression of social solidarity is needed to 
address the high levels of alienation experienced by the 
working class populations of capitalist societies. For this 
reason the form of social control exercised by the welfare 
state, appears to be less coercive, and at least it is so 
when compared to the residual type of welfare. 
Moreover, the welfare state itself is seen as having 
assumed an autonomous position from the bourgeoisie . It is 
thought to be acting as an independent arbiter to conflict-
ing interests, without being seen as an instrument of 
domination. 
Marxist authors, though not in total agreement among 
themselves, are critical of the role and nature of the 
welfare state, and its contradictions. Gough, O'Connor, and 
V.George have developed a class struggle or group model of 
analysis to explain the way social policy is formulated, 
and the emergence of the welfare state. 
According to these theorists the form and content of 
social policy is determined by the level of development of 
a particular economy, and the relative strength of 
competing interest groups or classes, particularly between 
capital and labour. 
In developed capitalist societies social classes are 
not uniform in their composition or interests, and are also 
in alliance with other ones. So they have different 
ideological interpretations and approaches to social policy 
issues, amongst them and even within fragments of the same 
class. 
The acceptance of a particular social policy is 
contingent upon the relative power of group or class forces 
at a given time, which can impose their ideological 
interpretation on the state bureaucracy. The final 
application of social policy, therefore, reflects the 
relative ideological power of classes or groups, as it has 
been mediated through the particular interests of the 
bureaucracy [Jakubowicz et.al. op.cit: 5]. 
Based on this model then, the emergence of the welfare 
state in post-war Britain and N.Europe, is viewed as the 
result of the class struggle between capital and a strongly-
organised labour movement [Gough op.cit: 127]. It was a 
political struggle fought at the state level, with the 
organised labour - in a position to apply more pressure 
for greater welfare provision. 
Sweezy, Bowan and Offe regard the development of the 
welfare state as the functional necessity of capital to 
affect the continuation of capital accumulation, and to 
minimise class conflict. The above authors, in general 
terms, argue that capital accumulation continued to grow, 
because the working class has been incorporated into the 
values of the welfare state, and subsequently accepted the 
social order as it is [Mishra op.cit: 83-6]. 
Most Marxist writers accept that to a certain extent 
the state has acquired some degree of autonomy from the 
domination of the bourgeoisie. State social policy may not 
necessarily serve only the interests of capital, to which 
it can even be against in the short term, but the rest of 
the population [Gough op.cit: 65]. 
Despite this, Marxist authors believe that the welfare 
state does not represent any harmony of interests. As the 
state's role is to maintain the existing social order, 
policies that are directed against the long term interests 
of capital will be undesirable and unworkable. 
This is so, because the state by preserving the 
present social order, seeks to establish its own 
legitimacy, and that of the bourgeoisie. As Anderson 
remarks the welfare state can not represent the interests 
of the working class, because 'power in capitalist society 
derives from wealth, and the capitalist class has a grossly 
disproportionate amount of wealth', [Anderson op.cit: 
p.l2]. 
Offe argues that the principal responsibility of the 
state is to ensure that the process of proletarianization -
the reproduction of labour power- is affected continuously, 
and it is not left up to the individual [Offe 1984:95]. 
What the welfare state does in relation to this 
reproduction of labour power, is to offer the solution of 
the social wage to wage workers to minimise as much as 
possible their reproductive costs. In this way the welfare 
state creates a continuous and expanding pool of potential 
and actual surplus value creators for capital [ibid: 92-
95]. At the same time the welfare state ensures that the 
surplus value produced is maintained at such levels where 
capital accumulation continues to grow. 
According to Offe, the welfare state by being 
perceived by the people as a source of security and 
benefits, has obscured the reality of capitalist relations. 
He regards this perception as having a detrimental effect 
in the development of working-class consciousness and 
organization. In other words, he sees the welfare state 
itself as performing a social control function [ibid: 156]. 
The welfare state creates the perception of two 
separate and divided spheres of working life. The primary 
income distribution- the sphere of work, economy and 
production - and the secondary distribution, the sphere of 
citizenship, the state, and reproduction. The result is 
that: 
"...the structural arrangements of the welfare 
state tend to make people ignore or forget that 
the needs and contingencies which the welfare 
state responds to are themselves constituted, 
directly or indirectly, in the sphere of 
production, and that the welfare itself is 
materially and institutionally constrained by the 
dynamics of the sphere of production and that a 
reliable conception of social security does, 
therefore, presupposes not only the expansion of 
•citizens rights', but of 'workers rights' in the 
process of production", [ibid: 156-57]. 
The welfare state has become the centre of contentious 
interests, and itself a political issue and arena of 
political struggles. Though it has been under attack from 
the Liberals and the Left, for different reasons, both 
sides enjoy/\Socio-economic benefits from the welfare state 
to wish to destroy it. 
Despite this, the economic crisis of the last few 
years in capitalist societies has exposed the fragility 
and inability of the welfare state to affect any 
significant change in the distribution of resources and 
power in society. Marxist authors like Offe, George and 
Gough argue that the welfare state is in a state of crisis. 
V.George, for instance, believes that one of the main 
reasons why the welfare state is undergoing a crisis, and 
has been unable to fulfill its supposedly welfare role, is 
to be found in the following fundamental contradiction of 
capitalism [George op.cit: 237]. And this is, on the one 
hand the ever increasing socialization of costs, and on the 
other hand the continuous private appropriation of surplus 
value and profit. This process has a destructive impact as 
the welfare state: 
"... is torn between public pressure for more 
social services which taxpayers are nevertheless 
unwilling to finance, and demands from capital 
for more support which capital then insists it 
cannot afford to pay for through increased 
taxation". [ibid: 2 4 8]. 
2.3: Personal Care Services or Social Services 
The personal care seirvices [PCS] of the welfare state 
exist to address social problems created by the 
inequalities of the capitalist system in a humane way at 
the individual level. The primairy roles of the PCS are to 
achieve social peace and exercise social control, so that 
capital accumulation can proceed unobstructed. 
Social services promote the impression that they can 
improve, provide solutions, or even ameliorate the existing 
social problems, by addressing the individual needs of 
their clients. By working at the personal level, PCS are 
trying to reduce the level of alienation found in the the 
social relations of individuals. Generally PCS do: 
"..provide and combine elements of control and 
services provisions, impose sanctions and confer 
benefits", [ibid: 12]. 
The definition of clients' needs by PCS is based on 
pathology models, of individualistic, group or family 
characteristics. The PCS are not preventive in character. 
as they address social problems and needs after they have 
occurred in the sphere of socio-economic relations. 
An appropriate example of the the role of PCS is in 
relation to unemployment. Social security services identify 
unemployment as an individual failure, and not as a feature 
of the capitalist economic system. The usually low un-
employment benefit rates and strict eligibility criteria, 
are discouraging people to leave the labour market 
voluntarily, thus enforcing the work ethic. 
The social control value of the PCS is, therefore, 
very important because pathology concepts are exercised at 
the individual level. In this way the PCS help to achieve 
the maintenance and acceptance of dominant ideologies and 
structures, and their subsequent legitimation. 
Offe argues that the PCS of the welfare state are 
repressive in character as: 
"Such repressiveness is indicated by the fact 
that, in order to qualify for the benefits of the 
welfare state, the client must not only prove his 
or her "need", but must also be a d e s e r v -
i n g client, a client, that is, who complies 
with the dominant political and cultural 
standards and norms of the society". [Offe 
op.cit: 155-156]. 
One of the most important consequences of the 
intervention of the welfare state in society, is to 
politicise all social and economic relations. 
Although the intensity of the political conflict can be 
dangerous for the welfare state, its scope can actually 
provide for political stability. As George explains about 
the role of social services in reducing social conflict: 
"...they contrive to turn political debate and 
conflict to the issue of the distribution of the 
national product rather than the mode of 
production - which according to Marxist analysis 
is the crucial determinant of economic and social 
relations.The significance of such a change in 
the pattern of conflict is twofold. First, 
such conflict can be processed on the political 
plane...Second, such conflict becomes group 
conflict rather than class conflict because it is 
detached from the basic class cleavages of 
society. It can therefore be contained within the 
existing political system...". [George op.cit: 
216]. 
The PCS of the state are not the only institutions 
that are involved with welfare provision. The state 
intervenes in other areas of social reproduction to 
sanction other social formations, like those of the 
institutions of the civil society. It is due to the wider 
appeal and apparent consensus practices of these 
institutions to the masses, that the state extends its 
ideological influence. 
This intervention in social formations like the 
family, community institutions, schools, etc., which 
produce and educate wage labourers, is necessary to 
exercise control over their members [Offe op.cit:94]. The 
state has to ensure that the reproductive role of such 
formations remain for the benefit of capital, and are in 
line with the dominant ideologies. 
For instance, in the case of women their role as 
welfare providers for the family members has to be re-
inforced all the time so as to limit the use of social 
services as much as possible, and to continue the sexual 
division of labour. For example this traditional image of 
women is perpetuated through media stereotypes. On other 
hand if women do use PCS, then the latter affect and shape 
the traditional ideologies and expectations of women: 
"Personal social services, by stressing family 
and community care as the natural and proper ways 
to care for the dependent, help to perpetuate 
women's imprisonment in traditional female caring 
roles... community care means family care, family 
care means care by women, care by women means the 
perpetuation of a discriminatory division of 
labour". [George op.cit: 214]. 
One of the strategies to deal with the problem of 
alienation and social conflict in capitalist societies, has 
been the rediscovery of the concept of community work. This 
concept assumes the existence of more affinitive personal 
and social relations based on shared conraion interests. As 
Gough explains the political and strategic value of this 
policy was based on: 
"The development of community work organization 
and development...was intended to incorporate 
poorer working class areas into the restyled 
government by fostering a community 
identification and managing better the conflict 
between groups and various organs of the "local 
state". [Gough op.cit: 139-140]. 
With the introduction of community work, social work 
has become one of the most widely used methods of social 
and individual service provision, primarily designed to 
intervene in working-class families to make them conform 
and control their members' behaviour. Social work was one 
of the first forms of personal care service introduced in 
the early stages of capitalist society, in order the 
bourgeoisie to control and ins-tii working-class families 
with the dominant middle-class values of family 
organization, child rearing techniques and the work ethic 
[George op.cit: 48]. 
As the primary socialization role of the family has 
been largely taken over by other institutions, social work 
functions to reinforce the dominant values, or to re-
socialise individuals or groups into new sets of values. 
With the growth of the welfare state social work has become 
an integral part of social policy, and so too social 
workers have become involved in social control activities, 
and the rationing of scarce resources [ibid: 209-210]. 
Depending on the personal values of the social worker, 
his/her class consciousness, and the ideological 
orientation of the institution he/she serves, can be 
either a social control agent or agent of social change. As 
agents of social change, social workers though may not seek 
the total transformation of society, they can initiate 
social reforms, which can improve the social conditions of 
the marginal groups they represent. 
We now turn to the Australian experience to examine 
the role of ideology in class relations, the social 
policies of the welfare state, and the position and 
relations of migrants to these ideological, economic, and 
socio-political developments. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE ASSIMILATION PERIOD 1947-72 
3.1: Migration and Australia 
The processes of migration and settlement entail 
complex interrelations for the individuals, groups and 
societies involved. To understand these two processes, and 
their consequences, they have to be placed within the the 
specific historical milieu they have evolved. That is to 
say, the capitalist mode of production, the class relations 
and ideologies generated, and the role of state social 
policies in affecting both migration and settlement. 
Migration is not simply based on economic 
considerations, but also on the socio-political and 
cultural relations that exist inside the 'exporting' 
country at the time, in the receiving country, and 
generally in the arena of international capitalist 
relations. So migration to be understood has to be seen: 
"...under the prism of the political and socio-
economic structures of those [underdeveloped] 
countries, whose underdevelopment is not only a 
result of internal idiosyncracies..., but it is 
connected with the historical relationship of 
dependence of these countries on the developed 
capitalist countries, and the position which has 
been determined for them by the latter in the 
international capitalist system of division of 
labour". [Loukopoulos in 'Economic Development 
and Migration in Greece' (ed) Nikolinakos 1974: 
102] [Greek text].* 
In the context of this statement Australia at the end 
of WW II was a developing capitalist society as it 
possessed the necessary preconditions, financial. 
structural, political, and the resources to develop 
industrially. The post-war large scale importation of 
workers to Australia was essential for capitalist and 
demographic growth. Migrant workers provided the necessary, 
ready made, labour power to create surplus value, expand 
markets and consumption, upon which the growth of capital 
accumulation relied. [Jakiibowicz et .al. ,op.cit: 1] 
Australian political parties, business groups, and 
other interest groups, supported this form of economic 
growth and the idea of "populate or perish". The trade 
unions were initially reluctant to support the migration 
program, as they perceived it as a threat to the wages of 
the indigenous working class, but eventually they supported 
it. They supported migration especially when realised that 
non-skilled migrant labour posed no such threat to their 
occupational and social mobility [de Lepervanche in 
•Australian Society' 1984: 197]. 
The policy of^migration has always had a high priority 
for the Australian state as successive Federal governments 
introduced and implemented various policies conducive to 
migration. In an article published in 1950, E.J.B Foxcroft 
of the Department of Immigration, stated clearly the 
benefits of the migration program: 
"At a time when our workforce is little more than 
stationary and when the Australian population 
shows a decreasing ratio of workers to 
dependents...migration helps to rectify this 
imbalance and has a beneficial effect upon our 
population and workforce structure... Many of the 
migrants bring to Australia skills that it has 
cost us nothing to produce, and which are related 
to our most pressing employment needs. Through a 
combination of the special selection of certain 
classes of migrants... it is possible to attack 
some of the most acute bottlenecks in our 
economy". ["The Impact of Migration", issued by 
the Commonwealth Bank, October 1950]. 
Part of the immigration criteria referred to by Fox-
croft, and used throughout the 50s and 60s, were those 
related to the White Australia policy. The selection of 
migrants was based on their work ability and suitability to 
the Australian economy, but also on cultural/racial 
and political criteria. 
Immigration policy had a specific bias towards people 
of Anglo-Celtic background. This formed the basis of the 
White Australia policy, which was designed to maintain the 
cultural uniformity of Australia, by restricting Asiatic 
migration [de Lepervanche op.cit: 170]. However, the 
perpetuation of the Anglo-Celtic dominant class system and 
institutions, could not be maintained intact after 1947. 
Collins argues that this occurred as: 
"The need to fill immigration targets overrode 
the perceived needs to maintain racial purity in 
Australia". [Collins in Bottomley 1984: 4]. 
Indeed non-British migrants constituted 60 percent of 
the post-war Australian migrant intake [Encel in 
•Australian Society* 1984: 2]. At the official level, at 
least, the immigration program was targeted towards skilled 
labour, which was available mainly from the U.K and 
Northern Europe, while unskilled labour was supplied from 
Southern Europe. 
One of the primary reasons why the intake of non-
British labour to Australia increased, especially that of S. 
European, was due to the international capitalist system of 
division of labour during the post-war period [Loukopoulos 
op.cit: 102]. That is to say, after WW II developed 
capitalist countries historically have exported few 
industrial workers, and particularly unskilled ones. 
On the other hand cheap unskilled labour, needed for 
manual repe tative, low-paid and undesirable occupations, 
could only be found in under-developed countries with large 
peasant populations. These countries, like the S.European, 
have traditionally supplied capitalist industrialised 
countries with peasants, who in their majority were 
destined for industrial workers. 
An appropriate example of the socio-economic 
conditions faced by migrants in their countries of origin 
in the 50s and 60s was the case of Greece. According to 
research carried out by the Greek Bureau of Statistics in 
the early 1960s, approximately 800,000 persons, or 23% of 
the total Greek labour force, was either unemployed or 
underemployed [Essays on Greek Migration 1967: 2]. As a 
result between 1961-65, 470,000 persons migrated 
overseas. 
Until the early 70s then the cheap source of migrant 
labour to Australia was provided by S. European countries, 
mainly Italy, Yugoslavia, and Greece. As table [1] 
indicates, migrants from the U.K. comprised more than half 
of the total overseas born population in 1954, while in 
1981 just over one-third. 
Table 1: Total Overseas born Population (%) 
Birthplace 1954 1966 1971 1981 
UK and Ireland 
S. Europe (a) 
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Source ABS 1954, 1966, 1971, 1981. 
Bj/ comparison^ the Southern European 
population increased 9.4% from 1954 to 1966, to reach a 
quarter of the migrant population in 1971, and only to 
decline in 1981, when Australian capital started to import 
unskilled labour from other countries. 
3.2: Migrant Settlement and Social Policy 
The Liberal party remained in power for most of the 
first 25 years of post war migration to Australia. During 
this period, even the importation of migrants had residual 
characteristics, with the majority of U.K. and other N. 
European migrants receiving assistance, while the majority 
of S. European migrants had to pay their own expenses, thus 
their labour power cost even less [Birrell and Birrell 
1981: 54]. 
The period of economic growth and political stability 
in Australia during this period was due to the 
international economic stability and various social 
policies of the Australian state. The arrival of large 
numbers of culturally diverse migrant workers was not 
readily acceptable by the local working-class and Anglo-
Australian bourgeoisie. The Assimilation policy was to 
provide the ideological framework for addressing this 
situation. 
Assimilation was based on the sociological assximption 
that regarded the absorption of the dominant values as a 
natviral process of social adaptation. Failure to do so, was 
seen as an individual incapacity, or anti-social behaviour 
[Jakubowicz vol.3.,no.3, 1983: 51]. 
Assimilation was designed to achieve two social 
control goals. On the one hand to placate the indigenous 
working class from any fears of possible threat to their 
socio-economic and occupational position by migrants. On 
the other hand, migrants, particularly NES working class 
migrants, had to be instilled with the work discipline and 
contained within the dominant values of the host society, 
thus entrenching more the institutional and ideological 
dominance of the Anglo-Australian bourgeoisie. As de 
Lepervanche comments on the ideology of assimilation: 
"The problem of assimilation belonged to the 
immigrants; the host society remained 
unproblematic". [op.cit: 178] 
In this way, assimilation acted as a necessary 
strategy to affect labour discipline, to maintain the 
cultural dominance of Australian institutions and class 
relations, and to achieve capital accumulation rate at its 
maximum capacity. Assimilation, by assuming the eventual 
absorption on NES migrants to the values of the host 
society, side stepped their socio-economic ^ political 
and cultural existence. As a result they were 
restricted in their communities, which became the main 
areas of their socio-political expression, denied them 
wider access to the resources and rewards of the host 
society, while at the same time this expression represented 
a form of resistance to the dominant culture and ideology 
of the host society. 
3.3: The impact of Migrants on the Economy 
Since 1945 the processes of proletarianization and 
urbanization of the Australian workforce continued to 
increase, with 
migration contributing to this acceleration. 
As a result of that the structure and composition of the 
Australian society changed, and so too that of the labour 
force. 
In 1947 72.6% of the total workforce had employee 
status, as compared with 86.7% in 1976, while the 
comparative figures for employer status [6.9%] and self-
employed [12.1%] in 1947, had been reduced to 5.1% and 8.7% 
respectively [Collins op.cit: 10]. 
The impact of migrant workers on the Australian 
economy and labour market is part of a constant debate 
within the general framework of the economic development in 
Australia [Jakubowicz et.al. op.cit: 3]. And the opinions 
on this issue vary considerably. 
Birrell and Birrell [1981] and J.Collins [1984 
op.cit.] have both argued that the major negative effects 
of migration have been the lowering of the living 
standards of the Australian working-class, and impediment 
of technological development. However, each of the authors 
offers different interpretations for these effects. 
The Birrells acknowledge that Australian capital 
relied for its growth on the immigrant labour. The authors 
argue that the primary motive for the continuation of 
migration had more to do with the desire of the Department 
of Immigration to maintain high numerical targets, and 
enhance its position in the bureaucracy, and less with 
employer pressure [Birrell and Birrell op.cit: 67-72]. As a 
result of that the number of S. European unskilled workers 
increased gradually as skilled labour became more scarce. 
In this way the S. Europeans became the only available 
cheap labour to local employers, a ^ were then channelled 
to the dirtiest, low paid and dangerous occupations of 
Australian industry [ibid: 79-109]. These occupations 
became identifiable as migrant occupations, because of the 
type of work they involved, and lack of career prospects, 
which deprived economically NES migrants, while the local 
population avoided them. 
Then the Birrells go on to argue that the impact of 
the unskilled S. European labour on the Australian industry 
was to inhibit the development of technology, and high 
productivity, as the industry adapted to the low skills of 
these workers, and this situation contributed to the 
lowering of living standards [loc cit]. Finally the whole 
migration program created uncontrolled urban growth, and a 
corresponding rise in the cost of infrastructures which 
reduced the availability of scarce capital [ibid: 264]. 
Although some of the Birrells' arguments are valid-
like the creation of 'migrant' occupations and the economic 
deprivation of many S. Europeans- the dynamics of capital 
accumulation are ignored, and so the role of unskilled 
migrant labour in this process is diminished or 
misinterpreted. Labour studies in W.Europe and the USA have 
shown that even for developed capitalist countries, unskil-
led labour is imperative [Piore 1979]. 
Imperative in the sense of filling labour shortages in 
repeatetive, low-paid and dangerous manual occupations 
which are often non-unionised. Unskilled labour is, 
therefore, an important element in the creation of surplus 
value because: 
"Migrants undertake these occupations, not 
because they are illiterate and unskilled, but 
precisely for this reason, by being illiterate 
and unskilled they are necessary". [Loukopoulos 
op.cit: 102]. * 
Even the Birrells themselves point out that the 
existence of quotas and tariffs, the domestic focus of 
industrial output and reliance on the export of primary 
products, increased the the reliance of the local 
manufacturing sector on labour intensive techniques 
[Birrell and Birrell op.cit: 81]. And it would appear that 
the above factors are more responsible for the low 
technological development of Australian industry and its 
low quality products, than the employment of unskilled 
workers. 
Collins views the role of unskilled labour in the 
Australian economy, as the result of capital seeking to 
maximize a low cost labour force and achieve a higher rate 
of capital accumulation [Collins op.cit:l-8]. 
During the process of migration Collins notes that the 
Australian labour market has been fragmented along ethnic, 
sex, occupational and industrial lines [ibid: 11], The main 
labour market fragmentation involves the creation of a 
skilled English-speaking labour force, and an unskilled NES 
labour force. 
This can be seen clearly on table [2] where in 1971 
90.1% of Greek males and 81.8% of Italian were without any 
qualifications, as compared with 71.4% of the total 
population, 62.4% for U.K. and 46.3% for Germany. Among 
females the discrepancy was more pronounced, with only 2.5% 
of the Greek females and 3.6% of the Italian having some 
form of qualifications, in comparison to 12.3% of the total 
population and 33.3% of German uior̂ e'vu. 
Table 2 : Population over 15 years of age: Level of 
qualifications by Year, Birthplace and Sex. (%) 
Birthplace Year Level of Qualifications 
¡Bach. Degree | Trade Qual 
Australia 







1 9 7 1 I 
1 9 8 1 I 
1 9 7 1 I 
1 9 8 1 I 
1 9 7 1 I 
1 9 8 1 I 
1 9 7 1 I 
1 9 8 1 I 
1 9 7 1 I 
1 9 8 1 I 
1 9 7 1 I 
1 9 8 1 I 
1 9 7 1 I 
1 9 8 1 I 
M 
2 . 4 
3 . 9 
2 . 3 
3 . 6 
2 . 4 
3 . 6 
0.2 
1.0 
0 . 4 
1.1 
N / A 
0 . 9 
2 . 4 
3 . 7 
M 
0 . 9 
1.8 
0 . 9 
1 . 7 
1.2 
1 . 9 
0.1 
0 . 4 
0.1 
0 . 4 
N / A 
0 . 3 
0 . 9 
1 . 9 
I 1 6 . 7 
I 1 7 . 0 
I 2 3 . 9 
I 2 1 . 3 
I 4 0 . 3 
I 3 7 . 3 
I 8 . 4 
I 9 . 2 
! 1 6 . 0 
I 1 6 . 3 
I N / A 
10.0 
I 1 7 . 9 
I 1 7 . 3 
4 . 9 
5 . 0 
6.1 
5 . 5 
8 . 4 
7 . 8 
1 . 5 
1 . 7 
1.8 
2.0 
N / A 
1 . 5 
5 . 0 
4 . 9 
No Qual. 
M 
7 3 . 0 
5 8 . 5 
6 2 . 4 
5 3 . 5 
4 6 . 3 
3 6 . 5 
9 0 . 1 
7 9 . 1 
81.8 
7 1 . 2 
N / A 
7 4 . 5 
7 1 . 4 
5 7 . 3 
8 7 . 7 1 
7 0 . 8 1 
86.11 
7 2 . 7 1 
8 0 . 7 1 
6 6 . 7 1 
9 7 . 5 1 
8 7 . 0 1 
9 6 . 4 1 
86.01 
N / A 
8 3 . 0 
8 7 . 7 I 
7 0 . 7 1 
*Trade qualifications include technical and trade. 
Source ABS 1971, 1981. 
By 1981 the respective male and female qualification 
levels for all groups had shown increases, but still 
Greeks and Italians retained low levels. Very few NES 
workers had the time, opportunity and assistance to gain 
additional qualifications. 
3 . 4 : The Welfare of Migrants 
The Australian welfare state that emerged after the 
war developed in an unplanned and ad hoc way, and never 
really developed to the extent of the N. European welfare 
states [Jones op.cit: 2 ] . Australia was spending 9.6% of 
its GDP in welfare in the early sixties, while the average 
OECD figure was 13.2%, Austria's 19.6%, U.K.12.6%, and the 
U.S 10.2%. In the mid seventies Australian welfare 
expenditure had risen to 12.8%, but still below the OECD 
average of 18.8%, 7% less than Italy's and just .9% more 
than that of Greece's [ibid:46]. 
The welfare state in Australia has been traditionally-
conservative towards social policy, with little future 
planning, and a strong reliance on the values of self-help, 
the work-ethic, and the deserving needy. This form of 
residual social policy has been employed by the Liberal 
governments, while the ALP, being a Social-Democratic 
party, tends to support more state intervention in society. 
During the fifties and sixties, when the Liberals 
dominated Federal politics, there was very little done by 
the Australian state to increase the social wage. The main 
reason the Australian state adhered to residual welfare 
policies, was that political stability and economic growth 
justified the role of the free market as the main welfare 
distributor, and thus encouraged self-help welfare 
policies. 
The assimilation policy had various negative 
consequences for the welfare of migrants. Firstly, it 
justified, ideologically, the fragmentation of the labour 
force along ethnic lines, which disadvantaged NES migrants 
occupationally, socially and economically, while the 
identification of 'migrant' occupations contributed in 
weakening the ideological insight of workers' solidarity on 
a non-racial/cultural basis. 
To a large extent, trade 
unions followed assimilationist policies, which did not 
encourage or support the participation of NES migrants in 
the decision making process [L.Nikolaou, Occasional Papers 
EAC of NSW, 1986, no.10, pp.1-25]. Due to this attitude of 
unions, NES migrants could not push for their particular 
welfare needs through the labour union movement, and this 
might explain the present character of migrant welfare. 
Secondly, the process of proletarianization had a 
great impact on the class structure of pre-war migrant 
communities. The post-war arrival of many industrial 
workers, who entered pre-war established communities of 
their countrymen, reversed the pre-war dominance of ethnic 
petit- bourgeois economic activity. This process was also 
affected by the increasing productive activity of 
monopolies and multinationals, which broke down the old 
mode of production and services. 
This last observation is made by Collins, who notes 
that in 1947 28.4% of the total Greek and Cypriot 
population, and 16.7% of Germans were employers, and 21.5% 
and 20.3% respectively were self-employed [Collins op.cit: 
14]. In 1976 the figures for the same groups were 6% and 
5.4% [employers], and 12.6% and 9.5% [s.employed], while 
all ethnic groups had employment status characteristics 
closer to the national figure than in 1947. 
This class restructuring of many NES communities and 
the political isolation of assimilation, made the former 
the only outlet for socio-political expression and 
organization. There was an intense political conflict, as 
new ideological forms were developed for the re-alignment 
of class relations, and the control of institutions in the 
quest for more power, control and status. 
Thirdly, the residual character of social welfare 
during this period was felt more strongly by NES migrants. 
Despite the general low level of welfare provision, 
noticeably in personal care services, the assimilationist 
state attitude excluded migrants from access to many 
benefits. Studies on the living conditions of NES migrants 
during this period, though they brought into light their 
welfare problems, they identified these problems in terms 
of various pathology models, mostly as being problems 
related to poverty [Cox and Martin 1975]. 
Most personal services for NES migrants could only be 
provided within their communities, by institutions which 
could not deal with the complexities of industrial and 
urban life, and limited themselves to individual cases of 
the deserving needy . 
The family was another important welfare institution 
for NES migrants that became increasingly demanding on its 
women members. This was so, as the low wages of their 
husbands left many married migrant women with no option but 
to enter the workforce in order to increase the family's 
income, while at the same time they had to perform their 
traditional roles of housekeepers and emotional providers 
of the family. In 1971 married migrant women constituted 
33% of the total married female workforce, though they 
comprised 25% of all the married women in Australia 
[de Lepervanche op.cit: 207]. 
Marital and familial relations among S. Europeans were 
under continuous stress due to the migration process, 
economic insecurity, and anxiety in a new socio-cultural 
environment. The lack of primary supporting networks, like 
in the case of Greek women, was an additional burden, as 
well as the lack of child care provision [Cox and Martin 
op.cit: 30]. 
The main welfare distributor during this period was 
the labour market. Full employment and conservative 
residual state policies, despite the low wages and hard 
working conditions experienced by NES workers, were 
sufficient reasons to limit any form of protest for better 
state welfare services. 
Overall, during the assimilation period the cost of 
production and reproduction of migrants was kept into a 
minimum level, while their productive capacity of surplus 
value at a maximum one. The exclusion of NES migrants from 
the secondary income distribution of production, which was 
supported by their lack of political participation, was an 
effective method of social control and enforcer of the work 
discipline. According to Jakubowicz: 
"Migrants were thus supposed to have minimal 
impact on the fabric of Australian social 
relations, and migrant women were assumed to be 
totally invisible. Any process or action which 
hightened visibility had to be prevented. Thus 
national groups as avenues for the delivery of 
any service were anathema - the national(or 
ethnic) group was seen as the major barrier to 
assimilation. Any problems experienced by 
immigrants had to be the result of the individual 
incapacity or pathology, either medical or 
psychological. Non-British migrants would have to 
earn their social rights through years of labour 
and taxation, only then would they be permitted 
to enjoy the social provision of an increasingly 
affluent society [et.al., op.cit: 27]. 
What was to change migrant social policies after the 
mid 60s was the NES migrants' increasing social awareness 
of their inequality, the growing questioning of the 
legitimacy of the Australian state and its institutions, 
of the Anglo-Australian bourgeoisie, and the deepening 
economic crisis of Australian capitalism in the 1970s. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE MULTICULTURAL PERIOD - 1975 TO PRESENT 
4.1: Towards Multiculturalism - Integration 
In the late 60s and early 70s Australian capitalism 
and the Australian state experienced a period of 
legitimation crisis [Jakubowicz in Bottomley op.cit: 28-
48]. That is, in general terms the social policies of the 
state were proving ineffective in their attempts to 
legitimise the social position of institutions and 
practices of Australian capitalism. 
According to Jakubowicz this legitimation crisis was 
precipitated by: 
"The increasing concentration and centralisation 
of the processes of capital accumulation during 
the 1960s had created an intensification of 
social dislocation and an increase in demand for 
collectively provided (state) services...The 
essential 'political' problems became those of 
diminishing the pressure by social movements and 
organised labour for greater state expenditure", 
[ibid: 29]. 
This Marxist interpretation of the Australian state 
legitimation crisis, is explained in terms of the inability 
of the state to satisfy the contradictory needs of capital 
accumulation and legitimation in capitalist societies 
[George op.cit: 239]. Habermas, among other Marxist authors 
like Offe and Gough, argued that this legitimation crisis is 
inherent in the capitalist mode of production. And this 
crisis is expressed in the failure of various system levels-
economic, administrative, legitimation, and socio-cultural-
to produce the necessary results to satisfy both capital 
accumulation and the acceptance of capitalism [Loc.cit]. 
The failure of the various system levels is mainly due 
to the contradiction experienced between the assumed state 
of socio-economic relations espoused by the bourgeoisie and 
the state, and the social reality experienced by the working 
class. This contradiction occurs because for capital 
accumulation to continue to grow in advanced capitalist 
Joe 
societies, exploitation has to^made legitimate, and for this 
reason adherence to more democratic principles and practices 
are needed at the same time to secure popular acceptance and 
obedience to the whole social structure. 
However, democratic ideas challenge the legitimacy of 
accumulation, and the most fundamental expression of this 
contradiction is found in the increasing socialisation of 
social costs, and on the other side in the private 
appropriation of profit and surplus value. As George remarks 
about the role and position of the welfare state in relation 
to this contradiction: 
"If the state does more to aid accumulation, as 
it must if private capital is to remain 
profitable, it must at the same time, spend more 
on welfare and social control if its legitimacy 
is to be safeguarded".[ibid: 238] 
So in the late 60s the migrant presence became also a 
part of the legitimation crisis facing the Anglo-Australian 
ruling class and institutions, and the state. There were a 
variety of reasons contributing to this crisis. Foremost was 
the realisation that the policy of assimilation was becoming 
increasingly unworkable: 
"(Assimilation) failed to implement those goals 
of cultural, normative economic integration of 
migrants into a unitary Australian society". 
[Jupp et.al. 1984: 19]. 
What this failure meant in effect was that the 
consequences of assimilation policy -the proletarianization 
of migrants and their incorporation into the dominant class 
values and institutions- had undermined social peace and the 
legitimacy of those same forces that had promoted it in the 
first place [Jakubowicz et.al. op..cit: 41]. 
The failure of assimilation became gradually more 
evident in various social studies of the period, which 
showed the many social problems facing NES migrants and 
their children, health and mental problems, educational 
problems of children, 'povertyhigh housing costs, and a 
general lack of welfare provision. Tue Commission of 
Inqui3:y into Poverty, for instance, provided an overview of 
the social and welfare problems encountered by NES migrants, 
as they had accumulated in the first 25 years of post-war 
migration [Cox and Martin 1975: 5-19]. 
Although by the late 60s most migrants had acquired 
citizenship and voting rights, their social status and 
political power had remained marginalised within their own 
communities. This status marginalisation and rejection was 
felt mostly by the ethnic petit-bourgeoisie, who resented 
the stigmatisation of their ethnic identity as an obstacle 
to forge closer relations and alliances with the Australian 
ruling class and state [Jakubowicz in Bottomley op.cit: 28]. 
The civil rights movement of the period, with its calls 
for equal citizenship rights and a more equitable and humane 
involvement of the state in social life, provided the right 
ideological terrain for the ethnic petit-bourgeoisie to 
advance ethnic rights. The political mobilisation and 
demands of the ethnic petit-bourgeoisie to a large extent 
represented those of their own ethnic working class, but at 
the same time it was a reaction by the former to re-
establish their legitimacy. 
After many years of residual state policies, ethnic 
community institutions had reached a stage where they could 
not cope any longer with the complex demands and social 
problems of their working class members. This inability of 
ethnic institutions, together with the political 
unrepresentativeness of the ethnic petit-bourgeoisie, had 
undermined their legitimacy in their own communities, and 
made their calls for political participation, civic equality 
and welfare provision more vocal and urgent. 
Another contributory factor that undermined 
assimilation was the fact that in the late 60s departures 
exceeded arrivals as migrants found unsatisfactory working 
and living conditions in Australia, wUile W. Europe was 
absorbing more S. European immigrants. 
Already from the mid-sixties the state had reacted to 
these events by introducing progressively some integrative 
social policies to cope with the influx and settlement of 
migrants. The Good Neighbour Council, the introduction of 
the GIA program in 1968, some interpreting services, were 
among the first attempts to provide some forms of personal 
social services to migrants. 
Simultaneously, integration, though not yet the 
dominant issue of ethnic social policy, was receiving more 
attention as a possible future ideological form in shaping 
the social relations of migrants. Martin's comments on 
integration, and the problems of practical application it 
presented, were among the most articulate and influential of 
the period [J. Martin 1972]. 
With the election of the ALP to power in 1972 
assimilation policy was officially abandoned in favour of 
integration. The main proponent of this policy was the then 
Minister of Immigration A1 Grassby, who perceived 
integration as an ideology and policy able to achieve a 
unitary society based on the cultural diversity of its 
population. 
Whereas assimilation assumed the unproblematic nature 
of the host society and the inevitability of absorption of 
migrants into it, integration accepted the cultural 
pluralism of Australian society and a normative peaceful 
co-existence and competition between equally powerful groups 
[de Lepervanche op.citz 184-5]. What integration sought to 
do was to accept the cultural identity of migrants as a 
civil right, and humanise the process of proletarianization 
of NES migrant worlcers by increasing the provision of 
welfare services for them. 
Thus the socio-political isolation and rejection 
experienced by NES migrants under assimilation, was 
interpreted by integration as the failure of the state to 
accept and understand as legitimate their cultural identity. 
The cultural intolerance of NES migrant workers was 
recognised by the state as the primary source of their 
socio-economic inequality, while the vigorous and 
di lapi<3iating process of proletarianization of individuals 
and families, and their consequences, were ignored or at 
least it was assumed that increased welfare provision could 
ameliorate them. The main objective of integration then was 
to create social peace and order among the working class 
population, which were essential for the continuation of 
capital accumulation in an economy entering a deep and 
protracted economic crisis after 1973. 
Integration was in line with other interventionist 
policies of the ALP, and after 1972 the lobbying by rival 
intra and inter ethnic petit-bourgeoisie groups and 
institutions, like the AGWS in Melbourne and Co-Assit in 
Sydney, intensified in search for more state funds for 
welfare programs and access to other state resources. 
During this period the priority for the state was that 
gradually incorporated and co-opted ethnic leaders within 
existing bureaucracies, while at the same time sanctioned 
and helped the establishment of of some ethnic institutions, 
e.g the E.C.Cs, A.E.C.C. 
Generally integration policy had a great impact on NES 
migrants, who for the first time received an official 
recognition of their existence, even though it was a 
limited one. Eventually though the ALP never managed to 
formulate an applicable migrant policy, as integration was a 
new concept, and also stayed in office for a short period of 
time. Moreover, the assimilationist attitudes of the 
bureaucracy were another obstacle for the formulation and 
implementation of migrant policies. 
Multiculturalism was to provide the ideological and 
practical framework for solutions to manage the migrant 
presence after 1975. It was the policy of multiculturalism 
that really asserted and establishflblethnicity as the 
principal determinant factor in interpreting migrants'social 
existence. 
4.2: Theories of Ethnicity 
Ethnicity has become an important topic of discussion 
among social theorists worldwide, because as a set of 
relationships based on primordial non-'rational' concepts 
it 
has managed to survive and gain a high profile within 
capitalist relations of production. These relations to 
operate effectively have to be defined by rational concepts 
to support the continuous increase of capital accumulation. 
Despite this not only the concept of ethnicity, but other 
non-'rational• concepts like race, religion, dominant ideas 
about the role of women have continued to exist under 
capitalist relations, which points out to their value as 
ideological forms of social control by the ruling 
bourgeoisie. 
The issue of ethnicity became a part of Australian 
social literature during the late sixties, and gained more 
prominence in migration and settlement discussions in the 
following decade with the advent of multiculturalism. 
Mainstream discussions on ethnicity have been dominated 
mainly by two theories, the one that treats ethnicity as a 
cultural experience and the other as a status 
characteristic. Marxist analysis of ethnicity is another 
theory, which will be considered first and compared and 
contrasted with the mainstream theories. 
Bonacich in her class model of ethnicity has treated 
the concept as a socially created one, as an ideology, which 
although it calls upon primordial symbols and attributes 
based on a common ancestry, these must be activated within 
concrete historical, economic and socio-political conditions 
[E. Bonacich,'Class Approaches to Ethnicity and Race', 
Insurgent Sociologist,, Vol.X, No.2, 1980: 11]. That is to 
say, the nature and structure of the ethnic group will be 
determined by both the 'ethnic characteristics of the 
group, and the material conditions encountered by it in the 
new environment. 
Ethnic groups have a material basis in the means of 
production and because of that class differentiation occurs 
due to the different structural positions occupied by the 
people sharing the same ethnicity. The conflict arising out 
of this class differentiation is over the definition of the 
group's ethnicity, and takes the form of ideological 
struggle. Although intra-ethnic conflict is class based it 
is not necessarily expressed or perceived a such, but more 
as a political conflict [ibid: 9-21]. 
For this reason Bonacich regarded ethnic groups as 
essentially political groups whose dominant class mobilises 
the rest of the group, by appealing to the ethnic 
symbolizations of the group in order to acquire more 
political and economic resources. In doing so the dominant 
ethnic class acquires more power to determine, or rather to 
define the 'ethnicity' of the subordinate ethnic class. 
Australian class theories on ethnicity have been 
dominated mainly by discussions from Jakubowicz [1983, 
1984,1985], and de Lepervanche [1980, 1984]. Jakubowicz's 
general argument on ethnicity has been that, although it may 
not directly derive from class relations or expressed in 
such terms, ethnicity has to be treated in terms of its 
ideological function in affecting class relations in 
Australian society [Jakubowicz et.al op.cit: 16-17]. 
Moreover, the everyday relations of migrants do not 
constitute a form of false consciousness as they refer to a 
certain reality, however transfigured it may be. 
In Jakubowicz's view ethnicity's interpretation and 
application in state social policies, has been used as an 
ideological tool to reconstruct social relations at times of 
capitalist crisis in order to maintain capital accumulation 
and legitimise the Australian state and the Anglo-Saxon 
dominant class. At the same time ethnicity as expressed in 
the form of multiculturalism is a ruling class ideology 
that aims to achieve social order, and maintain social 
control by masking and mystifying migrant class people's 
social relations and inequalities. In this way migrants 
perceive their social existence mainly as related to their 
ethnic background, and unconnected with the means and 
relations of capitalist production. 
The development of multiculturalism has also been 
explained by Jakubowicz as part of the overall neo-
conservative ideology that was advocated by the Liberal 
government after 1975. During this period Federal social 
policies incorporated residual forms of welfare provision to 
migrants, and conservative perceptions about the nature of 
the individual [Jakubowicz in G.Bottomley 1984:28-48, and in 
Ethnic Politics in J. Jupp (ed), 1984: 14-28]. 
For de Lepervanche the emergence of ethnicity as a 
determining concept of migrants' social relations in 
Australia, is but another form of racism which has been a 
part of capitalism ever since its emergence and its 
imperialist adventures in non-European countries [G. 
Bottomley and M. de Lepervanche 1984, op.cit: 49-71]. 
In another paper though de Lepervanche argued the 
following as the main reasons for the promotion of ethnic 
heterogeneity and cultural pluralism after 1973: 
"Ethnocentricism in home affairs was no longer an 
appropriate public stand. Ethnicity emerged as a 
crucial variable in Australian class society. 
When harnessed by the state and promoted as 
multiculturalism, it gave priority to ethnic 
rather than class differences, and thus provided 
an effective means of social control". [de 
Lepervanche op.cit:184]. 
Other authors who have taken consideration of the class 
implications of ethnicity in their research have been 
F.Mackie [1982], and by M. Humphrey [1984]. For example, 
Humphrey in his book 'Family, Work and Unemployment: A study 
of Lebanese settlement in Sydney' notes about the Lebanese: 
"Social inequality in Australian society does not 
primarily derive from membership in an ethnic 
group. Inequality is mainly determined by the 
class structure. Individuals from the same ethnic 
group may share a common class position in 
Australia but this is not primarily a product of 
their ethnic origin but their former class status 
in their home society...But while class may 
largely determine relative disadvantage in 
Australian society, ethnic discrimination may 
reinforce it", [pp.1-2]. 
The development of an ethnic group through the process 
of inigî ŝ tion entails the re—definition of its primordial 
identity in the new socio-cultural environment. This 
reinterpretation of cultural symbolisations involves a 
continuous synthesis of selection and manipulation, both 
inside and outside the ethnic group. So what becomes 
important about an ethnic group are not the symbolisations 
themselves, but in the way these symbolisations are 
reproduced and used [Kakakios in G.Bottomley op.cit: 145]. 
A class analysis of ethnicity, therefore, treats the 
concept itself as an ideology, while methodologically as 
descriptive, as a means of identifying a group of people 
distinct from another due to their ethnic characteristics. 
The most common theoretical approach to define 
ethnicity is the culture approach. According to this theory 
culture is the pattern of ideas, values, beliefs and 
practices into which people are socialised. Ethnicity and 
the ethnic group, therefore, are defined by a common 
culture, shared religious beliefs, which are transmitted by 
language or by primordial symbols and attributes based on 
common ancestry [Bostock 1977: 1-7]. 
This theory views language as having the central role 
in the socialization of the individual and of the group, as 
socialization transmits and maintains cultural identity, 
solidarity and consciousness. Since socialization into 
cultural norms constitutes the premises of action for the 
individual and the group, those ethnic members with similar 
cultural background engage into similar patterns of activity 
[Loc.cit]. 
Within this concept of ethnicity then the individual is 
treated as an unchangeable cultural agent, living in a 
homogenous and cohesive group. Conflict arises only when 
there is absence of socialization to the core values of the 
group. This theory of ethnicity implies that the social 
existence and action of members of the ethnic group, or of 
the ethnic group itself, are directed by the common desire 
of all members to preserve their ethnicity, because the 
preservation of primordial characteristics is seen as an 
important activity in binding the ethnic group together. 
This formulation of ethnicity offers very little to the 
understanding of both the ethnic group and of the cultural 
process itself. The fundamental assumption of this 
interpretation of ethnicity is aptly summed up by Jakubowicz 
who argues that: 
"The most important component of such a view is 
that ethnicity transcends economic divisions, and 
and implicitly contains a social order which all 
participants internalise as legitimate". 
[Jakubowicz et.al. op.cit: 11]. 
In other words the gender and class relations of the 
members of the ethnic group are not addressed, their social 
relations and inequalities are attributable to their 
culture, rather than to the capitalist system and the 
hegemonic ideology that defines them. On the other hand 
culture is not immutable, but is activated and reinterpreted 
within a given social and political milieu to meet the new 
social and cultural demands of the individual and the group. 
Multiculturalism's interpretation of ethnicity is based 
on this model of culture, while ethnic communities have been 
treated as homogenous entities. The idea behind this is for 
an ethnic culture to continue to exist, and therefore the 
cohesive relations of the group and the community spirit 
to be maintained -to maintain social order and avoid 
conflict- then the primordial characteristics of the group 
have to be recognised and preserved. The consequences of 
this policy have been to obstruct the migrant working class 
of the ideological means to develop alternative forms of 
social organization and action. 
However, Australian mainstream theories on ethnicity 
have been greatly influenced by the work of Glazer and 
Moynihan [1975a], and Weber's concept of status inequality. 
Glazer's study on ethnicity was mainly drawn from the 
nationalist movements of the underdeveloped countries and 
the civil rights movement of Blacks in the USA. His general 
argument is that the political mobilization of these 
ethnic/racial minorities was based on forms of self 
identification and conflict defined by ethnic criteria, 
rather than class criteria. 
Glazer defines ethnicity as a common culture shared by 
people from the same national origin, with shared historical 
experience and language [ibid: 18]. In comparison to the 
culture model of ethnicity, this model treats ethnicity as a 
status attribute, and the ethnic group as a status group 
motivated by material interests, rather than the primordial 
characteristics that constitute it [ibid: 1-25]. 
Moynihan and Glazer are treating ethnic groups as 
status hierarchies groups operating within a system of 
closure [Jalcubowicz et.al.op.cit: 12-13]. That is to say, 
the cultural tolerance shown by the dominant group will 
determine the position of the ethnic group in the 
stratification ladder. The ethnic group mobilises its 
ethnicity when it feels marginalised, particularly in terms 
of social esteem. This feeling of marginalisation is 
expressed by the ethnic intelligentsia who feel most 
isolated, ignored or obstructed by the dominant cultural 
group and the state. 
In this process the ethnic intelligentsia presents 
itself as representing the interests and feelings of the 
whole ethnic group, and expresses its feeling of cultural 
denial and esteem by challenging the legitimacy of the 
state and of the dominant group, by questioning the lack of 
access to resources and democratic rights as espoused by 
the latter. 
Once the state recognises and accommodates the demands 
of the ethnic intelligentsia, social integration and order 
are established. The state, therefore, becomes the arbiter 
and distributor of social, political and material 
resources. As Glazer points out: 
"The strategic efficacy of ethnicity (is) in 
making legitimate claims on the resources of the 
state". [Glazer and Moynihan op.cit: 11]. 
This theory has been used extensively by Martin 
[1978], Encel [1981] and Birrell and Birrell [1981] to 
analyse the emergence of the concept of ethnicity in 
Australia, to interpret the migrants' mobilisation after 
the 70s, and for social policy applications. 
This position has been further discussed more recently 
by Encel, McCall and Burnley [1985]. In the introductory 
chapter of their book 'Immigration and Ethnicity in the 
1980s', the authors' arguments on ethnicity run along the 
theory of status hierarchies. They argue that the 
analytical validity of the ethnicity concept lies in its 
ability, amongst other things, to expose unequal social and 
ideological relations, which are to a certain extent 
independent from class relations [ibid:1-10]. 
In support of their arguments the authors raise the 
point that there is always a state supported hegemonic 
definition of cultural reality to which ethnic 
particularism represents a challenge [ibid: 10]. 
Assimilation and integration policies then are two examples 
that demonstrate the prevention or weakening of closure by 
the dominant majority in view of the challenge presented by 
the ethnic group. 
Under multiculturalism the barriers of ethnic closure 
have been lowered. This is more evident in the area of 
welfare provision, which is seen by the ethnic elites as a 
means to act as welfare mediators between the state and 
their communities, obtain positions in the bureaucracy and 
compete for scarce state resources [ibid: 29]. 
The status hierarchy approach provides a more dynamic 
analysis to the concept of ethnicity than the cultural 
model. However, this analysis fails to locate the different 
class positions occupied by members of social groups, thus 
failing to explain the material dominance of one group over 
the other, and consequently the contradictory inter and 
intra group relations and conflicts that develop because of 
that [Jakubowicz et.al. op.cit: 16]. For this reason a 
status interpretation of ethnicity will pose significant 
methodological problems at the intra-group level of 
analysis. 
A relevant example of the application of the status 
analysis to ethnicity and race is the experience of Blaclcs 
in the USA. The Blaclc civil rights movement in the USA in 
the 1960s achieved the recognition of the racial 
characteristics of Blaclcs as a civil right, and therefore 
their right participate equitably in all aspects of social 
life. 
Twenty years later the middle class Blaclc Americans 
have achieved equal status li]ce their White peers, but the 
vast majority of Blaclcs still occupy the fringes of 
American society living in a vicious cycle of poverty and 
racism, which they find increasingly hard to bradc away 
from. 
This example shares many similarities with the present 
situation in Australia, where the ethnic middle class has 
achieved a degree of recognition by the ruling Anglo-
Australian class, while working class migrants and marginal 
groups are slipping down the stratification ladder in 
greater numbers than before. 
4.3: Multiculturalism under the Liberals 1975-83 
In 1975 the conservative Coalition parties came to 
power with the intention to reverse the more institutional 
social policies of the ALP. The general direction of the 
state social policies during this period were residual in 
approach, emphasising the values of the free market and 
self-help welfare methods. 
Such policies were deemed as necessary by the state to 
address the growing economic and social policies of 
Australia. In terms of social welfare, the state 
incorporated the same conservative ideological concepts in 
the form of increased payment of cash benefits closer to 
the poverty line, voluntary services, and to minimise 
universalistic programs, like the abolition of Medicare. 
Migrant related social policies were dominated by the 
same ideological concepts and strategies. One of the first 
acts of the Fraser government was the re-establishment of 
the Dept. of Immigration, which had been abolished in 1974. 
In 1976 the ethnic Affairs section was added to the 
Department [ROMMPAS 1986:32-33]. 
This reshuffling was necessary for the government to 
formulate a more effective policy strategy of integration, 
which was latter came to be known as Multiculturalism. The 
government initiated various reports and inquiries to 
define and implement its migrant policy. The Bailey report 
of 1976 proposed that mainstream services ought to be 
relative to the needs of migrants, as they are with the 
general population [Jakubowicz et.al.,op.cit;72]. 
The same report also proposed a review of the role of 
the conservative Good Neighbourhood Councils, and the 
transfer of post-arrival responsibilities to DIEA, which 
happened in 1977. In the same year the Australian Ethnic 
Affairs Council, which had been appointed by DIEA, 
recommended what it believed were the guiding principals 
for a multicultural society. The recommended principles 
were social cohesion, cultural maintenance, equality of 
opportunity and access. 
These state bureaucratic developments, also reflected 
the ongoing struggle Aantagonistic ethnic petit-bourgeois 
groups, to gain more access to state resources. This 
struggle was intense due the structural differentiation 
occurring among the ethnic groups: 
"The deeper structural issues were those of an 
industrial working class in a declining 
industrial sector,which lacked representation, 
power and control, having their interests 
projected by a leadership which was increasingly 
"of them", though not necessarily "for them". The 
most effective advocates of ethnic rights 
perspectives, such as those in the Greek welfare 
in Melbourne, were arguing that services could be 
best designed and provided by the ethnic 
communities- that is, by the bourgeoisie and 
intelligentsia of those communities on behalf of 
their own working class". [Jakubowicz op.cit:68] 
The Galbally Report of 1978 on 'Migrant Services and 
Programs: report of the review of post-arrival programs and 
services for migrants', proved to be the watershed policy 
for Australian migrants. The Galbally report was presented 
in 1978 to the government, which contained the basic 
principles of the Liberal's neo-conservative, that is the 
belief that the free market is the major welfare 
distributor and self-help concepts on welfare [Jakubowicz 
in Bottomley 1984: 43]. 
The recommendations of the Galbally report, and 
their subsequent implementation, shaped up to the present 
date migrant social policy. The Report's implementation of 
multiculturalism was based on the concept of recognising 
ethnic communities as whole uniform entities, with no 
conflicting interests among their members. The ethnic 
community was identified as a form of organization, where 
it could act as^resource pool and structure for welfare 
provision. In this way, the ethnic community became a major 
organizational form of reproductive responsibility for the 
migrant working class. 
The Report also recommended the extension of the GIÀ 
program, so that ethnic institutions and other generalist 
welfare organizations could employ social workers of 
ethnic background. One of the reasons of establishing 
ethno-specific services, was their low cost of operation. 
The GIÀ grant never reached a level of financial adequacy, 
thus forcing ethnic communities self-help methods, on 
volunteers, charity, and donations. 
However, the most important reason for the funding of 
ethnic institutions was the favourable support of the 
community concept among conservative ethnic bourgeoisie, 
and specifically by religious institutions. Conservative 
ethnic institutions were targeted as the main recipients 
of state welfare funds, and in the process they become 
mediators between the state and the members of their 
communities. 
The emphasis of the Galbally report on the provision 
of personal care services to migrants through volunteer 
ethnic and non—ethnic community organizations, was to 
certain extent an unavoidable policy, as at that particular 
time there were no such services available in the the 
government sector. This policy decision showed also the 
lack of political and ideological commitment of the state 
to quality and equatable migrant welfare service. 
The real value of the PCS is to be found in their 
immediate form of social control they can exercise at the 
individual and group level. PCS by their very nature, are 
located at the end of the productive and reproductive 
processes of capitalist society, where they supposed to 
piece together people or groups who have suffered from 
these processes. 
NES migrants have gone through such processes, and the 
economic recession, high unemployment, and falling 
standards of living, made PCS necessary instruments of 
control for any social discontent. So ethnic welfare 
institutions that received funds, and notably conservative 
ones, used social work and workers as methods to control 
their own working class. 
These conservative organizations and practices, 
introduced niigrant working class and other disadvantaged 
groups to the dominant values of Australian society. They 
have sought to contain them, and thus to restrict any 
alternative forms of ideology and organization. 
Another notable recommendation of the Galbally report 
was the establishment of the Migrant Resource Centres, 
which were designed to provide a community development role 
and resources to localised ethnic groups. Through the 
MRC•s the state intended to give a wider community 
acceptance to the status of conservative ethnic petit-
bourgeoisie, by appointing them to the management 
committees of these Centres. 
In terms of class relations, multiculturalism co-opted 
and established firmly the relationship between the 
conservative ethnic bourgeoisie and the state, and the 
Anglo-Australian dominant class. Moreover, the conservative 
ethnic bourgeoisie progressively increased its 
participation in the major political parties. 
The state practice of funding politically conservative 
ethnic institutions, effectively isolated the progressive 
ones from state resources, and consequently their influence 
and legitimacy with community their members was reduced. 
Under multiculturalism, the NES working class found its 
real welfare needs - income security, better housing, 
education, health provision, general social services and 
psychological well being- ignored. Instead, their welfare 
needs were ideologically and materially fragmented. 
Multiculturalism co-opted at the bureaucratic level 
not only ethnic conservative elements, but also progressive 
middle class elements and intelligentsia, so they could be 
neutralised. The establishment of organizations like the 
2EA and SEA in 1977, of AIMA, and of the SBS later on, had 
this intention. 
4.4: The Economy and Migrants 
Multicultural policy represented an ad hoc reaction to 
control the growing socio-economic problems of migrant 
workers, and at the same time to maintain the rate of 
capital accumulation. The restructuring of the Australian 
economy in the last 15 years, and its cyclic recessions, 
further eroded the living standards of working class 
migrants, and their position in the labour market. 
Under the Eraser government immigration intakes 
remained high despite the recession, 93.177 [1982/3], while 
under the Labor government they were somewhat reduced 
78.087 [1984/85] [ROMMPAS op.cit:416]. The immigration 
policy of the 1970s and early 1980s, lost much of the 
economic and cultural bias of the earlier migration years. 
In 1984/85, 52.7% of the migrant intake was in the 
form of family reunion, 19% refugee, and only 9% due to 
labour shortage which showed a bias towards skilled 
migrants [ibid: 417]. Other factors that affected 
immigration policy in the seventies significantly were 
local and international political circumstances and 
pressures. 
The end of the Indochinese war in 1975, and the 
commencement of the Lebanese civil war the same year, was 
followed by the arrival of thousands of people to Australia 
from these areas. At the same time, political pressure by 
ethnic groups in Australia, witnessed the arrival of more 
people under various settler statuses, i.e refugees, family 
reunion scheme etc. 
Despite some cultural, socio-economic and educational 
differences between the post-7Os NES migrants from 
underdeveloped countries and the earlier ones, in their 
majority the former constituted a new source of cheap, 
mainly unskilled, labour for Australian capital. These 
migrants, filled in the labour vacuum created after the 
cessation of S. European migration in the early 70s. 
This new unskilled labour was cheaper for capital than 
the 'older' one, not necessarily in terms of wages, but in 
terms of labour discipline, lower union participation, 
working conditions and reproductive costs, attributes 
probably lost by the 'old' unskilled labour. Thus the more 
established migrant groups started to move out of unskilled 
occupations, and the newer immigrant groups replace them 
[Mackie 1982: 16]. 
There were also some important changes in the 
employment status of the working population between 1971-
86, which were more noticeable among NES migrants. By 1986 
the national employee status decreased by 10.2% for males 
and 10.9% for females, while Greeks of both sexes 
registered one of the biggest drops, 18.9% and 18.1% 
Table 3: Employment Status by Birthplace (%) 
M A L E S 
Birthplace Years (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
Australia 1971 83.1 6.4 8.8 1.4 79.6 
1981 78.9 5.9 9.6 5.3 77.2 
1986 74.0 6.4 10.4 7.7 74.7 
UK Slrel. 1971 89.5 3.4 5.4 1.6 79.4 
1981 82.5 3.8 8.0 5.6 75.9 
1986 78.0 4.9 9.2 7.4 73.5 
Greece 1971 81.4 7.0 9.4 1.9 86.9 
1981 68.8 8.5 15.6 6.8 81.7 
1986 62.9 10.6 17.0 8.5 74.7 
Italy 1971 79.7 7.7 11.3 1.2 85.7 
1981 72.6 8.5 14.8 4.0 80.2 
1986 67.3 10.3 16.0 4.8 73.3 
Lebanon 1971 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1981 65.5 6.2 12.6 15.3 67.0 
1986 47.6 7.2 13.2 29.1 74.1 
TOTAL 1971 84.0 6.0 8.2 1.4 80.3 
1981 79.1 6.6 9.5 5.4 77.3 
1986 73.8 6.4 10.4 8.0 73.5 
F E M A L E S 
Birthplace Years (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
Australia 1971 88.1 3.7 4.7 2.0 35.8 
1981 80.1 4.2 7.1 6.5 45.5 
1986 78.0 4.3 6.9 6.0 47.6 
UK & Irel. 1971 90.8 2.3 3.2 2.3 38.3 
1981 83.4 2.9 5.4 7.0 44.2 
1986 81.0 3.4 7.4 5.2 46.1 
Greece 1971 86.4 3.6 6.3 2.6 48.8 
1981 72.9 6.2 13.2 6.2 5 1 . 1 
1986 68.3 7.9 14.0 5.3 46.1 
Italy 1971 87.1 3.5 6.0 1.5 37.9 
1981 76.8 5.4 11.4 4.4 41.5 
1986 72.3 7.0 12.8 3.2 36.8 
Lebanon 1971 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1981 66.5 4.1 10.9 16.4 36.4 
1986 46.8 4.9 13.0 25.1 33.1 
TOTAL 1971 88.4 3.5 4.6 2 . 1 37.1 
1981 80.4 4.0 6.9 6.7 45.6 
1986 77.5 4.3 7.0 6.3 46.8 
(a): Employees, (b): Employers, (c): Self Employed, (d): 
Unemployed, (e): In workforce. 
* Percentages calculated to those in workforce. 
* 1986 Unemployment figures are only for persons seeking 
full-time work. 
Sources ABS 1971, 1981, 1986 (microfiche). 
respectively table [3]. The Lebanese males had the lowest 
employee status percentage at 47.6%, and Lebanese females 
46.8%. 
Greek and Italian males for the first time since the 
50s had similar workforce participation rates as the 
national one, around 74% in 1986, while Lebanese males had 
the same figure, though this was 7% higher than 1981. 
Migrant female workforce participation rates declined 
between 1971 and 1986 when compared to the national figure. 
However, the most dramatic changes occurred in the 
unemployment status of NES migrants. The Lebanese male 
unemployment rates nearly doubled between 1981 and 1986 
to reach 29.1%, which is more than three and half times of 
that of the Greeks and of the national average, while 
Lebanese female unemployment figures stood at 25.1%, four 
times more than the national average. What these figures do 
not show is the extent of hidden unemployment, which 
according to Humphrey is high among migrants [Humphrey 1984 
op.cit:1]. 
In view of the high unemployment rates and declining 
employee status positions, self-employment represented an 
alternative to this situation, and this was reflected in 
the general increase of self-employment status between 
1971-86. NES migrants recorded the highest increase of 
self-employment, with the Greek, Italian and males and 
females registering increases from 4.7% to 7.7%. 
The comparatively high self-employment rates among NES 
persons, did not necessarily correlate to high income. A 
recent study showed that the four lowest income groups were 
the Vietnamese ($9,400), Lebanese ($9,600), other Middle 
Eastern countries ($9,800), and Greeks ($10,300) [ROMMPAS 
op.cit: 400]. The average income of persons with native 
born parents is $13,000, for Yugoslavs $11,000, Italians 
$11,700, from U.K. $14,300, and for Germans $14,900. 
The high unemployment rates among NES migrants, were 
due to the restructuring of the Australian economy since 
the middle of seventies. This activity was more widespread 
in the manufacturing sector, which was the traditional 
source of employment for NES migrant workers. 
The rationaleof capitalist restructuring, effectively 
being one method to improve capital accumulation, pays 
little attention to the social and economic consequences of 
those mostly affected. In fact the only respect capitalism 
has for the individual, is her/his actual or potential 
ability to produce surplus value. In a capitalist economy 
the major source of welfare for the working population is 
income from employment, with the social wage acting to 
minimise the reproductive cost of the worker and his/her 
family. Thus unemployment acts as a disciplinary method to 
enforce the work ethic on the working class, and control 
wage increases in periods of economic recession. 
Restructuring meant a shift towards the development of 
the financial and service sector, which demanded a more 
skilled workforce, both technically and linguistically. 
This process resulted in the growth of occupations which 
were beyond the reach of NES unskilled workers, and 
generally of most NES workers. For instance de Lepervanche 
mentions that between June 1971 and October 1977 there was 
an increase of 485.000 jobs in the tertiary sector, while 
in the manufacturing there was a loss of 150.00 jobs [de 
Lepervanche op.cit: 207]. 
The manufacturing sector witnessed a general fall in 
the rate of workforce participation, though this was more 
visible among NES migrants. In 1976, Greek, Italian, and 
Yugoslav males in the manufacturing sector had an average 
participation rate of 68.8%, compared with 48.8% of 
Australians, and Geonnans table [4]. By 1981 the 
corresponding figures were 62.2% and 43.3%, with the Greeks 
registering the biggest single fall from 66.2% to 54.2%. 
Table 4: Occupational Percentage in Manufacturing/Trades. 
Year Birthplace 
Aus UK &I Ger. Gr. It. Yug. Leb. TOT. 
1976 36.6 44.8 52.9 66.2 63.0 77.1 N/A 40.5 
1981 37.0 42.4 49.8 54.2 59.4 73.0 55.4 39.5 
Source ABS 1976, 1981. 
Other economic policies that contributed to the high 
unemployment levels of NES workers were the introduction 
of labour saving technology, retrenchments, export of 
capital to underdeveloped countries of the region to employ 
cheap labour to manufacture and import the same goods that 
used to be made in Australia. 
The two issues discussed thus far, high unemployment 
and the labour market disadvantage of NES migrants workers, 
have been taken up by Collins. He argues that although many 
migrant workers share many similar positions in the labour 
market as Anglophone workers, the location of most NES 
workers in unskilled positions, creates more disadvantages 
for them [Collins in Bottomley 1984 op.cit: 11]. 
The consistently higher than average rates of 
unemployment among NES migrant workers, and the higher 
increases and duration of it, gives these workers a 
particular role in the reserve labour army. According to 
Lever-Tracy, migrant workers form an important source of 
the reseirve labour army in their countries of origin. Once 
they arrive in Australia they join the workforce, and 
cease to perform this role, particularly as related to^ 
exercise discipline for the rest of the workforce. 
Collins disagrees with Lever-Tracy's argument on the 
role of migrants in the reserve labour army, by arguing 
that as an integral part of the workforce migrants are 
also subjected to periods of unemployment [ibid: 6-7]. As 
migrant workers, however, occupy different positions in the 
labour market, they do not form a cohesive body of workers. 
Given the fragmentation of the labour market, it could 
be said that unskilled NES migrant workers are the most 
vulnerable to labour market changes. Unskilled NES labour, 
due to its structural inequality, does not constitute a 
threat to the majority of the workforce, especially for the 
skilled and organised, nor it ever intended to do so. 
As table [5] shows, NES migrant workers had more than 
double the average 'Labourers NEI' participation rates, in 
both manufacture and trade and in other unskilled 
positions. In relation to skilled occupations, only the 
Italians among the NES sample, had a higher percentage of 
bricklayers than the national average. 
It could be argued, therefore, that NES unskilled 
workers are acting as the reserve labour army to the 
particular positions they occupy, to themselves. Though 
they are not destined for permanent unemployment, their 
higher and longer rates of unemployment will further 
marginilise their socio-economic position. 
The importance of migrant unskilled labour to the 
Australian economy, as well as its vulnerability, is aptly 
demonstrated by the participation of migrant women in the 
manufacturing sector. As table [6] shows in 1976 only 10.6% 
of the total female workforce was employed in the 
manufacturing sector, in contrast to 54.3% of the Yugoslav, 
50.7% of Greek and 37.8% of Italian. 
In 1981 the national female participation rate in the 
above sector had fallen to 9.1%, but migrant women still 
maintained five times higher participation rates, with 
Yugoslav women having the highest of all at 47.9%. 
Table 5: Manual Occupational Status by Birthplace (%) 
Birthplace Status Year 
Aus UK &I Gr . It. Yug. Leb. TOT. 
Labourers 
NEI 1976 13.3 7. 8 35 .0 24.7 27.8 N/A 14.5 1981 13.6 8. 3 30 .0 21.9 24.6 27.7 14.0 
Tool 
makers 1976 25.1 28. 5 14 .8 19.3 21.8 N/A 25.0 
1981 25.2 27. 4 13 .2 17.9 20.0 13.8 24.6 
Metal 
workers 1976 3.1 4. 6 6 .8 4.7 5.9 N/A 3.8 
1981 2.6 3. 8 5 .9 4.0 5.2 N/A 3.3 
Carpenters 1976 8.6 7. 3 5 .8 6.5 7.5 N/A 8.1 
1981 8.0 6. 8 5 .5 6.5 7.0 4.3 7.6 
Electri-
cians 1976 10.2 9. 4 3 .0 3.6 3.1 N/A 9.0 
1981 10.4 9. 3 4 .3 4.3 3.7 2.9 9.2 
Brick-
layers 1976 6.6 8. 6 4 .0 15.2 6.6 N/A 7.2 
1981 7.0 8. 5 4 .6 15.8 7.1 5.7 7.5 
Source ABS 1976^ 1981. 
Table 6: Female Participation in Workforce and in Trade 
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TOTAL 43.9 45.6 
Source ABS 1976, 1981. 
10.6 9.1 
This fall in the workforce participation of females 
in the manufacturing sector reflected the impact of 
restructuring, which was also accompanied by cheap overseas 
imports. The most dramatic demonstartion of this change 
could be seen in the textile/clothing industry and the 
growth of outwork. As shown in the graph of the following 
page, between 1976-81 the total percentage of female 
participation in the textile/clothing industry was reduced 
dramatically from 29.7% to 15.3%. 
The graph shows Southern European , migrant women 
were over-represented in this sector as it had been a 
traditional source of employment for them, as well as for 
other NES migrant women. Thus, in 1976 47.9% of Italian 
women and 38.1% of Greek were employed in this sector, 
whereas in 1981 their employment levels had dropped to 
20.3% and 17.3% respectively. 
This reduction in employment was caused by the growth 
of outwork. Outwork involves mainly industrial sewing done 
at home for clothing and textile manufacturers. Outwork 
became widespread because of the advantages it offered to 
the employers and middlemen in the form of very low wages, 
and the absence of responsibilities and entitlements 
offered to factory workers ["Women Outworkers", Women's Co-
Op Feb.1986 :1-9]. Outwork created a hidden economy made up 
of women, mostly migrant, which is characterised by naked 
exploitation and labour market marginalisation. 
Migrant outworkers are very vulnerable and 
financially dependent on this form of economic activity, 
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because of their lack of employment opportunities, lack of 
child care facilities, and sometimes they have to provide 
care for elderly relatives [ibid:6]. Wages paid to outwork 
workers range between $2-$3 per hour, as compared to $6.55 
p/f to full-time factory workers, or $8.50 to casual 
[Australian Society March 1987: 10-12]. 
4.5: Multiculturalism under LcJDor 
The ALP government was elected to power in 1983 
because of the failure of the conservative Liberal party to 
manage the growing socio-economic crisis of Australian 
capitalism. However, the current Labor government shares 
few of the innovative and progressive ideas of its 1972 
predecessor. 
With conservative ideologies fiinmly entrenched in the 
bureaucracy, the ALP has pursued monetarist economic 
policies, and in the process has almost abandoned the 
Social Democratic social policies is identified with. 
In relation to ethnic social policy, the government has 
retained almost intact the conservative concepts, policy 
directions and structures of multiculturalism. 
The first indication of the continuation of the 
previous migrant social policies, came up with the AIMA 
review of 1983. Despite the critical findings of the 
Committee that reviewed AIMA, like its conservatism, and 
biased sexist and racial ideologies, the government 
retained the Institute, and also accepted the majority of 
its recommendations on the evaluation of the Galbally 
Report. 
The most important social policy initiative by the ALP 
into ethnic relations and services has been the 1986 
ROMMPAS report headed by J.Jupp The Jupp report, 
commissioned by the Minister of DIEA, was to review the 
current strategies and principles of state migrant policy. 
The Report at least moves away from the folkloric 
concepts that have been associated with multiculturalism, 
giving more emphasis on the structural disadvantages of 
migrants. Equity and participation constitute the main 
themes of the Report, which are seen as the means to 
address the disadvantages faced by migrants [ibid: 1-15]. 
The Report maintains the right of cultural diversity, and 
accepts multiculturalism as the guiding concept for future 
migrant policy. 
Nevertheless, the Jupp Report has already been 
criticised as not being a watershed policy for migrants, 
but actually offering 'more of the same, just better' 
[Collins,"Report no watershed for migrants", SMH, 
25.11.86]. Collins identified the following major 
wealcnesses of the ROMMPAS Report: 
1. The scime basic service structures related to 
migrants have been retained, though they would be 
provided with more resources. 
2. The issues of mainstreaming and ethno-specific 
services were not addressed. 
3. Although the report recognised the disadvantages of 
many NES migrants, and migrant youth, in the labour 
market, it offered no recommendations. 
4. Most of the solutions offered are bureaucratic in 
form, mostly related to the re-shuffling of Depart-
ments and departmental responsibilities. 
5. The needs of the most disadvantaged groups among 
migrants, were not examined. 
6. The Report offered very few policy initiatives, with 
the authors arguing that the role of the stage I of 
the report was to advise, while stage II of the 
report will recommend new directions. 
If Collins' assessment of the Jupp Report is valid, 
then there seems to be few possibilities in affecting the 
present residualist implementation of multiculturalism. The 
domination of reactive social policy approaches to 
migrants, was reflected on 1986-87 Budget cuts on ESL 
programs, the abolition of AIMA, and the uncertainty 
concerning the SBS. 
Nine years after the implementation of the Galbally 
Report, there is little evidence to suggest that multi-
culturalism has improved the general welfare of migrant 
working-class. The uncertain and negotiable provision of 
state resources to migrants reflects the ad hoc nature of 
multiculturalist policy. Moreover, the capitalist economic 
crisis of the last 12 years, has highlighted the 
precarious position of unskilled migrant workers in the 
labour market. As the Birrells have commented 
'multiculturalism seeks to improve ethnic social status,it 
does not get to the core of the problem in the workplace' 
[Birrell and Birrell op.cit: 258]. 
Multiculturalism as a social control mechanism has 
attempted to curb the aspirations of the migrant working 
class by creating and trying to fit them in an ideological 
straight jacket. It is difficult to measure if this policy 
has managed to control protest or resistance by migrant 
working class. 
The many contradictions of multiculturalism 
particularly that of its stated ideal relationships and the 
social reality experienced by working class migrants- have 
turned it into an issue of continuous controversy and 
debate along the whole political spectrum. As ethnic 
relations and welfare have been moved into the political 
arena, the struggle for access to resources and equality at 
the state and societal levels is more likely to intensify. 
The nature and operation of migrant welfare at the 
voluntary level is, therefore, one area where this 
ideological and political struggle is unfolding. 
CHAPTER 5 
METHODOLOGY 
The study draws on two models of analysis. On the 
class analysis of ethnicity, and on Gramsci's model of 
civil institutions and intellectuals. The first model, 
argues that ethnicity is an ideology which defines social 
relations in terms of the primordial attributes of groups 
and individuals. The concept of ethnicity is used by the 
state and the Australian ruling class to define the 
social reality of migrants and exercise social control, 
while the dominant ethnic class is attempting the same 
thing by defining the 'ethnicity' of the subordinate ethnic 
class. 
The second methodological model, that of civil 
institutions argues that it is at this level the 
ideological and political struggle of the hegemonic classes 
takes place and is more visible [Mouffe op.cit: 10]. The 
impact of these institutions on the popular culture and 
intellectual concepts on the daily lives of the masses is 
important, because it is at this level where the hegemonic 
beliefs shape practical ideologies and penetrate the level 
of common sense. On the other hand, the intellectuals 
articulate, transmit and organise these beliefs for the 
political and material interests of the hegemonic classes 
they represent. 
5.1: The study 
In empirical terms the ethnic and non-ethnic institu-
tions of the study constitute Gramsci''s civil 
institutions. The ethnic institutions of the sample 
comprise the major civil institutions of the Greek and 
Lebanese communities. The non-ethnic institutions are part 
of the wider Australian society, and are linked in with the 
Greek and Lebanese communities, and their institutions, via 
their social/welfare workers. 
The organic intellectuals of the study are the 
social/welfare workers, and community leaders whose 
institutions are products of the capitalist mode of 
relations, e.g. a worker's club. The traditional 
intellectuals are represented mostly the priesthood, who 
perform an organic function for the Greek and Lebanese 
bourgeoisie. 
5.2: The organizational sample 
The research was based on an organizational survey 
contacted by interviews with Lebanese and Greek 
representatives or employees in the non-government 
volunteer sector. The sample covered community, welfare and 
professional organizations. The criteria for selecting the 
sample organizations were: 
1. Greek and Lebanese institutions, and generalist 
welfare organizations, in receipt of state welfare funds. 
2. Greek and Lebanese welfare professional 
associations with membership made up of professional 
welfare workers from either the volunteer or state sectors. 
The Greek and Lebanese institutions constituted the 
primary focus of the research, while the generalist 
institutions were included in the study because of the 
employment of Greek and Lebanese social/welfare workers in 
them. 
The second criterion included one welfare professional 
association from each group. The reason for including these 
institutions in the sample was due to their active 
political role and influence, both at the community and 
state levels on welfare related issue. 
The sample included a total of 18 organizations, 15 
ethno-specific and 3 generalist. Of the ethno-specific 
institutions, 10 were Lebanese and 5 Greek. The 
institutions of the sample were divided in three 
categories: a. Secular ethno-specific, b. Religious ethno-
specif ic, and c. Generalist. 
The first categoiry included ethno-specific 
institutions that combined only secular elements, or both 
secular and religious elements, but the secular aspect was 
the dominant one. The second category contained only 
religious institutions or their welfare agencies. And the 
third category was defined by: a. generalist community 
organizations and b. by the professional associations. 
The latter were included in the generalist category of 
organizations because their organization and membership 
were based on professional rather than primordial criteria. 
and were not aligned with ethno-specific institutions of 
their communities. 
Each category is characterised by different 
ideologies, different values and perceptions about the 
existence and position of Man in the world, about the 
concepts of community and the individual. For this reason 
each category operates different forms of welfare practice, 
and interpretations of social needs. Moreover, every 
ideological category uses varying forms, levels and methods 
of social control, or alternatives of social change. 
The distribution of the organizational categories 
between Greeks and Lebanese was: 
a b c 
LEBANESE 5 4 2 
GREEKS 2 2 3 
The variety of organizations selected for the sample 
was designed to be as much as possible wide and 
representative of each community's organizational and 
welfare provision. The exclusion from the study of 
charitable organizations of each community, of ethnic 
political parties, and of weIfare/community institutions 
that do not receive state funds, may thus not reflect the 
full picture of each community. Nevertheless, the exclusion 
of these institutions is thought of having a rather limited 
impact in understanding the fundamental structure and 
relations of each community. 
In the case of the Lebanese sample, due to their 
institutional fragmentation along religious, political, and 
regional lines, it was impossible to include all the 
institutions that fell within the criteria of the study. 
The most important Lebanese secular institutions have been 
included in the sample, as well as the main religious 
groups, - Maronites, Orthodox and Muslims - are represented 
either directly, or indirectly by at least two institutions 
/each. 
Most of the Lebanese organizations were found in the 
•Arabic Resource Directory', or referred to the researcher 
by various respondents. The existence of the Greek 
organizations was either known to the researcher, or he was 
referred to them by some of the respondents. 
5.3: The Respondents 
The selection criteria for the respondents was based 
on their past, or present positional role in the 
institutions of the sample. They were employees 
welfare/social workers- or members of the organizations, 
community leaders. This selection was necessary to obtain 
the contrasting views and values of the respondents about 
the past and present community relations of each group, 
the social needs identified, and the welfare methods 
employed. 
There was a total of 19 respondents, 11 of whom were 
Lebanese and 8 Greeks. All Lebanese respondents were 
interviewed between December '86 and March '87. Five of the 
Greek respondents had been interviewed in 1985, as a sample 
of an Honours sociology thesis by the researcher. The 
additional 3 Greek respondents were interviewed between 
March and April '87 in order to update the information, and 
provide an additional number of institutions. 
The organizational representation of the Greek and 
Lebanese respondents was: 
Secular Religious Generalist 
GREEK 2 2 4 
LEBANESE 5 3 2 
Four out of the eleven Lebanese respondents were 
community leaders, seven welfare/social workers, while the 
corresponding number for Greeks was three and five 
respectively. There were three female and eight male 
Lebanese respondents, while the Greeks had four respondents 
from each sex. 
5.4: The Interviews 
All interviews were conducted by the researcher at the 
institutions' premises. All respondents but one, 
volunteered to give a recorded interview. The only 
respondent who refused to do so, however, volunteered some 
written statements, and for this reason he was included in 
the sample. 
There was no structured interview schedule used during 
the interviews, which proceeded more in the form of 
discussion, but all respondents were asked the following 
questions : 
1. How do they see the general role of their organization 
in their community, and specifically as related to 
welfare. 
2. How do they perceive the roles of social work practice 
and of the welfare/social workers. 
3. To identify the main needs/problems facing their 
'communities'. 
4. Their opinion on multiculturalism and mainstreaming. 
Due to the attitudinale open-ended, form of the 
questions, the respondents volunteered additional 
information during the interviews. The average length of 
the interviews was 40-50 minutes. Three interviews were 
contacted in Greek, while the rest in English. All 
respondents co-operated fully and there were no 
cancellation or postponement of interviews. 
5.5: Data Analysis 
For the analysis and discussion of the data to be more 
comprehensible in a sociological, ideological, and 
historical context, the following method was used: a) A 
reference on the national/ethnic identity of both groups; 
b) A discussion on the pre-war migration and settlement of 
Greeks and Lebanese in Australia. Then the main body of the 
data was analysed and discussed. 
A class analysis on the content and operation of 
ethnicity - particularly as related to first generation 
migrants - has to be addressed not only within the 
historical conditions it has evolved in Australia, but as 
well as to those of their country of origin. A discussion 
of ethnicity in the Australian milieu ought to contain a 
discussion and recognition of the national/ethnic identity 
of migrants as it developed in the first place in their 
homelands. 
In other words for the ethnicity of a migrant group to 
be understood, an analysis and discussion of the 
ideological and class construction of its national/ethnic 
identity prior to migration is needed. Such an approach 
would provide more insights about certain particular 
'ethnic' characteristics of various migrant groups. For 
instance, it could explain why Greeks tend to have higher 
levels of self-employment than other NES groups, or what 
makes self-employment to Greeks more socially and 
financially desirable than wage employment. 
This approach has not been a common feature of many 
migrant studies in Australia. One of the main reasons for 
this appears to be the lack of availability of appropriate 
literature in English or other languages, and this in turn 
may have inhibited the methodological application of this 
approach. 
However, whenever such literature has been used for 
reference on the national/ethnic sentiments of migrants in 
their country of origin, the sources have tended to rely 
more on anthropological data - thus enhancing more the 
cultural interpretation of ethnicity - rather than 
historical, sociological or political studies. 
This lack or limited bibliographical support on the 
subject of national/ethnic identity, is evident in the 
author's discussion on Greek national ideology, which has 
been mostly drawn from his own reading of various Greek 
studies on the issue. 
The second method is needed to connect the 
experiences -socio-cultural, economic political and 
ideological- of pre-war and post-war Greek and Lebanese 
migrants. In this way a continuity will be established 
between past and present similarities and differences, thus 
providing a better understanding of the present. 
The analysis and presentation of the main body of the 
data, will be made within the general framework of the 
ideological stages of the Australian class relations and 
state social policies, as outlined in the theoretical part 
of the study. The ideological stages are. Assimilation and 
Multiculturalism, while Integration is a transitory stage 
and would not be dealt with in detail. 
The advantage of such a method of data analysis and 
presentation is, that the ideological stages would provide 
a continuous developmental picture of the social 
experiences of Greeks and Lebanese, by highlighting the 
following: 
A. In general the position and relation of Greeks and 
Lebanese to the economy, the political process, and the 
social institutions of the wider Australian society. 
B. The intra-communal relations and conflicts of each 
community. 
C. The development and the form of welfare provision of 
each community. 
D. The role of the Greek and Lebanese institutions and 
'intellectuals', in generating ideologies that affect the 
daily relations and perceptions of the members of each 
community. Special attention will be paid on the social 
control aspects of such ideologies, and the possibilities 
they represent for social change. 
E. The effect of state social policies on each of the 
abovementioned. 
In the assimilation period the data on both groups 
will be contrasted and compared separately. This is needed 
to underline from the beginning any major ideological, or 
structural similarities or differences between the two 
groups. The institutions of each community are treated 
together. 
In the multicultural period the data will be divided 
into the three ideological/organizational sections, secular 
ethno-specific, religious ethno-specific, and generalist. 
Each section will be divided in three main parts: 
1). Social work and Social workers which will deal 
with the communal relations of both groups, and the reasons 
of each ideological section for the employment of social 
workers and the practices of social work. 
2). Will discuss the identification of needs as 
defined by the respondents. 
3). Will discuss the issues of multiculturalism and 
mainstreaming. 
Moreover, the last section will compare and contrast 
the views of the respondents from all sections. 
There is also data related specifically to Greeks and 
Lebanese, like research studies, statistical material, 
sociological studies and reports, and other material. 
Finally statements by Greek respondents with an asterisk 
(*) at the end indicates that they have been translated 
from the Greek language into English. 
CHAPTER 6 
GREEK NATIONAL IDEOLOGY - GREEK AND LEBANESE PRE-WAR 
MIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT 
6.1: Greeks and National Ideology 
The roots of the Greek national identity, of Hellenism 
or Greekness, can to be traced in the creation of the 
modern Greek State, the Orthodox Church, and the Greeks of 
the old overseas Greek Communities, the Diaspora. 
The geographical area of modern Greece, as the whole 
Balkan peninsula, was under Ottoman rule since the 15th 
century. The only institution acceptable to the Ottoman 
Empire was the Greek Orthodox Church. The church acted as 
a form of unofficial government, and provided the link 
between the Greek speaking population and the Empire 
[McNall 1974: iv-vi]. 
The Orthodox Church had limited administrative 
responsibilities, it maintained the religious faith and 
Greek language, and its priests were the leaders and 
organisers of community life. In other words, Greeks at the 
time identified themselves as belonging to a religious 
community, and not a national one. 
From the 17th century until the middle of the 20th 
there were throughout central Europe, the Middle East and 
North Africa, numerous prosperous Greek communities, led by 
plantation owners and merchants. The French revolution of 
1789, the creation of the European nations, the rediscovery 
of Ancient Greece by the West, all of them had a great 
impact on the Greek intelligentsia of Diaspora. The need 
for a Greek nation, in a geographical and ideological 
meaning, plus the persecution and oppression of Greek 
Christians, were the main reasons for the overseas 
intelligentsia and nationalist Greek merchant class to seek 
the overthrow of the Ottoman rule in Greece. 
The official Orthodox Church initially was not suppor-
tive to the idea of a Greek nation, as it undermined its 
monopoly of power and authority. However, it was won over 
by the overseas leadership, and became the moral symbol of 
the 1821 national revolution. The modern Greek state was 
established in 1832, with the leadership of the Diaspora 
playing a central role in the organizational,financial, and 
literary fields, and in the formation of the new Greek 
national identity. 
Orthodoxy became the state religion, thus reinforcing 
the concept of being Greek and Orthodox Christian through 
the state apparatuses. The Greek nationalist bourgeoisie 
after the revolution of 1821 fought another 100 years of 
wars in the Balkan peninsula to extent the geographical 
and demographic area of Greece, which reached its present 
boarders in 1947 when Italy returned the Dodecanese 
islands. 
The role of the Greeks of Diaspora was instrumental in 
the creation of the modern Greek state and national 
identity. Moreover, the overseas Greek communities had 
another important ideological impact and dimension on Greek 
nationalism. These Greek communities flourished during the 
18th and 19th centuries, when the Greek merchant class, 
like the Armenian and Jewish ones, acted as middleman class 
in the sale and distribution of manufactured goods from 
England. 
These Greek communities were seen as representing the 
ideal of Greek character, hard working, independent 
individual, thrifty and prosperous, deeply religious with 
high family ideals, and a bearer of the Greek civilization. 
These attributes constitute the concept of Hellenism. It 
was, and still is, a view of a world seen through the eyes 
of the mercantilistic class, which said very little about 
the social division within the communities themselves, or 
their role in the national economies of the countries they 
lived in. 
Greek communities in Russia, Asia Minor, Central 
Europe, Egypt and N. Africa declined and disappeared within 
the first 70 years of this century. This happened once the 
industrialised countries started to export capital and 
undertake their own distribution of goods in underdeveloped 
countries, the middleman foreign classes could not compete, 
became irrelevant and forced out of the market. 
Related to this situation, were the national and 
independence revolutions that took place where Greeks 
lived. Their socio-economic and political position often 
meant that they became the first targets of nationalist 
feelings. 
Throughout this century in Greece both the concepts of 
Hellenism and Diaspora were vigorously promoted by the 
Greek bourgeoisie as the ideal Greek identity. 
Socialisation into the values of Hellenism became a state 
responsibility, through the educational system, other state 
activities, and in popular culture [ibid:106]. 
Identified with the idea of Hellenism in Greece was a 
mode of social mobility that emphasised bureaucratic 
appointments and mercantilistic activities, which appealed 
to the petit-bourgeoisie tendencies of Greek peasants as 
models to aspire for themselves and their children, thus 
reinforcing them. 
The main features of the Greek society in the 50s were 
a slow industrial development, high rates of unemployment 
and under-employment, a large public sector, and deep 
social and political divisions after the end of the Civil 
War in 1949. The mass migration of Greek peasants in the 
50s and 60s was the most important testimony of the 
unreality of Hellenism to satisfy the socio-economic and 
political aspirations of these people in Greece. 
Hellenism was looked upon by prospective Greek 
migrants as the ideal to which they should aspire . In 
this way Greeks carried with them pre-defined ideological 
constructs about their life expectations overseas. During 
this century the ideology of Hellenism became increasingly 
problematic to Greek migrants who migrated from rural 
areas, not in underdeveloped countries as in the previous 
centuries, but in developed capitalist countries to work as 
industrial workers. 
This ideology was challenged strongly by the Greek 
guest workers of W. Germany and other W. European 
countries, for whom the process of proletarianization and 
lack of alternative non-industrial employment, led to the 
development of a stronger working class mentality. While in 
Australia, Canada and the U.S., more possibilities of 
social mobility and self-employment, contributed to the 
comparative relevancy of the value of Hellenism and this 
hampered the growth of an alternative strong working class 
ideology. 
6.2: The Greeks: Pre-War Migration and Settlement 
Greek migration to Australia commenced in the 1830s 
and followed a pattern of kinship and regional migration 
movement until the end of world war II [Price 1963]. The 
majority of Greek migrants were from certain Greek islands, 
like Kythera, Ithaca, and Castelorizo. The lack of skills 
among the first Greek arrivals, and the small industrial 
base of the Australian economy, led them into shopkeeping 
occupations mostly in cat ering. 
The Greek migrants displayed a high level of 
organizational and institutional activity. The basis of 
this activity was reflected in the concept of community, an 
organizational feature of rural Greece at the time. A 
community could be established, where a number of people 
living in a certain area collected money to set up a 
church, schools and a secular administration to run the 
activities of the community. The first Greek Orthodox 
Community in Sydney was established in 1898, which later on 
became known as the Central Community. 
By the 1920's the Greek Orthodox Communities [GOC] 
were under the control of a strong petit-bourgeoisie, which 
had grown up through an expanded shopkeeping activity in 
the previous years [Kakakios et.al 1984: 149]. For this 
class the control of the GOC's had both economic and socio-
political importance. 
First of all, the Greek community provided the 
shopkeeper petit-bourgeoisie with a cheap source of 
labour, as the majority of Greeks were employed by Greek 
business. This economic domination was strengthened by 
other factors, such as the increased level of dependency on 
the sponsor, and the employment of family members, mostly 
women as unpaid labourers, both of which acted as forms of 
labour discipline and conformity [ibid: 148-49]. 
Secondly, the GOC's provided the petit-bourgeoisie 
with an institutional setting, whereby they could exercise 
their political power, claim legitimacy and social status. 
The ideological dominance of the Church, coupled 
with the Church's close identification with Greek 
culture, made it a compelling symbol of Greek 
identity. For the rising Greek bourgeoisie, 
control over Church affairs became an issue of 
central importance and in turn a potent tool of 
dominance, social recognition and control within 
the Community [loc.cit]. 
The issue of defining the role of the Church in social 
life, was projected by competing petit-bourgeoisie groups 
in the 1920s as the major source of conflict. The arrival 
of inoiT© iniĝ rants in th© pxGCGciing" y©a.3rs ̂  was on© ic©a.son 
that l©d to a chall©ng© of authority of th© ©stablish©d 
petit-bourg©oisi© in th© GOC's. Th© n©w arrivals att©mpt©d 
to establish a Church authority ind©p©nd©nt of th© GOC, 
with th© support of th© Archbishop of Constantinopol©. 
After a 10 y©ar community split, Constantinopol© conc©d©d 
th© role of the Church affairs to the GOCs, and established 
for itself only the spiritual guidance of the Greek Church 
in Australia [ibid: 149]. 
During this period the Greek press reinforced the 
belief that family values, and the family unit itself had 
to follow the spirit of Hellenism, which was seen as an 
ideal form of social life, ethnic identity and cohesion. 
In the pre-war period the Greek population in 
Australia remained very isolated from the general socio-
economic, and political processes. Three factors that seem 
to be largely responsible for this situation were: 1. The 
limited economic activity of Greeks dominated by petit-
bourgeoisie shopkeeping; 2. Lack of common cultural 
characteristics with the dominant Australian values and 
institutions, e.g. like religion, which could enable them 
to assimilate or integrate more; and 3. Related to that 
there was no class solidarity or co-operation between Greek 
social classes or groups and Australian ones, nor any state 
links. 
6.3: The Lebanese: Pre-War Migration and Settlement 
The first Lebanese migrants reached the shores of 
Australia in the 1880s. These first settlers were 
classified as Syrians because at the time Lebanon did not 
exist as a nation until 1926. The Lebanese followed a 
pattern of migration similar to that of Greeks based on 
regional and kinship ties, but it also involved an 
additional element, that of religion [Battourney 1985:20-
48]. These migrants were predominantly Christians from 
rural areas, with the Maronites comprising the largest 
group, and some Melkites, and Antiochean Orthodox. 
Like their Greek counterparts at the time, Lebanese 
migrants left their country for economic reasons, and 
concentrated on trade occupations which did not require 
any skills. Their main economic activity was peddling and 
hawking, an extension of the jobs they performed in their 
country [ibid: 34]. 
Once ,they managed to accumulate capital they would 
become commercial shopkeepers, where unpaid labour was 
crucial, as with Greek shopkeepers, for capital 
accumulation. Battourney also mentions that Lebanese women 
not only helped in the shops, but played and important 
welfare role "in maintaining unity in the family, prepare 
food, and look after the children and sick" [ibid:43]. 
During the 1920's Lebanese migration stopped due to a 
sharp decline of the population caused by famine. There is 
no much detailed history available, covering the Australian 
community relations of the Lebanese at this period of time. 
From what is available, unlike the Greeks, Lebanese showed 
no signs of establishing institutional structures. This was 
mainly due to two factors, which had important implications 
in the future make up of Lebanese institutional formations. 
Firstly, there was a very small number of Lebanese in 
Australia to stimulate organizational activity. Until 1947 
ABS statistics classified Lebanese as Syrians, and the 
first specific reference on Lebanese in 1954 showed their 
numbers as 3,861. The other important factor at the time 
was that the Lebanese settlers did not have a strong 
national ideology, but strong religious identities. Though 
they defined themselves a Syrians, their primary 
identification was with their respective religious 
communities [ibid: 57]. 
Of all three main Christian denominations, only the 
Antiochean Orthodox established their own Church in the 
1920s, because of their strong Eastern character, which 
did not fit well with the dominant western culture of 
Australia. However, some Lebanese Orthodox went to Australian 
Catholic churches for worship. 
The Maronites and the Melkites, both of them 
Catholics, used to worship in Catholic Australian churches, 
so the need to establish their own did not arise. This was 
in contrast to Greeks, whose mutual reinforcing aspect of 
ethnic and religious identity, made Greek and Orthodox 
identities seem as inseparable [Mackay, 'Religious 
Diversity and Ethnic Cohesion: A Three generational 
analysis of Syrian-Lebanese Christians in Sydney', 
International Migration Review, Vol.19. Summer 1985: 319]. 
Mackay argues that the Catholic and Protestant 
Churches in Australia, absorbed the pfce-war Lebanese 
Christians and this contributed to their speedier 
assimilation [ibid:323-25]. He sights as a major proof of 
that the loss of their Arabic language. 
Bat ourney observes the same process, particularly 
with the more westernised Maronites, and sees the role of 
the Catholic Church in Australia as having provided a 
medium for greater access to Australian society [Battourney 
op.cit:48]. Given the petit-bourgeois economic activity of 
many Lebanese during this period, the Catholic Church 
provided them with the language skills, and the social 
contacts to advance their socio-economic interests. Unlike 
the Greek petit-bourgeoisie, the Lebanese one, and mostly 
the Maronite, found in the Australian Catholic Church a 
cultural and social medium, that introduced them to the 
dominant values of Australian institutions, thus 
accelerating their assimilation. 
Moreover, as the Lebanese at the time were classified 
as Asians, there was additional pressure to assimilate 
[ibid:25]. Mackay notes that the same pattern of Lebanese 
bourgeoisie assimilation took place in the U.S. as well, 
where: 
"Syrian-Lebanese in the USA have emphasised 
economic success and fairly easily to the middle 
class values of American society...They wanted to 
assimilate". [Mackay op.cit:329] 
The absence of national identity by the Lebanese 
during this period, their access to Australian religious 
institutions, strong familial and regional ties, combined 
to enhance the econoinic a.nd social pairticipation of the 
Lebanese pre-war petit-bourgeoisie in Australian society. 
At the end of WW II the dominant ideological position of 
pre-war Lebanese migrants, as well as that of their Greek 
counterparts, was a petit-bourgeoisie one, with emphasis on 
independence, hard work, strong familial, religious and 
regional loyalties, and conformity to the dominant values 
of the host society. 
CHAPTER 7 
THE ASSIMILATION PERIOD 1947-1972 
7.1: Greek and Lebanese Migration in the 1950s and 1960s 
In the first 25 years of post-war migration Southern 
Europeans dominated the proportion of NES migrant unskilled 
workers arriving in Australia. During this period Lebanon 
provided a very small percentage of migrant labour to 
Australia, due to the relative economic growth of the 
country until the mid 1960s. In addition to that, Australia 
at the time had classified Lebanon as an Asian country, and 
under the White Australia policy and consequently Lebanese 
migration was not encouraged. 
The Lebanese population in Australia increased from 
3,861 in 1954 to 10,668 in 1966 table [7]. 
Table 7: Population by Birthplace 
Birthplace 1947 1954 1961 1966 1971 
Greece 12,291 25,862 77,333 140,089 160,200 
Lebanon (a) 1,886 3,861 7,253 10,668 24,218 
(a) Included in Syria 
Sources ABS 1961, 1971. 
Until the mid 60's economic considerations were the 
main reasons for Lebanese migration, but various political 
events in the Middle-East, like the Six Day war in 1967, 
accelerated their migration [Bat ourney op.cit:51-60]. By 
1971 14,500 Lebanese had arrived in Australia, which meant 
that their numbers increased threefold in ten years. 
In contrast to the Lebanese, the Greeks constituted 
one of the main S. European migrant groups to arrive in 
large numbers in Australia. Greek migration was delayed by 
the Greek civil war [1947-49], and between 1947 to 1954 
only 13,500 Greeks migrated to Australia, bringing their 
total number in 1954 to 25,862 table [7]. 
The large scale Greek migration started after 1954, 
when during the years 1955 to 1966 more than 540,000 Greeks 
left Greece as permanent immigrants to industrialised 
countries [Essays on Greek Migration op.cit:158]. The 
majority of these migrants left for economic reasons, 
belonged to the 15-44 years age group, and 90% of them were 
from rural areas. This unprecedented level of migration was 
reflected in the 1965 Greek statistics, where the natural 
increase of the Greek population stood at 10%, and 
migration at 13.9% [ibid:25]. 
The Greek population of Australia increased by 51,500 
between 1954-61, by 62,700 between 1961-66, and by 20,100 
between 1966-71, and reached a peak of 160,200 in 1971 
table [7]. These figures do not include Greek-Cypriots, 
Greeks from Egypt, or the offspring of Greeks generally. 
Tsounis had estimated that in the middle seventies, there 
were approximately 300,000 Greeks in Australia, including 
their offspring [Tsounis 1974:2]. 
Greeks and Lebanese migrants of this period display 
similar patterns of settlement and employment in most 
areas. Both groups , as the majority of migrants, settled 
in the large urban centres of Australia where the 
manufacturing industries were concentrated. As table [8] 
shows, both Greek and Lebanese migrants record increased 
urbanization levels between 1954 and 1966, nearly 24% up, 
in comparison to the Australian born population [2%], and a 
decline in non-metropolitan residence. 
Table 8: Population by Birthplace Metropolitan and Non-



























includes Other Urban, Rural, and 
Sources ABS 1954, 1966. 
By 1966 58.1% of the total Australian population 
lived in metropolitan areas, whereas the comparable 
percentage for the Lebanese was 90.9%, and 87.1% for the 
Greeks. 
This high level of urbanization was significant for 
both migrant groups. On the one hand, urbanization for the 
groups represented a complete reversal of residential 
environment to their previous rural one. This meant that 
one of their first priorities and needs, was cheap and 
accessible housing. Furthermore, there was an increased 
demand for social and health services necessary for the 
production and reproduction of migrant workers, which 
though wGi"© not available or* accessibl© during assimilation 
period. 
On the other hand, in the process of migration both 
the informal and formal networks of rural Greeks and 
Lebanese, either broke or became irrelevant in the new 
urban and cultural environment. Most often than not, new 
informal networks had to be re-established, and the role of 
the institutions to be reinterpreted and recreated, under 
different socio-economic, cultural, and political 
conditions. Thus, in this period the ethnic community, 
was not only a source and an area of welfare and political 
activity for NES migrants, but also an important refuge 
from alienation. 
Another important aspect of the migration process, was 
that of proletarianization. For both Greeks and Lebanese, 
as for all migrants, this process was quite drastic. 
Although the process of becoming wage-labourers had already 
taken place in their homelands, it had a more profound 
character in Australia. Proletarianization in Australia was 
done within an industrial setting, affected by 
urbanization, cultural and linguistic factors, lack of 
socio-political power in the wider society, the 
assimilation policy, all of which created high levels of 
alienation and social dislocation. 
One way the proletarianization process can be seen is 
through the changing employment status of Lebanese and 
Greek migrants. The employer/self-employed status among 
Table 9; Birthplace by Employment Status 
Emplm.status Years Birthplace 
Australia Greece Lebanon Total 
M A L E S 
Employee 1954 76.8 58.9 68.8 77.4 
1961 — — — — 65.5 .... 
1971 83.1 81.4 N/A 84.0 
Employer 1954 8.0 20.5 14.5 7.7 
1961 11.8 _ _ _ _ 
1971 6.4 7.0 N/A 6.0 
Self Employed 1954 13.2 15.6 13.9 12.5 
1971 — — — — 12.8 
1971 8.8 9.4 N/A 8.2 
Unemployed 1954 1.3 3.9 2.2 1.4 
1961 — — 9.6 
1971 1.4 1.9 N/A 1.4 
Total in 
workforce 1954 60.0 87.0 82.3 62.8 
1961 80.8 
1971 79.6 86.9 N/A 80.3 
F E M A L E S 
Employee 1954 87.6 67.1 68.0 87.2 
1961 — — — 69.8 
1971 88.1 86 .4 N/A 88.4 
Employer 1954 3.5 9.6 13.0 3.5 
1961 7.3 
1971 3.7 3.6 N/A 3.5 
Self Employed 1954 5.8 12.6 16.1 6.1 
1961 12.2 — — 
1971 4.7 6.3 N/A 4.6 
Unemployed 1954 1.6 3.1 0.5 1.6 
1961 8.8 
1971 2.0 2.6 N/A 2.2 
Total in 
workforce 1951 18.3 20.9 29.4 19.0 
1961 31.3 
1971 35.8 48.8 N/A 37.1 
Sources ABS 1954, 1961, 1971. 
Greek males decreased from 36.1% in 1954 to 16.4% in 1971 
and for Greek females 22.2% to 9 .9% respectively table [9] 
For the same period the employee status among Greek males 
increased from 59.9% to 81.4%, and for Greek females from 
67.1% to 86.4%. 
For the Lebanese, unfortunately, the ABS statistical 
figures for the period were not consistent, as most 
statistical data for 1966 and 1971 referred only to the 
large migrant groups. Nevertheless, these fragmented 
figures show that Lebanese migrants followed similar 
employment patterns as Greeks. 
The Lebanese male employer/self-employed status group 
is reduced by 3.8% between 1954 to 1961, and for Lebanese 
females by 9.6% table [9]. The Lebanese figures for 
employee status for the same period are somewhat distorted 
by the economic crisis of the early 60's. For Lebanese 
males there was a decline from 68.8% in 1954 to 65.5% in 
1961, which was attributable to the high unemployment 
levels they were experiencing, 2.2% to 9.6% respectively. 
For Lebanese females the employee status increased by 1.8% 
in 1961, and their unemployment from 0.5% to 8.8.%. 
Another significant aspect of Greek and Lebanese 
labour of the period was their higher rates of workforce 
participation. Between 1954-71 this rate for Greek males 
remained constant at around 87%, for the Lebanese [1954-61] 
there was a small decline of 1.5%. For the Australian males 
the workforce participation rates increased from 60% in 
1954 to 79.6% in 1971. 
The rate of proletarianization also showed a rapid 
increase among migrant women. For instance, Greek female 
workforce participation rose from 20.9% in 1954 to 48.8% in 
1971, which was one of the highest and well above the 1971 
national figure of 37.1% table [9]. For the period 1954-61 
Lebanese female workforce participation rate increased by 
2% to 31.3%, while in 1954 it was 29.4% as compared to the 
20.9% for Greek females. One the main reasons why Greek and 
Lebanese women, along with other NES women, were drawn in 
large numbers in the labour market, was the low wages paid 
to their husbands. 
The majority of Greek and Lebanese women in the labour 
market were married, had to supplement the family's income, 
look after their children, house duties, and husbands, 
without having any institutional support like child care 
[Cox 1975 op.cit: 16]. 
Thus, the main features of both Greeks and Lebanese 
migrants until 1971 were a high and rapid rate of 
proletarianization for both sexes, and a sharp fall in the 
employer/self-employed status. This was the general pattern 
for the total Australian population, with the important 
difference of the employer/self-employed status among the 
migrant petit-bourgeoisie of pre-war communities, declining 
faster and more steeply than the national figure. 
The changes in the employment status of Lebanese and 
Greeks, were accompanied by changes in their occupational 
status as well. Between 1954-71 the participation of the 
Greek males in the manufacturing sector, increased from 
26.2% to 44.9%, and for Greek females from 33.3% to 54.6% 
table [10]. For the same period the Australian-born male 
participation rate in the manufacturing sector was reduced 
from 26.3% in 1954 to 21.6% in 1971, and for females from 
25% to 14.7% respectively. In the construction sector, by 
1971, 10% of the Australian born males were employed, a 
drop of only 0.7% since 1954, while the Greeks and 
Yugoslavs recorded increases of up to 4%. 
Table 10: Males and Females classified according to 
Industry by Birthplace 1954, 1961*, 1971. (%) 
Birthplace Years Industry 
Manuf. Constr. Commer. Pub.Adm. Amus 
M A L E S 
Australia 1954 26.3 10.7 14.2 9.3 3.1 
1971 21.6 10.0 17.4 6.6 4.0 
Greece 1954 26.2 5.2 16.8 0.9 29.8 
1971 44.9 9.3 18.4 1.1 7.7 
Yugoslavia 1954 41.0 14.2 5.6 3.7 4.2 
1971 48.8 17.2 7.9 1.4 2.2 
Lebanon 1954 55.1 4.2 23.7 1.4 5.9 
1961* 50.6 5.8 21.7 0.6 5.7 
Total o/s 
born 1954 34.8 13.6 10.9 8.2 4.8 
1971 34.7 3.8 13.3 5.6 4.4 
TOTAL 1954 28.0 11.3 13.6 9.1 3.5 
1971 25.2 10.9 16.8 6.2 4.1 
F E M A L E S 
Australia 1954 25.0 23.5 22.4 15.1 
1971 14.7 — 24.4 4.5 9.8 
Greece 1954 33.3 — 20.6 2.2 36.2 
1971 54.6 - - 17.8 0.7 9.9 
Yugoslavia 1954 52.8 — 8.5 13.9 17.6 
1971 55.1 — 9.5 1.0 7.5 
Lebanon 1954 47.7 — 28.9 4.1 16.1 
1961* 49.1 — 24.6 1.3 12.9 
Total o/s 
born 1954 36.9 — 16.9 20.3 17.3 
1971 30.8 — — 20.5 3.0 4.9 
TOTAL 1954 26.8 — 22.5 22.0 14.8 
1971 18.9 — 23.4 4.2 4.1 
1961* There are no 1971 statistics available for Lebanese 
Source ABS 1954, 1961, 1971. 
Finally, other significant changes and differences in 
occupational status can seen in the administrative and 
'amusement' sectors. Greeks, Lebanese and Yugoslavs were 
grossly under-represented in administrative occupations. 
There was also a sharp decline in the participation of 
Greeks in the 'amusement' sector, which included catering, 
by 22.1% for males and 26.3% for females [1954-71], who 
were mostly absorbed by the manufacturing sector. 
The general characteristics of settlement and work for 
Lebanese and Greeks during the assimilation period were 
high and sharp increases in the process of 
proletarianization, concentrated in the manufacturing 
sector, a decline of self-employment status, and high 
levels of urbanization. Both the Greek and Lebanese 
communities in the first 25 years after the war, change 
from petit-bourgeois shopkeeping based, to working class 
based. 
The ensuing intra-communal conflicts that developed 
within each community, were portrayed by the protagonists 
as conflicts over ethnic symbols, which actually 
represented deeper socio-political and economic interests 
between conservative and progressive class alliances. 
7.2: Post-war settlement of Greeks and the Greek Community 
The Greek Orthodox Communities [GOC's], were the only 
institutions that provided Greeks with a form of political 
representation and participation, and a focus of social, 
cultural, and religious activities. The Central Community 
of N.S.W. at Paddington, was the largest and most 
influential, and was regarded as the representative body of 
the whole community. 
In the late 40's and 50's, the GOC's across Australia 
were still under the control of the pre-war petit-
bourgeoisie. This monopolization of power, resources, and 
prestige by the old conservatives, however, came under 
increasing threat in the mid 50s. Many factors were 
involved in the erosion of the power of the conservatives, 
amongst the most important were: 
a. The large number of Greek migrants arriving in Sydney 
le d into a larger institutional fragmentation in the 
community. 
b. The absorption of the vast majority of the new arrivals 
by the Australian economy weakened the control of the old 
petit-bourgeoisie over the labour power of Greek workers. 
So, the old settlers shifted their economic emphasis in 
treating the whole community as a consumption market 
[Kakakios op.cit: 152-59]. 
c. The high level of proletarianization of the new 
settlers, and their lack of wide socio-political expression, 
increased the pressure on the community institutions to 
become more representative and responsive to their new 
aspirations and social needs. 
This last factor was evident in the growth of a major 
political institution in Sydney during the 50s, of the 
Atlas Workers Club. According to the respondent from Atlas, 
the club was established around 1942, possibly as a 
sporting club at the beginning. During the war some Greek 
freight ships were stranded in Sydney harbour, and many 
Greek seamen became members of Atlas. Later on the majority 
of these sailors worked either as water side workers or 
labourers, joined unions and in this way Atlas became a 
workers club. 
The first post-war members of Atlas were mainly Greek-
CypriotSy î^̂ot Greeks from Greece. The reason for this 
was that Atlas was a left wing organization active during 
the Cold-War era, and its membership was under surveillance, 
so Greek-Cypriots who were British subjects could not be 
easily expelled. The few other Greek members, according to 
the respondent from Atlas, used mostly aliases. Some of 
Atlas' members belonged to the CPA, and the Club had strong 
links with left-wing unions. 
As the number of Greek migrants arriving in Australia 
in the 50s increased, so did the membership and political 
activity of Atlas. The GOC under the control of the 
conservative petit-bourgeoisie bitterly opposed Atlas, 
while the latter targeted the GOC for political influence. 
The respondent from Atlas, explained how the Left 
approached the political conflict between the new and old 
settlers : 
"We saw the participation of the Left in the GOC 
as a part of the struggle for the démocratisation 
of the community, not as a war against religion, 
or the Church. We saw that the Right, the 
reactionary forces in our community, were 
represented by the clergy. As there was no 
participation of Greeks in the conservative 
[Australian] political parties, there was none in 
the Liberals, and in the ALP only a handful. So, 
the Rose Bay siders, the aristocrats, were 
together with the Archdiocese, and wanted to keep 
the others out. And we saw the struggle as a 
démocratisation of the GOC to include also the 
new Greek migrants, to represent and reflect the 
views of the newcomers, who came to fight for 
their livelihood, and were not rich. They had to 
fight, so the GOC could develop certain 
activities which were to relieve Greeks. To try 
to promote union membership, to take a stand 
against assimilation, to create Greek schools, to 
provide charity...". * 
Clearly Atlas saw its role, and possible influence 
through the GOC, as a leading one in the community, while 
identified the conservative elements of the GOC and the 
Archdiocese, which was part of the GOC, as the main 
obstacles for the démocratisation of the community. Atlas 
appeared to be prepared to work towards a more dynamic and 
prticipatory community, willing to pursue wider social 
issues, and link into Australian working class 
institutions, while at the same time to retain and develop 
the cultural identity of Greeks. 
An important point raised by the respondent in the 
statement, as well as in other ones of his throughout the 
interview, was the lack of access of the Greek petit-
bourgeoisie in the Australian political parties. Those few 
Greeks who were members of the ALP at the time, were mostly 
leftists seeking a safe cover to avoid deportation. 
In the 1950's two broad political alliances emerged 
within the GOC's. On the one hand, there was an alliance of 
progressive petit-bourgeoisie forces with the growing 
working class, and on the other hand an alliance between 
old and new conservative petit-bourgeoisie. 
The political and socio-economic conflict of interests 
of the two alliances and their struggle for control of the 
GOC, was expressed in the form of manipulating the same 
cultural identity of Greeks, their Greekness. In other 
words, the ideological and political conflict of the two 
opposing groups, was presented by each group as the most 
appropriate interpretation of Greekness in the new social 
environment. 
What emerged as the apparent source of conflict 
between the progressive and conservative forces, as in the 
1920's, was the role of the Church in social life. The 
GOC combined both secular and religious functions. However, 
such a structure had a contradictory role in an 
industrialised society, which had no state religion, and 
the social and religious spheres of life were clearly 
defined. 
This contradiction, and its consequent conflicting 
interpretations, was presented by both sides as the real 
source of the conflict, and it was partly true. The 
progressive alliance wanted to assert the dominance of the 
secular over the religious part, whereby the GOC Council 
could have the absolute authority to organise the social 
and cultural life, choose priests for its churches, and for 
the Archdiocese to attend to its religious and national 
duties. 
At that time the Archdiocese, through its priesthood, 
had the power to veto GOC Council decisions, or ignore 
them. The conservative forces, were under increasing 
attack, pressure and diminishing representation by the new 
arrival, closed ranks with the Archdiocese to counter the 
progressive forces, and stem the tide of loosing control of 
the GOC•s. 
This intra-communal conflict, was also affected by-
wider ideological processes taking place in Australia and 
Greece. After the end of the Civil War in Greece in 1949, 
the right wing governments embarked on a permanent and 
repressive anti-communist propaganda, which lasted for 25 
years. Greeks who disagreed with either the government or 
the state, which was virtually the same, were branded 
communists, anti-Orthodox, traitors, and anti-Greek. This 
form of ideological social control and oppression inhibited 
any possible wider support or participation in left-wing 
organizations. 
In Australia the Cold-War period further discouraged 
left-wing participation, and also helped to accentuate the 
political differences of the two Greek opposing groups. The 
identification of the progressive alliance with the left 
provided the conservatives, and especially the Church, with 
many opportunities to criticise them severely, and use 
their anti-communist position as an additional 
justification to set up a new independent, moral, and 
national leadership. 
Eventually the conflict came to a climax in 1959. In 
that year the conservative alliance was removed from the 
GOC Councils by the sheer number of the progressive forces 
[Kakakios op.cit:155]. As a result of that the Greek 
community was split across Australia. The progressive 
alliance retained the control of the Central Community of 
N.S.W., and of some other GOC's, while the Archdiocese with 
the support of the Conservatives, and indirectly of the 
Greek Consular representatives, set up the Greek Orthodox 
Archdiocese [GOA], independent from the control of the GOC. 
Archbishop lezekiel was the first leader of the GOA. 
In the following statement, the priest respondent 
from the Archdiocese stated explicitly the motives for the 
establishment of the independent GOA: 
"After 1960 the Church gradually starts to get 
organised, with the creation of parish-
communities, independent now, because the Church 
saw the problem in that Hellenism should have a 
new structure, and the only structure to survive 
was for the parishes-communities to multiply, so 
every group in every area to have an interest. 
And this action proved to be soul-saving, nation-
saving, because all are unified...there is no 
other force to unite them". * 
The new Archdiocese, therefore, did not see the role 
of the Church restricted only to religious activities, but 
in the wider context of community leadership. The use of 
the term Hellenism by the respondent, instead of Greeks, 
has significant ideological context as it has already been 
said. Thus, the Archdiocese assumed the role of moral, 
spiritual and national guardian and leader of the Greek 
community. 
The parish-community structure of the GOA proved 
successful and efficient, because of the political support 
it received, and its decentralised nature. The counciBDr 
positions created in the new communities were filled in 
with the disaffected members of the old and new petit-
bourgeoisie. Some Communities accepted the authority of the 
Archdiocese only in religious matters, while they retained 
the property titles of the church buildings. 
The respondent from Atlas gave the following statement 
to describe what happened after the split, and the Left's 
perception of the situation. In retrospect, he acknowledged 
the mistakes made in the evaluation and action towards the 
Archdiocese, that is, the entanglement and preoccupation of 
the left with primordial issues: 
"The Archbishop used to go to various suburbs, 
find respectable citizens, mainly illiterate 
people who had a shop, he will get them to 
mortgage the shop, buy a little house and make 
it a church. And his aim, of course, was to 
encircle the GOC with various off-shoots, as we 
used to call them, which eventually weakened the 
GOC and kneeled it down. Unfortunately, we didn't 
see that from the beginning. In general the 
Community people didn't see this trick by the 
Archbishop, and the GOC restricted itself in 
declaring that the off-shoots don't exist, 
they're vegetating,and we didn't try to enter 
[the parishes] as there were opportunities.Had 
they have seen it correctly at the time, it could 
had been over, or very small. He [the Archbishop] 
continued the paper-war with the GOC, 'you're 
communists - no we're not', 'you're dismissed -
no we're not, we're dismissing you'...etc. That 
was the mistake, that we got involved, not only 
with the paper-war, but also with the religious 
issue. And basically, the Arctibishop 
disorientated us, and we have to accept that. We 
fell into his trap, and instead of mobilising the 
community to focus on its problems...all our 
efforts were spent to build a church, and create 
a hierarchy".* 
The progressive alliance tried to assume the dominance 
of the secular sector over the religious, and partly 
succeeded in that within its own sphere of influence. 
Simultaneously it attempted to use the religious issue for 
its own benefit, as a means to achieve power within the 
whole community. 
In the struggle with the Archdiocese the GOC, and to 
a large extent the Left/ became so preoccupied with the 
religious question, that left the organization and 
development of alternative ideologies for the Greek 
working-class underdeveloped and inarticulate. As a result 
both the GOC and Atlas, whose political links and 
fortunes became inextricably tied together in the 1960's, 
lost their representativeness, influence and ability to 
offer real organizational and intellectual alternatives, to 
those offered by the Archdiocese. 
Tsounis argues that the Greek Left in Sydney, and 
generally in Australia, never managed to develop an 
analysis and interpretation of the conditions,and needs of 
the Greek working class and its allies. The community split 
was not the only reason, but in addition to that 
the assimilation policy employed by the state and by some 
unions [Tsounis, M 'The Greek Left in Australia', 
Australian Left Review 29, March 1971, pp.53-60]. 
The GOC•s were petit-bourgeois institutions geared to 
cultural maintenance and they proved a continuous source of 
conflict and ideological confusion for the Left [Kakakios 
op.cit: 159]. They tried to redefine Greekness by offering 
more of the same - more schools and cultural activities- as 
the Archdiocese. 
On the other hand the Archdiocese, after the late 
60s became the dominant institutional and ideological 
expression of the conservatives in the community. Certainly 
the Archdiocese had its own esoteric reasons to leave the 
GOC, namely the creation of parishes under its own 
jurisdiction, and the acquisition of the church properties 
of the parishes which could best guarantee its survival. 
The conservatives proved more successful than their 
opponents in using the priesthood to advance their socio-
political and economic interests. They were very quick to 
realise the ideological, and political importance of their 
alliance with an independent Archdiocese. The conservative 
petit-bourgeoisie, found in the cultural tradition of the 
Greek Orthodox Church, as espoused by the Archdiocese, the 
perfect medium to achieve the impression of a homogenous 
ideological community, based on the concept of Hellenism. 
In this way the conservative alliance covered its real 
interests, economic, social, status and political power, 
behind Hellenism, which helped it to increase their 
legitimacy and dominance, while this ideology inhibited the 
development of alternative ideologies by the progressive 
alliance. 
In a study of a Greek community split in a USA city, 
Simon describes how the Greek-American middle class 
modified the Orthodox Church, in order to achieve wider 
socio-economic and political access to the host society 
[Simon 1979:158-69]. Simon's argument is that the 
separation of state and church in the USA, meant that the 
Greek Orthodox Church was the only non-suspicious and 
legitimate institution where middle class Greeks could 
develop formal and informal social business networks. 
These Greeks started to modify the Greek Church along 
the lines of the Protestant one, by creating layity 
positions for men through parishes, communities, and other 
structures. Consequently, the traditional role of women as 
the support group of the Church was reduced, and directed 
towards charity functions. 
This process also involved the promotion of a stronger 
work ethic, with emphasis on the development of 
entrepreneurial skills. In this way the Greek-Amerioan 
middle class managed to assimilate in the American society, 
as they tried to be culturally less noticeable, and 
projected this new image to their communities as the true 
spirit of Hellenism. 
This process in Australia started at a slower pace and 
under different conditions, and with different 
characteristics. The small number of Greek middle class in 
Australia, the large number of industrial workers, the 
intra-communal conflict (which actually accelerated this 
process), the nature Australian economy, and the policy of 
assimilation were among the main contributing factors for 
this slow development. 
The participation and acceptance of the Greek 
bourgeoisie in Australian institutions, starts during the 
60s and accelerates in the 70s, when multiculturalism 
consolidated this process. In this period the upward 
social mobility of Greeks shifts from being dependent on 
entrepreneurial initiative, to educational attainment 
[Kakakios op.cit:158:63]. 
The community split had a negative impact on the Greek 
working class. The conflict alienated the majority of 
Greeks from both institutions, and the rate of membership, 
participation, and interest declined. The reasons for that 
were the politics of power, personal ambition, the 
animosity between the two opposing groups, and ultimately 
the increasing irrelevancy of the institutions in the daily 
lives of people. N.S.W. had about 1/3 of the Greek pre-war 
migrants in Australia, with a strong conservative petit-
bourgeoisie presence, and this also affected the 
development of Greek Women's organizations outside the 
church charity organizations. 
The success of the conservatives in Sydney in 
political and ideological terms, can be attributed partly 
to the political failure of the Left to develop alternative 
working class ideology, the presence of a large pre-war 
petit-bourgeoisie class in N.S.W., and that Sydney was the 
basis of the Greek Orthodox Church. In contrast to the 
situation in Sydney, in Melbourne the balance of power 
tipped in favour of the GOC's, and the Archdiocese has 
little political influence there. In the Greek community of 
Brisbane the balance of power is in favour of the 
Archdiocese, while in Adelaide there is more or less equal 
distribution of power in the community. 
7.3: Welfare in the Greek Community 
The size of the Greek migration, proletarianization 
and urban settlement, had generated complex welfare 
problems for Greek workers. Without any state services or 
support for migrant welfare provision, the labour market 
acted as the main welfare distributor. The structure. 
mentality and knowledge of Greek institutions was not 
geared to the demands of an industrial society, and 
therefore were unable to address them. 
There is no available literature that specifically 
examines the provision of welfare in the Greek communities 
of that period. Tsounis refers only in general terms on 
this subject [Tsounis 1975]. He lists as the main providers 
of welfare the GOC's, the church. Brotherhoods, 
associations and other clubs. These organizations provided 
a residual foinm form of welfare like charity, donations, 
for the deseirving needy, and generally self-help practices. 
As the GOC, the Archdiocese, and Atlas were the 
dominant socio-political and cultural institutions of the 
community, the focus will be on their role as welfare 
providers. An important institution in the provision of 
welfare was the Greek Church, which was acting through both 
the GOG'S and the Archdiocese. 
Although the ideological role of religion will be 
discussed in detail in the following chapters, a brief 
outline of its ideological and welfare role is necessary to 
understand these roles during the assimilation period. One 
of the definitions of religion is given by Cox as being: 
"The capacity of the human organism to transcend 
its biological nature through the construction of 
objective morally binding and encompassing 
Universes of meaning... it is a system of faith 
which helps men to cope with the basic problem of 
human existence". [Cox 1982:1] 
Thus, the need of believers to practice, experience 
and propagate their beliefs, unite them into a single moral 
community, the church. In this sense the church comes to be 
a moral and ritual community, and the basic values and 
perception of society are concentrated around the sacred. 
Religion tries to subordinate the empirical to the non 
empirical. That is to say, the interpretation of social 
needs by religion is unlikely to be a true reflection of 
them, as the social relations necessary to achieve the 
religious realisation of these needs, are subordinated to 
the assumed power of a supernatural being, [loc.cit]. 
This universalistic conception of society and Man by 
religion, will influence the development of all social 
forms of organization in society. Consequently, the church 
has an important socio-political role to play in 
determining the nature, and structure of social 
organization. 
According to Mishra, religion plays a central role in 
the welfare of people of rural societies, such as the type 
of society the post-war Greek and Lebanese migrants came 
from: 
"Religion - both as a set of beliefs and as an 
organization - symbolizes and upholds the idea of 
community... these are integrative functions par 
excellence". [Mishra op.cit:50] 
The Greek Archdiocese saw its welfare role as central 
to its activities. The Archdiocesean priest described how 
the Church viewed the initial arrival of Greek migrants: 
"There were two churches and two priests. They 
were surprised by the migration, as they hadn't 
been informed. There was nobody, absolutely 
nobody to help the church with the 
responsibilities it had to face". * 
The priests were the leaders and organisers in the 
provision of spiritual and material assistance. However, 
they did not possess the skills and resources to deal with 
the complex demands of an industrial society. As the same 
respondent explained: 
"The priests had around them groups of people who 
paid visits to hospitals, hostels etc...We used 
to have sermons to encourage them, to give them 
information, but all these were happening because 
of some good people, not because there was 
something concrete, organised or to do with 
something to claim any rights...We couldn't talk 
about rights, because of assimilation".* 
The denial of social rights under assimilation was 
strongly felt by the Church, and this was due to two main 
reasons: a) It denied the ethnic Church of legitimacy and 
access to state resources, and the conservatives of their 
social class status, b) The denial of cultural recognition 
was perceived as threatening the existence of the Church. 
Except the Archdiocese, welfare activities were 
performed by volunteers, bi-lingual professionals, 
charitable organizations, while the Greek coffee shops 
operated as information centres. The GOC's main welfare 
activities centred around the churches belonging to them. 
The GOC respondent summarised in the following statement 
the state of welfare provision in the Greek community at 
that time: 
"Welfare (during this period) was to plug some 
holes, to approach certain deserving 
individuals... it was much a reaction to 
misfortunes that had befallen on individuals". 
Together with the GOC and the GOA, Atlas was also 
involved in welfare activities. According to the respondent 
from Atlas, the club staged theatrical plays, organised 
talks on various issues, published a weekly pamphlet, and a 
fortnightly bulletin with labour news. However, the largest 
part of Atlas' activity was related to that of the working 
conditions and rights of the newly arrived Greek migrants. 
According to the respondent from Atlas: 
"There were many migrants coming by ships, and we 
from Atlas would go with pamphlets to welcome 
them. We explained to them what the Atlas club is 
...their rights in their work, the unions, what 
they could claim as citizens. But most of all, 
information on work, conditions of life, and 
wages".* 
The respondent gave an example of some of the working 
conditions faced by the new arrivals, and the role of Atlas 
in helping the Greek workers in cases where their rights 
had been abused: 
"As at that time they used to get a lot of 
young women to Bonigilla,some rich people used to 
go there, and take them to work as housemaids or 
in the shops they owned... Yes, Greek rich 
people, and there was great exploitation. They 
used to work 7 days a week like slaves. They 
wouldn't go out at all, so not to come in contact 
and learn what they were entitled to...With the 
help of the Hotel, Clubs and Restaurants union, 
we found some, mainly young women or even young 
men, who were exploited in this way in Milk Bars, 
restaurants etc. We took up their cases, went to 
court, and got compensation for lost wages etc, 
(at times) for hundreds of pounds". * 
So in contrast to the GOA or GOC, whose welfare 
practice was charity and spiritual appeasement. Atlas 
followed a different welfare practice. This practice 
involved the rise of the class consciousness of the Greek 
working class, to organise it and fight for better working 
and living conditions. As the respondent from Atlas 
explained, individual cases of misfortune were not seen 
in a limited way, only to improve the condition of the 
individual, but to affect changes in the general welfare of 
Greek workers: 
"Since the establishment of Atlas, there were 
members of the CPA who worked as members of 
Atlas...and they tried to point out to members 
the social forces that drive society...The 
purpose was to show the existence of the 
capitalist system. And every case we undertook, 
was to show people that the system is responsible 
for all the exploitation. It wasn't a matter of 
charity, 'he's working 20 hours a day, let's go 
and tell his boss to reduce them to 18...' In 
other words, there was a start for strengthening 
the progressive forces within the community. And 
always we saw welfare in this way... To find 
certain cases where the individual himself was 
prepared to get in front, and the organization to 
provide back up, so to claim something that will 
have a larger impact, and not to be confined only 
in the relief of the individual".* 
Thus, throughout the 50s and 60s the Greek 
institutions tried to come into grips with the social needs 
of Greek workers, using different ideologies and practices. 
The deepening political divisions in the Community, the 
strengthening of the conservatives forces, and the policy 
of assimilation, all combined to undermine any positive 
directions towards meeting the welfare needs of Greek 
workers. 
7.4: Post-war Lebanese Settlement and Community 
The post-war settlement of Lebanese in Sydney followed 
some important similarities and differences, with their 
pre-war counterparts. The pattern of chain migration based 
on regional and religious affiliations continued, though 
migration of kinship was reduced. Like the first Lebanese 
migrants, the post-war ones were migrating mainly from the 
rural areas of Lebanon. The early post-war Lebanese 
migrants were predominantly Christians, and only after the 
early 60's Muslim Lebanese started to migrate to Australia. 
Some of the new arrivals found work in Lebanese 
businesses, or became self-employed, the majority of them 
though became factory workers [Bat ourney op.cit 74]. There 
was considerable pressure from the old petit-bourgeoisie, 
on the new migrants to conform to the new values, and adopt 
an independent, hard working attitude for a successful 
economic and social mobility. 
This middle-class ideology of the old settlers came 
into conflict with the Lebanese national identity of the 
new arrivals, and their more working class attitude. As in 
the case of the Greeks, the conflict between the opposing 
political groups was fought over the definition and control 
of Lebanese identity [ibid:75-6]. 
The post-war Lebanese had a stronger sense of national 
identity than the pre-war settlers, though this identity 
was fragmented by religious and regional factors. Lebanon 
became a nation in 1926, and gained its independence under 
the French mandate in 1947. Under this mandate all six 
major religious sects were represented in the state 
apparatus. The Christian sects were the Maronites, 
Melkites, and Orthodox, while the Muslim were the Shi'ites, 
Sunnis f and Druze. 
This arrangement turned out to be destructive and 
divisive for Lebanon and led to the Civil war in 1975, 
which is still going on [ibid:14]. The concept of nation 
is that of a solidary ideological community, a community 
based on the realm of culture - of a common language, 
religion, customs or political experience and territorial 
area [Thompson op.cit:59]. On the other hand nationalism 
masks class relations and inequalities in society. 
The development of such a national identity did not 
take a very strong hold in Lebanon because of external and 
internal factors. Externally, the establishment of Israel, 
the Egyptian national revolution, and the 1967 Arab-Israeli 
war and other Middle East events created new or accentuated 
existing domestic political problems in Lebanon. 
Internally, Lebanese regionalism remained strong. 
More importantly though, the religious compartmentalisation 
of Lebanese society acted as a catalyst in bringing to a 
violent stage its socio-economic and political 
inequalities. Lebanon had identifiable and distinct 
religious ideological communities. The Christian and Muslim 
communities shared the same language and many customs, but 
had different positions and roles in the political and 
socio-economic life of Lebanon. 
The religious diversity of Lebanon was not the main 
obstacle for national unity. Many European countries, 
Australia and the USA, have religious diversity but still 
have achieved a strong sense of nationalism. What proved to 
be the obstacle for a strong Lebanese national identity and 
unity was the high degree of institutionalisation of the 
religious communities that made up the state. It was the 
mobilisation of religion as a political ideology for 
political participation that led to the civil war in 
Lebanon [A.Scboul in 'The Arabic Community: Realities and 
Challenges', AWI 1985: 19]. 
Lebanon went through a substantial economic growth 
during the 50s and 60 with the main economic activity been 
comprador trade between East and West. The financial and 
trading activity was concentrated among Christians, with 
the Maronites dominating it. Under the French mandate, the 
president of Lebanon was always a Maronite, while the prime 
minister a Muslim. 
The increasing socio-economic and political 
marginalisation of a sizeable proportion of the population 
was perceived and expressed to a large extent in sectarian 
terms. The Muslims became particularly disadvantaged, and 
they saw that as a result of the wealth and the political 
power of the Christians, mainly of the Maronites. 
Gradually the state came to be seen as acting on 
behalf of a section of society, of the Christians, and lost 
its legitimacy. As Thompson points out, the state can only 
survive if: 
"...in so far as it harnessed the solidarity-
feelings of the national community in support of 
its power. Reciprocally, the nation could only 
preserve its distinctive identity, its culture, 
through the protection it received from the power 
of the state". [Thompson op.cit: 59]. 
In Lebanon's case, the institutional sectarian 
structure and its effect on the state, could not affect the 
harnessing of the national identity. The Lebanese state 
became openly an institution for preserving, promoting, and 
reinforcing the interests of a section of society, and 
consequently lost its legitimacy and authority. For this 
reason civil war in Lebanon became unavoidable. 
Despite this, the post-war arrivals had a stronger 
Lebanese national and cultural identity, than the post war 
migrants. The impact of this was felt in the revival of 
traditional Lebanese institutions, mostly related to the 
establishment of churches. The Maronites established their 
own church in 1956, while the Melkites in 1977. 
In the first twenty years of post-war Lebanese 
migration, the Lebanese population of Sydney remained 
relatively small, and so the number of formal institutions. 
The main division was that between old and new migrants, 
expressed in terms of confessional identification. 
Political activity was restricted to some families, and 
there were no newspapers to form public opinion and discuss 
community issues. As the Orthodox Lebanese priest 
explained: 
"The rumours, the problems or the friction, were 
more or less restricted to a certain area, or 
certain families...Newspapers started in 1972, 
they were attempts before, but failed". 
The only secular Lebanese institution at the time was 
the Australian Lebanese Association [ALA], which attempted 
to provide an overarching platform for socio-political 
participation. The ALA was established in 1949 by the old 
Lebanese petit-bourgeoisie on a charter based on non-
political, non-sectarian, non-profit lines, and membership 
was open to all people of Lebanese descent. In 1964 the 
Association participated, together with the Lebanese 
government and other overseas Lebanese organizations, in 
the establishment of the World Lebanese Cultural Union, and 
after that the ALA forged stronger links with the Lebanese 
state. 
The ALA'S political and welfare function, however, 
became increasingly unworkable, as the old petit-
bourgeoisie wanted to assume complete political dominance 
in the organization and the community. The Lebanese 
Orthodox priest provided the following account of his 
experience with the ALA in the 1960s: 
"I joined the ALA to help...As in every ethnic 
community, there are always the people who try to 
exploit their position for self promotion. We had to 
fight selfishness, power struggle...people didn't 
care. Especially there was a gap between those who 
came before the war, and those who came after the 
war, and the animosity between them was tremendous". 
The political and ideological gap between the old and 
new Lebanese migrants was never bridged. The old petit-
bourgeoisie, mostly Maronites, did not manage to establish 
an ideological and political alliance with the new arrivals 
and their representatives in the ALA. This in turn 
strengthened the religious and regional identification of 
Lebanese, and at the same time deprived the new arrivals of 
resources and leadership skills. The ALA gradually came to 
be seen as a bastion of the old petit-bourgeoisie 
[Battourney op.cit: 87]. 
7.5: Welfare in the Lebanese Community 
The ALA had established a welfare sub-committee, which 
was an attempt to provide some foanti of welfare service to 
the new arrivals. The Orthodox priest was a member of this 
sub-committee : 
"I joined (the ALA), and we had a very successful 
welfare sub-committee, of which I was the 
convener...We had a very good social worker...We 
had started interpreting for health services 
myself and my wife...We started sessions with 
migrants and doctors... It remained like this for 
8 years". 
As in the case of Greeks, so with the Lebanese the 
churches of the various denominations, played a very 
important role in the provision of residual welfare, as 
they were also the only alternative institutions to the 
ALA. The Lebanese Orthodox priest recalled his experience 
at the time: 
"Until the early 70's there was nearly 
nothing...The Church was the only body which 
could provide some help, but only on a limited 
way...The main purpose was more religious and 
spiritual, but to be able to be pre-occupied with 
their daily needs was extra work. All churches 
were like that, not only mine. Maronites, 
Melkites, Muslim...And people wanting help used 
to come to the church and ask the priest in every 
area, customs, police, housing, everything was 
solved in the church. And the church didn't have 
the manpower to facilitate these needs, because 
really the church was meant to be a different 
structure". 
A similar situation to that of Sydney, existed with 
Maronite Church in Melbourne. According to the Maronite 
priest: 
"The church didn't have the structure to offer 
help...In Melbourne monsignor Paul was virtually 
like a social worker...He would help everybody, 
to buy furniture, marry people...He will be the 
organiser, he will be virtually the centre of 
whatever activities were happening, whether 
religious, social or welfare". 
Bat ourney also refers to the activity of the Maronite 
church in Melbourne, which responded to the welfare needs 
of Christian and Muslim Lebanese [ibid: 89]. 
As in the case of the Greek priesthood, the Lebanese 
too was compelled to mix parochial and spiritual guidance 
to organise and meet some welfare needs of their 
communities' members. It is also quite clear from the 
priest respondents, that their agrarian churches had 
neither the structure, nor the means to meet the social and 
psychological needs of their working class populations. 
Muslims during this period were very few in number so 
there were not any religious structures and very few 
welfare activities. The Muslim respondent from the Muslim 
Welfare Centre referred to only the following form of 
welfare provision for Muslims in the 1960s: 
"...In 1967 there was a house where people could 
gather in and provide few services. The co-
ordinator used to seat in that house, in his 
spare time, and assist people, because he had 
come to Australia some 30 years ago. And through 
his involvement in the welfare field he came to 
know more about the welfare activity going around 
than anyone else in the community. He used to 
assist those Muslims who were present at that 
time in whatever capability". 
After 1967 the Lebanese population settling in 
Australia started to grow rapidly, and so did the inability 
of the existing community structures to cope with the 
needs of the new arrivals. This situation, and the 
political conflict in the community, led to an increased 
ideological and institutional fragmentation. According to 
the Lebanese Orthodox: 
"From the 1970s onwards organizational thinking 
spread...The ALA weakened by internal trouble, 
didn't fulfill its charter of servicing the 
Lebanese community...The churches had their own 
welfare structures. Because of the failure of the 
ALA, the village associations came up. They tried 
to take up, more or less, the role of the church 
by providing services to their members...". 
With the active intervention of the state in ethnic 
communal affairs, the nature of the political struggle in 
the Greek and Lebanese communities changed, as did the 
provision of welfare. Institutional and class legitimacy 
for the Greek and Lebanese petit-bourgeoisie became 
interwoven with their claims for state resources and 
recognition. 
CHAPTER 8 
MULTICULTURAL PERIOD 1975 TO PRESENT 
Greek and Lebanese Migration after 1971 
The Greek born migrant settlers in Australia reached 
their peak at 160,200 in 1971, and after that their numbers 
steadily declined to 152,908 in 1976, 146,625 in 1981, and 
137,637 in 1986 table [11]. For the same period the 
Lebanese born population stood at 24,218 in 1971, showed a 
dramatic increase of 25,000 between 1976-1981, while in 
1986 had reached 56,341. 
Table 11: Population by Birthplace 
Birthplace 1971 1976 1981 1986 
Greece 160,200 152,908 146,625 137,637 
Lebanon 24,218 33,424 49,625 56,341 
Source ABS 1971, 1976, 1981, 1986 (microfiche). 
The reasons for the increased Lebanese migration were 
tied to the Middle East events after 1967, and the 
continuous Lebanese civil war since 1975, which disrupted 
the lives of Lebanese and forced many of them to leave the 
country. Many Lebanese were invited in Australia by their 
kin, and whereas the earlier settlers were economic 
migrants, the post-75 Lebanese arrivals were classified as 
quasi refugees. 
Quasi refugee status meant that people have left 
their countiry voluntairily foir their own safety, but may 
return back if the danger ceased to exist. This arrival 
status denied Lebanese of many services and help which is 
available to groups classified as refugees, as in the case 
of the Indo-Chinese. 
During the period 1954-1981 the Lebanese and Greek 
populations of NSW remained fairly stable. In 1954 there 
were 2,766 Lebanese in NSW or 71,6% of the total Lebanese 
population in Australia, while in 1981 the respective 
number was 36,952 or 74.5%. The Greeks in 1954 had 9,175 
persons living in NSW or 35,5% of their total population in 
Australia, and in 1981 47,606 or 32,5% [ABS 1981]. Also in 
1981 the total Greek and Lebanese population with the same 
birthplace for both parents was 244,205 and 74,134 
respectively [ABS 1981]. 
The employment status of the two groups has already 
been discussed in Chapter 4 table [3]. The most important 
changes in the employment status of the the two groups were 
their declining employee status, the extremely high 
unemployment levels experienced by Lebanese men and women, 
and an equalisation of the male workforce participation 
rates, while Lebanese females continued to have low 
participation rates in the labour market. 
The limits of occupational opportunities for NES 
migrants was well illustrated in their occupational 
mobility. Table [12] shows that in relation to occupational 
changes for Greeks, Lebanese and Italians between 1966 and 
1981, there was very little improvement in professional and 
administrative occupations for them when compared to the 
Geannans, UK & Ireland and Australians. F o r the same p e r i o d 
there was a g e n e r a l decline in participation in m a n u a l 
o c c u p a t i o n s , w i t h Greek m e n and women registering the 
highest f a l l 19,9% and 27.5% respectively. In the service 
sector A u s t r a l i a n , UK & Irish, German and Lebanese 
female participation decreased, while for Italian and Greek 
women there was an increase of 4-5%. 
Table 12: O c c u p a t i o n a l Status by Birthplace by S e x . (%) 
Birthplace Y e a r | 1 Profess. 1 A d m i n . | M a n u a l 1 Service| 
M A L E S 
Australia 1966 7.8 8, ,2 39, .4 3. 8 
1981 11.9 7, .5 37, .0 5 . 0 
UK & Irel. 1966 9.2 7. .6 49, .3 5 . 4 
1981 13.8 8. .5 42, .4 6. 1 
Germany 1966 7.0 5. .4 62. .5 6. 1 
1981 12.2 9. .0 49. .8 4 . 5 
Greece 1966 0.6 5. .7 69. .7 7. 0 
1981 2.8 6. .9 54. .2 8. 0 
Italy 1966 1.1 4. .2 67. .6 4 . 1 
1981 3.7 5. .5 59. .4 5 . 8 
Lebanon 1961a 0.8 11. .5 60. .0 3. 8 
1981 2.3 5. .8 55. .4 5 . 5 
F E M A L E S 
Australia 1966 14.2 2, .6 11. .3 14 .5 
1981 18.0 1. .9 6. .1 13 .0 
Uk & Irel. 1966 13.0 2. .7 15. .7 18 .5 
1981 17.3 2. .2 8. .9 15 .8 
Germany 1966 5.8 2. .5 23. .7 19 .0 
1981 15.3 2. .9 12. .5 17 .2 
Greece 1966 0.6 0. .8 69. .7 11 .7 
1981 2.6 1, .0 42. .2 16 .7 
Italy 1966 1.3 1. .0 53. .9 14 .7 
1981 3.5 1, .3 32. .7 18 .5 
Lebanon 1961a 2 . 1 7, .7 46. .7 13 .2 
1981 2.6 1, .2 33, .3 11 .5 
(a): There are no 1966 statistical figures for L e b a n e s e . 
Source ABS 1966, 1981. 
There were some other important similarities and 
differences between post-war Greek migrants, and post-1975 
Lebanese migrants. One significant difference is the 
noticeable age composition of the two groups. In 1966 both 
Greek and Lebanese migrants had very similar age group 
figures, table [13]. In 1981 the most noticeable change was 
in the age bracket 0-19, where there were only a small 
proportion of Greeks 5,8%, while the Lebanese had 24,2%, 
while the Greeks had 16,3% more people between the ages 45-
59. 
Table 13: Age distribution between Greeks and Lebanese (%) 
Birthplace Years Age 
0-14 15-19 20-44 45-59 60-64 65+ 
Greece 1966 8.5 7.3 71.0 7.8 2.2 3.2 
1981 2.6 3.2 54.9 29.6 2.8 6.6 
Lebanon 1966 12.4 8.5 62.9 9.8 2.3 4.2 
1981 13.5 10.7 57.8 13.3 1.4 6.0 
Sources ABS 1966, 1981. 
Considering that the Lebanese are in their majority a 
new migrant group, they have a larger proportion of younger 
population than that of Greeks and Lebanese in 1966. Nearly 
1/4 of the Lebanese population in 1981 was under 20 years 
old, which meant that there were fewer Lebanese of 
employable age, and therefore more pressure on the working 
family members to provide sufficient support. 
The young age of the Lebanese population becomes a 
greater problem because of the large size of Lebanese 
families as shown in table [14]. In 1981 31,4% of Lebanese 
women had more than four children (20,4% had more than 
five), as compared to 13,0% of Greek women of whom 58,6% 
had between 2-3 children. 
Table 14: Females over 15 years of Age and over: Birthplace 
by Total Issue. 1981. (%) 
Birthplace Number of Issue Children 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6+ N/S 
Lebanon 14.4 9 .3 13.1 13.5 11.0 7.3 13.1 18.1 
Greece 8.6 9 .5 36.8 21.8 7.8 2.7 2.5 1.0 
Source: ABS 1981. 
In terms of general educational level the Lebanese 
had considerably higher percentages than Greeks, as table 
[15] indicates. The main reasons for this is that education 
in Greece was not compulsory until the 1950's, as well as 
the war affected the educational opportunities of many 
people. The Lebanese are a younger group of migrants, and 
therefore had more educational chances than the post-war 
migrants. The only Lebanese percentage that was higher of 
any Greek in negative terms, was the 17% of Lebanese women 
who never attended school, as compared to 8.3% of the 
Greek. 
When both Greeks and Lebanese were compared with the 
national figures they had lower educational standards, 
especially in the age group <13-16. At the 17-18 years of 
age group, there was no much difference between the 
Lebanese and the national total, while in the over 19 years 
of age group both Greeks and Lebanese had higher 
percentages than the national one. This last difference was 
probably due to a certain extent, to interruption periods 
caused by war, which both old Greek and new Lebanese 
migrants have experienced, which meant extended attendance 
at school. 
Table 15: Persons 15 years of age and over by Birthplace by 
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F E M A L E S 
Greece 41.2 32.2 14.6 2.0 8.3 
Lebanon 8.2 43.3 16.1 5.5 17.0 
TOTAL 2.8 67.5 18.6 1.5 0.9 
Source ABS 1981. 
If specific qualifications are taken into account 
then there is not much difference between the two groups, 
but they look outstanding when compared to the total 
population as table [16] shows. The qualification 
differences between Greeks and Lebanese and the rest of 
the population are quite obvious and large to be 
elaborated, which explain the two groups' particular 
occupational status, mostly unskilled. 
Table 16: Persons over 15 years of age by Birthplace by 
Level of Qualifications. 
Birthplace Level of qualifications 
Univ.Degr. Dipl. Trade Oth.Qual. No Qual. 
M A L E S 
Lebanon 1.1 0.7 10.0 1.8 74.5 
Greece 1.3 0.7 9.2 1.7 79.1 
TOTAL 5.2 3.2 17.3 5.3 57.3 
F E M A L E S 
Lebanon 0.4 0.8 0.7 2.4 83.0 
Greece 0.6 0.3 1.8 1.6 87.0 
TOTAL 2.8 4.0 1.7 8.1 70.7 
Source ABS 1981. 
The only noticeable differences in terms of 
qualifications between Greeks and Lebanese is, that the 
latter had 0.8% more trade qualifications and 4.6% less 
without any qualifications than the former. 
In the last 15 years occupational immobility, lack of 
employment opportunities and of educational qualifications, 
political powerlessness, familial breakdown, health and 
housing problems, and racial/ethnic discrimination all of 
them have combined to increase the social and economic and 
inequalities of Greek and Lebanese working class people. 
Thus, state welfare provision for migrants at both 
state and community levels assumed priority, not so much to 
address the growing social and human inequalities 
experienced by NES working class migrants, but more to 
control these inequalities from becoming political threats 
to the status quo of Australian society and to the 
conservative ethnic bourgeoisie. 
Under the policy of Multiculturalism the crucial 
determinant factor in the balance of power in intra— 
communal relations became the increasingly active 
intervention of the state in the form of provision of 
welfare funds to ethnic institutions. For opposing intra-
communal classes and groups, the quest for state funds 
proved to be both the justification for the maintenance of 
primordial characteristics, and to seek legitimacy by the 
Australian state and ruling Australian class. 
After the Galbally Report of 1978 new welfare 
organizational forms and practices emerged in the ethnic 
communities and the voliime, range, and form of government 
funding increased. The next three sections of this chapter 
will deal with the ideological and practical welfare 
responses of Greek and Lebanese institutions and 
professionals to the social class and cultural inequalities 
experienced by Greek and Lebanese workers. 
SECTION 8A 
SECULAR ETHNO-SPECIFIC INSTITUTIONS 
8a.1: The Lebanese 
Secular ethno-specific institutions, along with 
religious ethno-specific, have been the main targets of 
state welfare funding. This policy was based on the 
proposal of the Galbally Report which suggested that 
funding to these institutions can meet better the needs of 
their members [Cox, 'Welfare services in a Multicultural 
society', Australian Social Work, 1983, vol.36., no.3: 11]. 
This proposal asserted that ethnic communities exist 
as unitary entities. By treating ethnic communities as 
unitary formations the state hoped to achieve social 
cohesion and harmony, both at the community level and in 
the Australian society. However, ethnic communities have 
never existed in unity, as there has always been continuous 
socio-political conflict by opposing classes or groups for 
control of their institutions and dominance in the 
community. Thus the idea of harmonious ethnic communal 
relations was in effect a social control mechanism intended 
to impose this idea as the reality of the social existence 
of migrants. 
Multiculturalism by encouraging the maintenance of the 
cultural identity of migrants provided with a legitimate 
incentive various ethnic groups and classes to seek state 
funds. In most cases this provision of funds, in 
combination with intra-communal conflicts, resulted in an 
increased institutional and political fragmentation of 
various ethnic communities. 
This situation is no more evident than in the case of 
the Lebanese. Until the early 1970s Lebanese welfare 
provision was limited to that provided by religious 
institutions. The development of new Lebanese welfare 
structures was brought about by the economic and social 
difficulties faced by the continuously increasing number of 
Lebanese workers from the early 70s, and by the 
unresponsiveness of government services to migrant welfare 
needs. 
The large number of Lebanese arriving in the 70s 
and 80s had different socio-political views from the 
established Lebanese, as well as this number contained a 
large portion of Lebanese Muslims. Thus the social 
relations of the Lebanese were intersected by the class and 
ideological differences between old and new Lebanese 
settlers, by religious factors, primarily expressed in the 
conflict between Muslims and Maronites, by regional 
considerations, and by the political and ideological 
conditions found in Australian society that defined their 
class and cultural experiences. 
Following the failure of the the ALA to attract and 
unite disparate political and religious Lebanese factions, 
and provide secular welfare services, the village 
associations were formed to complement the welfare 
functions of both the ALA and the churches. The village 
associations were initially small informal structures with 
strong familial and religious identities, and performed 
some welfare functions, like child care. The small size of 
these associations, and their specific functions and 
nature, provided many obstacles and limitations in the 
welfare services they could provide. 
Around the mid 70s some village and regional 
associations combined together to set up specialised 
welfare structures. This institutional approach to the 
changing welfare demands of Lebanese settlers, contained an 
important contradiction. On the one hand, there was further 
institutional fragmentation, while on the other hand, a 
petit-bourgeois alliance was established, which frequently 
overrode religious and regional sentiments. In this way 
these secular welfare associations became important 
institutional arenas where the new and old petit-
bourgeoisie could gain power and status. 
The Tripoli El-Mina Association, based in Lakemba, is 
one of the first such welfare organizations. This 
association is one of the most sizeable, visible and active 
in Lebanese welfare provision. In 1975 nearly 500 people 
from the Tripoli El-Mina area of Lebanon held a public 
meeting, and elected a honourary committee to establish and 
operate the Association. According to the respondent from 
the Association: 
"... the management committee was paying the rent 
of the office, the bills, and provided service to 
the community in a voluntary basis. That was up 
to 1978. Then we received a part-time grant from 
the EAC until 1982 for one day a week. In 1982 we 
received a full-time grant from YACS...There were 
lapses of funding between 1978 to 1982". 
Thus, for a period of three years, 1975-78, the 
operation of the centre was on a self-help basis with 
voluntary work, and financial contribution from the 
membership. At the time of the interview, the Association 
had a full-time worker, and few others on short term 
funding funding programs. Its main services included child 
care service, the running of various groups and cultural 
activities. 
The Australian Welfare Lebanese Association (AWLA), 
based in Merrylands, is an umbrella organization of 21 
village associations and also has individual membership. 
The AWLA was established in 1979, and initially co-operated 
closely with DIEA in providing services to Lebanese 
migrants. The respondent from AWLA explained what happened: 
"They (the AWLA) approached the DIEA and got a 
GIA fund. Initially (the operation of AWLA) was 
related only to immigration". 
Actually the AWLA operated from the offices of the 
Parramatta Migrant Resource Centre, run by DIEA, until 
1983. After that the organization was given another GIA 
grant, and moved to its present location at Merrylands. The 
establishment of the AWLA represents one case where 
indirect state intervention helped to set it up, fund it, 
firstly for immigration matters, and later on for general 
community welfare services. 
An additional consideration for this state initiative 
with the AWLA was the political character of the 
organization. AWLA's membership is mainly made up of old 
established petit-bourgeoisie Orthodox Lebanese, and some 
Maronites. The AWLA at the time of the interview had one 
GIÀ worker, one part-time GIA, and two CEP workers, and 
support from volunteers. 
The Lebanese Welfare Council of Canterbury/Bankstown 
(LWC), based in Punchbowl, was established in 1983 when it 
received GIA funding. Unlike the Tripoli El-Mina Associa-
tion, which is Muslim dominated, and the Christian 
dominated AWLA, the LWC's membership shows a significant 
convergence of class interests among different religious 
groups. The LWC is comprised of different religious and 
volunteer welfare organizations of the area. These are: 
1. The Muslim Adawa group. 2. The Lebanese Orthodox 
church of St. Nicholas in the area. 3. The Maronite St. 
Charbel monastery in the area. 4. Tripoli El-Mina 
Association, and 5. The Australian Arab Senior Citizens 
Association. 
The respondent from LWC explained the formation of the 
Council: 
"(The LWC) was the welfare sub-committee of the 
Canterbury Community Aid, but there were not 
satisfied with the administration there. So they 
broke away and formed the Council. The 
composition of clientele, reflects its 
membership. We serve all the Arabic 
Community...Lebanese are the majority". 
The way in which the LWC was formed seems to have 
been based on a combination of factors. On the intra-
communal alliance, motivated by the probable 
unresposiveness of the generalist organization, and the 
availability of funds to establish a separate ethno-
specific service. The respondent was the only worker 
employed by the LWC. 
The last Lebanese secular organization of the sample 
that provides welfare services, is the Australian Lebanese 
Association, the ALA. The history and welfare activities of 
the ALA have already been discussed. The ALA's social 
worker was the only person of the sample who declined to 
provide a recorded interview. 
According to the written statements he provided, the 
ALA was the first Lebanese organization to receive GIA 
funding. At one stage the ALA was employing a GIA worker, 
and three other workers. The GIA fund stopped more than two 
years ago because the organization did not comply with the 
fund's guidelines. There was no more elaboration on that 
issue. At the time of the interview the respondent was the 
only worker at ALA, funded by a state fund. 
So far the picture that has emerged from the 
description of the Lebanese organizations, shows an 
institutional fragmentation along religious, regional and 
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political lines, but at the same time signs of/v^coalition of 
cross sectarian and class interests. Another important 
pattern that emerged, is that nearly all organizations 
received state funding after 1978, and mostly in the 
early 1980s. 
The most significant aspect of state funding has been 
its role in encouraging the establishment of these welfare 
organizations. Multiculturalism's identification of social 
groups on the basis of their cultural or ethnic 
characteristics, has provided a legitimate basis for 
seeking state funding. As a Lebanese social worker 
commented: 
"The divisive approach of the welfare industry 
which deals with all groupings regardless of 
their sectarian role, adds more force to the 
fragmentation of the Arabic speaking community. 
This approach is basically justified by arguing 
that ethnic communities should be assisted, in 
order to became on an equal footing with the rest 
of our society...Funding bodies support to a 
great number of primordial groups". [Taber in 
'The Arabic Community Realities and Challenges', 
op.cit: 25]. 
This passage contains an explanation of the state's 
rationale for welfare funding, which has encouraged 
regional and village associations to establish welfare 
structure of their own. And in turn these structures are 
perceived by Lebanese as legitimate forms of social 
organization, thus perpetuating their political, religious, 
regional, and familial ideologies. So state welfare funding 
plays an important social control function in the 
maintenance and reproduction of the ideologies of these 
social formations. 
The perpetuation of the primordial characteristics of 
Lebanese is best reflected in the population these welfare 
structures serve, or suppose to serve. All Lebanese 
respondents at various stages of their interviews indicated 
that the services of their organization are available to 
all, irrespective of sectarian background. Despite these 
assertions these institutions by their very nature can 
provide only limited services to people who share the same 
beliefs and values as them. 
The interests of the Lebanese working class, of women, 
and other marginilised groups, get completely distorted and 
unrepresented in the maze of institutional and ideological 
formations among Lebanese. De Lepervanche makes the same 
observation about ethno-specific institutions generally, 
and points out also a gender dimension in relation to that: 
"The proliferation of ethnic groups and their 
official encouragement has reinforced male social 
domination as ethnic males, perhaps denied 
sufficient opportunity for status enhancement and 
political action in mainstream society, have 
found alternative arenas in their ethnic 
organizations. Most ethnic leaders and 
spokespeople are men, and they represent male and 
bourgeois interests rather than those of women or 
the working class majority", [op.cit: 189] 
A case of study of open state intervention to 
create an appearance of harmony and unity in a ethnic 
group, is the establishment of the Lebanese Community 
Council (LCC). The Lebanese institutional fragmentation 
along political and sectarian lines, meant that there was 
not a secular Lebanese organization that could claim 
communal representation and legitimacy. The majority of the 
Lebanese had rejected the authority of the ALA, and the 
cancellation of its GIA fund was probably a recognition of 
that by the state. 
The political considerations of the state to help the 
establishment of the LCC were also supported by 
administrative ones. State funding bodies could not decide 
or identify clearly which Lebanese organizations were 
entitled to welfare funds. 
The DIEA initiated the establishment of a committee 
composed of various Lebanese leaders to make a study of 
their community, and report back their findings and 
recommendations. The Lebanese Orthodox priest, who was a 
member of the committee and a founding member of the LCC, 
described how the Council came into existence: 
"They (the Lebanese) were trying to shift the blame 
from one person to another, and I would paint myself 
white, and the other side black, and vice versa. And 
this really has done a diservice to the community, 
because the government and the Departments were 
confused how to channel their services to the 
community. . .This is why the need to set up a 
settlement Lebanese committee which will study and 
communicate to the government the true facts. It is 
a fact finding committee, a research committee. To 
bring together all sects, all Lebanese sections of 
the community to work on social problems. There was 
a convention in Nanaru in 1983, where 97 delegates 
from 52 major organizations, sat down for three days 
highlighting the problems...Because of the failed 
ALA, lack of harmony, we threw in the idea of the 
LCC...We formed an interim committee. I was chairman 
of the LCC till 1984". 
The LCC was intended as an institution that would 
gain wide appeal and support from all Lebanese factions. 
The government hoped that by supporting the establishment 
of the LCC it would secularise the social relations of 
the Lebanese, and the LCC would act as the main secular 
legitimate institution of united Lebanese 'community'. In 
other words, the state tried at the ideological level to 
instill in the minds of the Lebanese, and of the Australian 
public the impression of a unitary Lebanese community. 
The respondent from the LCC explained the ideological 
reasons for the establishment of the organization: 
"In a country like Australia, which is 
lay, where it is open to every body, where you 
have you have a multitude of religions, why 
should you concentrate on one section of the 
community alone?" 
The same respondent, however, was aware of the 
limitations of the LCC, and of the political power 
struggles in the community and their effects on it: 
"The Council can be conceived as a democratic 
body, a structure in which all Lebanese 
organizations, or individuals can take part...It 
does not pretend to speak in the name of all the 
Lebanese. It wants to serve those who are 
affiliated with it...Within every community you 
have barons, who are usually businessmen, and 
have been involved in Australian politics, and 
have gained momentum. And because of their 
leverage have been used by the community and the 
government. They are a source of votes". 
The conflicting and contradictory institutional, 
sectarian and individual interests of the LCC's membership, 
undermine and underline its limited genuine support and 
legitimacy. The fluidity of the political relations among 
the Lebanese help to magnify the inability of the LCC to 
affect significantly the direction of these political 
relations and processes, and by extension the distribution 
of state welfare funds. 
As the respondent from the LCC said the main role of 
the institution is restricted to more or less a public 
relations exercise: 
"The target is. To boost the image of the 
Community...In Australia, Lebanese are synonymous 
with drug dealings, dole bludgers.. .Events in 
Lebanon affect this discriminatory 
attitude...It's a classic case. Every community 
has gone through that...To concentrate on common 
issues of concern in the Community...It's hard 
for the Lebanese to work together, because this 
is something new in the country, but the fact 
that it (LCC) is still standing on its feet, 
despite many attempts from within and outside to 
undermine it. It's already an achievement in 
itself". 
8a.2: The Greeks 
In the case of the Greek community the power struggles 
that had raged in the first 25 years of post-war migration, 
started to subside in the late 1970s. With the Greek 
conservative bourgeoisie on the ascendancy, the religious 
question became secondary to other more important social 
issues. The relative integration of Greeks in the wider 
society made intra-communal politics less important and 
appealing. 
The direction and intensity of Greek communal conflict 
shifted from the direct confrontation between the 
Archdiocese and the GOC, to that between the Archdiocese 
and the Communities. At the centre of this conflict was the 
Archdiocese's intention to gain the transfer of the 
property titles of the churches of the various Communities 
under its Canonical juristiction. 
The Archbishop Stylianos in a speech he gave in 1981 
titled 'The Church - The solution to a problem', tried to 
persuade community leaders why they should transfer the 
property titles of their churches to the Archdiocese. In 
this speech he also identified the types of Greek 
communities in operation and the alternative type he 
favoured [Papageorgopoulos 1981: 78-97]. 
The most common type of Greek communities to be found 
is the one where the church building has been paid by the 
members of that community, the committees are made up of 
the financial members of the community, while most of these 
communities accept the Canonical juristiction of the 
Archdiocese. The other type of community organization 
involves the communities controlled by the GOC. And the 
third type the community-parishes which are under the 
direct property and Canonical control of the Archdiocese, 
but are very few in numbers [ibid: 84-90]. 
The Archbishop in his speech appealed to the national 
and religious sentiments of the 'independent' community 
leaders, and compared the disadvantages of their own 
community structure with the advantages of that envisaged 
by the Archdiocese: 
"By registering in advance the title of the 
church directly with the Church Authority, which 
is neither a person nor a group of people nor a 
Company, it is guaranteed that the Church 
building will remain a church In this way, 
since the Church will belong automatically to all 
Orthodox people, there will be no reason for the 
parishes to be organised as societies...Thus 
there will be no fights for wordly or political 
pursuits at the expense of the faithful people 
within the parish boundaries", [ibid: 90-94] 
Thus the Archdiocese's interest in acquiring the 
•wordly' property titles of the community churches, is due 
to its own realisation that unless this happens, its 
legitimacy, social control ability, and future 
survival will always be under threat. 
On the other side the GOC saw its power and influence 
in the 70s been reduced under the successful policies of 
the Archdiocese. Another factor that contributed to the 
decline of the GOC, was the emergence of various opposing 
groups within the organization itself. The Left that 
dominated the Council of the GOC did not manage to create 
new alliances with other groups within the GOC, and failed 
to attract new groups and individuals from the community. 
In the opinion of the respondent from Atlas this 
policy of the Greek Left proved destructive, because with 
the advent of the provision of state welfare funds the GOC 
was in a weak political position to have sufficient 
community support to attract funds: 
"In the 70s, because the base of the GOC had 
shrunk so much, it didn't have the persons who 
could benefit, or even claim equal treatment with 
the Archdiocese, or an 'x' treatment for the 
benefit of Greeks who followed the GOC. There 
were no people . Persons who were community 
minded left the GOC, only because they found 
themselves selves against a certain clique or 
situation".* 
Atlas followed the same path of political decline of 
the GOC and was actually split in 1983. The fundamental 
problem for Atlas, which was transferred to a large extent 
to the GOC through its membership, was the issue of 
defining the precise character of the organization. The 
presence of SPA members in Atlas meant that their views 
affected its perception and role. The conflict that 
erupted within Atlas had to do with defining its role as a 
political party, or a mass organization. As the respondent 
from Atlas explained, the reasons for its split were: 
"Atlas was never an instrument of the Communist 
party. It was established by progressive 
people...It always had members of the Communist 
party, they never hide it...In the last 10-15 
years Atlas went through various stages, which 
unfortunately had a retarding effect on the work 
and appearance of the organization. 
Unfortunately the splits in the international 
communist movement were carried in Atlas, in the 
mass organization. By giving greater emphasis, as 
it is said by some people, to the political 
activity, instead to the broad cultural activity, 
contracted the base of the organization, which 
slowly resulted in its isolation from the 
community. The cultural activities stopped, the 
talks, etc..•Slowly the character of the 
organization became very limited, to the degree 
that some people were saying that Atlas is a 
left-wing organization. Some of its members 
wanted to promote it as a left wing political 
organization, not only participating within the 
left wing movement generally, but as a particular 
part of this movement. As a political party. This 
alienated a lot of its members".* 
When the state welfare funds were made available to 
the Greek community the Archdiocese was the first one to 
get a GIA grant in 1973, and later on established the Greek 
Welfare Centre in 1975. The welfare activity of the Arch-
diocese will be discussed in the next section. 
In 1975 the GOG received a GIA grant as well. No other 
Greek institution received any funding. In 1978, however, 
the GIA fund of the GOC was terminated. A delegation of 
six Council members of the GOC went to visit the then 
minister of DIEA M.Mckellar to discuss the reasons for 
the termination of the fund. The respondent from the GOC, 
who was a member of the delegation, described in the 
following statement the meeting with the minister: 
"...And the first thing he asked was: 'How's the 
Atlas club?'. The Atlas club is a workers' club 
and a left-wing club, and everybody knows that. 
And that was a totally inappropriate question to 
ask before he even said good-afternoon...It made 
us think that they knew how's the community like, 
that had received advice, and the advice was 
totally against us". 
It is evident from this statement the government's 
decision to terminate the Central Community's GIÀ fund, 
was politically motivated. The close links of the GOC with 
Atlas were perceived as potentially troublesome, meaning 
probable non-compliance with the neo-conservative social 
policies of the Fraser government. As the GOC respondent 
explained: 
"We are seen by them (the government) as quite a 
rebel organization...To that extent this is 
unfair...We are willing to buck the system to 
some extent. If the interests of the community 
are threatened, we're willing to take them on". 
For the respondent the source of advice to the 
government about the GOC, appeared to have originated from 
within the community, and particularly from the 
conservative forces. In the following statement the 
respondent from the GOC implied that the political links of 
the Greek conservative alliance were used to influence the 
government's decision: 
"The way in which the Church functions is...it 
has an advisory committee which seats the 
Archbishop, made of some very wealthy, primarily 
pre-war Greeks, but also some wealthy post-war 
Greeks, some of which are very active in the 
Liberal party, and some are donors to the 
Liberal party. Therefore they have direct access 
to the leadership of the Liberal party...But it 
is tougher to swallow how some Greek Labor party 
politicians are using the patronage of the 
Church as means of carving out political 
careers". 
Since 1978 the GOC re-applied many times to have the 
GIA fund reinstated to it, and despite some positive 
indications at the bureaucratic levels, the applications 
were always rejected. Finally, the grant was given back 
under the Labor government in 1984. During the period 1978-
84 the welfare activities of the GOC had to be carried out 
with small State funds and from its own resources. 
Even at present the GOC has to rely in its own 
diminishing resources for welfare activities. For the 
financial year 1984-85 it recorded a deficit of $133,000, 
and in 1985-86 $32,000 [GOC Directors' Report 19863 At 
present the GOC has a full time GIA worker, one part-time 
and two child care centres in the Western suburbs, for 
which it receives State funds. 
The termination of the GIA fund to the GOC in 1978 
and the increasing funding to the Archdiocese after this 
period had important implications for the community. This 
decision legitimised even further the authority and power 
of the Greek conseirvative bourgeoisie and that of the 
Archdiocese as the sole Greek institution that enjoyed 
government support and recognition. In this way, the form 
of social control that was imposed on the subordinate 
classes and groups in the community, reinforced 
conservative political and ethno-cultural ideologies and 
practices. 
For the GOC the lack of state funds, combined with 
its internal problems, made the organization less effective 
within the community, and consequently minimised its 
legitimacy, thus contributing to its perceived irrelevancy. 
The decline of Atlas and of the GOC, meant that the Greek 
working class and its allies, have largely lost the 
existence of any popular and alternative political 
organizational formation. 
The unequal distribution of welfare funds in the Greek 
community did not result in any large scale fragmentation 
as in the case of the Lebanese. Nevertheless, this state 
intervention had similar effects on both the Greek and 
Lebanese working class because fragmented further their 
social relations and ideologies, reduced institutional 
collaboration and reinforced the power of conservative 
petit-bourgeoisie elements. 
8a.3: Social Workers and Social Work 
For the Lebanese and Greeks the welfare state and its 
services represented a new experience for them in 
Australia. The welfare state either did not exist in their 
countries, or was very underdeveloped. The form of welfare 
found in their countries at the time of their departure was 
of residual type. The personal care services of the welfare 
state, like social work, were unknown to them. 
Social work is a response to the complex life of indu-
strialised societies, and the unequal distribution of 
rewards. In a capitalist society, characterised by 
inequalities and alienation, social work intends to provide 
a human response, at the individual level, to the personal 
needs of marginalised groups [Davies 1981: 195]. 
In doing so the social worker maintains the stability 
of society, both in terms of social unity and social 
control. As Davies explains: 
"Social work is about reconciliation and 
compromise, reconciling the personal and the 
political, the individual and the state". 
[Davies ibid: 210]. 
In this mediating role the social worker is a part of 
the state machinery, as his/her salary is paid by it to 
interpret and implement its welfare policies [Galper 1980: 
3-15]. At the same time the social worker acts and 
advocates on behalf of the client or the group he/she 
represents. 
The role of the social worker is to re-socialise the 
individual or group to accept at the ideological level the 
existing pattern of economic and socio-political 
domination. This is done through the individualistic 
approach of social work to societal problems. In turn this 
approach distorts the individual's perception of his/her 
problems, as they are located at the immediate environment, 
either at the individual or community level. 
For these reasons social work encourages individual 
solutions to societal problems based on the liberal 
ideological constructs of individual responsibility and 
success. Social work concepts and practices, however, are 
not uniform because of the different socio-political 
ideologies they are based upon. 
There are three main approaches to social work that 
attempt to provide different solutions to individuals and 
groups: 
a) The consensus or conservative approach views society 
largely unproblematic, with no inequalities or opposing 
interests [Thorpe et.al 1985:13]. If this approach accepts 
the existence of social inequalities, these are either 
recognised as personal or group ones, or due to lack of 
knowledge about services that can ameliorate or resolve 
their problems. These values together with the concepts of 
community participation, co-operation, individual casework, 
self-help, and the welfare role of the family, are used by 
this approach as means to achieve social cohesion, and 
social control. 
b) The pluralist or institutional approach is based on the 
idea of welfare as a citizenship right [Mishra op.cit:21]. 
The citizen rights consist of three different elements, the 
civil, the political and the social. These three elements 
constitute the basis for the equal status of the individual 
as a member of society. The interplay of political and 
civil rights enhances the social rights, and thus the 
individual and community sense of belonging and 
participating as a full member of society. 
This welfare approach treats the state as the main 
provider of welfare services to people in an unbiased and 
democratic way. This involves the re-direction of state 
resources to the disadvantaged by means of lobbying, 
pressure, advocacy and bargaining [Thorpe op.cit: 14-15]. 
Community action, pursuit of issues, and self-help, are 
regarded as other methods of personal and group welfare 
provision. 
c) The structural conflict model or radical perspective, 
views social problems as being generated by the conflicting 
interests of classes and groups of society, and the unequal 
distribution of resources and power between the dominant 
and subordinate classes or groups [Thorpe ibid: 14]. The 
social service institutions are regarded as serving low-
income people as an extension of the dominant political 
and economic forces [Galper op.cit: 9]. 
Through casework and political participation the 
social worker can identify and act towards the socio-
political and economic structures of society. The social 
worker is viewed as an active agent of change for the 
interests of the marginilised groups. The main aim of this 
approach is to make the individual more aware of his/her 
marginal position. Nevertheless, this radical approach is 
not easy to implement, because social work, and 
particularly casework, is structurally conservative. 
All three social work models are certainly not ideal 
types, but rather are found in combinations. These 
combinations depend on state welfare policies, the ideology 
of the voluntary institutions, and the personal and 
political views of the workers themselves. 
The provision of welfare funds to ethnic institutions 
meant the employment of social/welfare workers. The 
employment of social workers by ethno-specific 
organizations proved to be very important, because they 
provided the most immediate form of contact between the 
organization and the state, the community/individual and 
the state. Social/welfare workers in their capacity as 
organic intellectuals acted as carriers, interpreters and 
distributors of knowledge, which was beyond the ideological, 
organizational, and functional capabilities of the 
traditional intellectuals. 
The inanageinent and. leadership of the secular* ethno— 
specific institutions, though not belonging to another era 
of socio-economic relations, ideologically are more 
involved and aware of their intra-communal interests and 
conflicts. As the primary role of these institutions is the 
maintenance of primordial characteristics, capitalist 
socio-political and economic inequalities faced by the 
ethnic working class, are interpreted by the institutions 
through primordial concepts, and are presented as possible 
threats to the primordiality of the group. 
However, this primordial perception and interpretation 
of the nature of the community and of the individual, 
is the outcome of a social construction of reality that 
hides other social relations. Primordial values and beliefs 
are in effect themselves creations and expressions of 
social values that are continuously generated in the sphere 
of material, class and ideological relations of capitalist 
society. 
Ethnic social/welfare workers employed by ethno-
specific institutions, therefore, mediate these social 
values and beliefs of the institutions through their social 
work practice. In most cases the workers employed by ethno-
specific institutions share the values of these 
institutions. 
Turning now to the respondents statements on their 
views on the role of social/welfare workers in their 
communities, the respondent from LWC said: 
"The role of the social worker is to educate the 
Community about services and departments, about 
how the system works, the welfare system, and 
that is important to facilitate their integration 
in the community". 
While the respondent from the AWLA added: 
"There is some ignorance in the Community, it is 
not the fault of the people, because of the new 
system". 
Both respondents saw as the primary role of the 
Lebanese social worker to educate the community about the 
existence and use of various welfare services. The aim is 
that through this education the Lebanese would be 
integrated in the Australian society. The welfare state and 
its services were therefore seen as being able to provide 
solutions to the social problems faced by Lebanese. 
The respondent from LCC defined more clearly the 
linking role of the Lebanese welfare workers to the 
Australian social conditions: 
"Most of the new arrivals are not aware of the 
Australian structure and access to information 
and rights. So welfare can occur through friends, 
or through the worker. The social worker knows 
the contacts...(he) has a very important role to 
play. He's the link, the information provider, 
he's the referral body, the connection". 
Thus the Lebanese respondents described the role of 
the Lebanese social workers as that of primarily re-
socialising the Lebanese into a new value system, that of 
the Australian welfare state. The respondents saw the role 
of the social workers as integrative, as mediators between 
the 'old' and new value system. 
The respondent from the GOC saw the role of the Greek 
social workers extending beyond the limits of service 
delivery and information provision. In his opinion, social 
workers could be more effective and helpful to their 
community if they were to participate in the political 
process. That is, for the workers to see themselves as 
active agents of social change, to challenge certain 
dominant values, than merely transmit them: 
"There's a high burn out among social workers. I 
think, in part, they don't see any future, and 
they get so demoralised with their work, with the 
constant flow of social problems flotsam and 
jetsam...There's only one way to overcome the 
burn out, and that is to actually view themselves 
as agents of change, get involved into an 
organization, participate and fight". 
The GOC's view of the role of social work represents a 
more radical approach than that employed by the Lebanese 
sample. This difference in political ideology is crucial 
because it determines the way in which the individual and 
the community are perceived by the institution and what 
methods and policies it uses in relation to them. Although 
the GOC has a cultural maintenance role, its control by 
progressive elements means that is using Greekness to 
challenge socio-political inequalities that affect the 
Greek working class. 
As far as the Lebanese institutions of the sample are 
concerned, they are predominantly petit-bourgeois 
representing a mixture of conservative and Liberal 
ideologies. For them the maintenance of their 
primordiality, coupled by their limited sphere of influence 
in the Lebanese community, is far more important than 
to challenge inequalities created by capitalist society. 
The extent to which ethno-specific organizations can 
provide the welfare seirvice that they are supposed to is 
complicated by other factors. According to Cox one of the 
important reasons why these organizations are receiving 
state funding is that they are cheap to operate, easy to 
establish, and often employ base-grade untrained staff to 
deal with the most difficult cases ['Welfare services in a 
Multicultural Society', Australian Social Work, Sep. 1983, 
vol.36, no.3: 17]. 
In addition to the above factors these organizations 
have structural limitations, financial restrictions and 
lack of overall professional organization, which makes 
welfare provision a really arduous exercise. As a former 
social worker with the GOC, employed at the time of the 
interview with the St. George Migrant Resource Centre, 
explained: 
The GOC has its own assets, so it can depend on its 
own income, but because'/Tis a non-profit organization 
it isn't run professionally. You have people working 
on a volunteer basis. You'd find it may be run not 
as efficiently as it could be...When you're a worker 
in a ethno-specific organization, you'd find that 
you're usually a lone worker, on your own, and that 
means that you need to depend on yourself, and on 
any person on the management committee that might 
have an interest in welfare". 
Although some of the details of the above statement 
may specifically be relevant to the GOC, it generally 
reflects the situation experienced by ethno-specific 
organizations with limited funds. The majority of the 
Lebanese respondents expressed similar sentiments. However, 
what renders the position of these organizations and of the 
social workers helpless, is the sheer volume of social and 
cultural problems they are called upon to address. And this 
situation is more evident with the Lebanese as the 
respondent from AWLA commended: 
"What the social worker is supposed to do? Not to 
create miracles... If we can't eliminate these 
problems, then we're trying to decrease them, to 
give some awareness to these problems". 
While the respondent from Tripoli El-Mina Association 
added further: 
"... there's a high expectation from the community 
members. They expect you to know everything, 
answer all queries and solve all problems. They 
look at you as a miracle angel who is going to 
solve their problems just like that...it's 
impossible to do all these things". 
What the two statements share in common is the word 
'miracle'. The word itself indicates symbolically the 
critical position of many Lebanese migrants, and the 
realisation by the workers themselves of their 
powerlessness to affect any change. At the same time the 
Lebanese clients, due to the magnitude of their problems, 
are more demanding on the social workers. 
Thus secular ethno-specific welfare organizations are 
not in the position to deal with the social dislocations 
created by capitalist social relations. What in effect they 
are doing is to reduce alienation, offer some personal 
service and maintain the community concept, not only 
as a form of social cohesion, but also as one of social 
control. 
The social control role of these organizations is also 
also exercised through the implementation of particular 
welfare practices. Most of the service provision of the 
institutions of the sample is limited to casework, and this 
is even more so for the Lebanese ones. 
The respondent from AWLA gave a description of his 
organization's work schedule: 
"Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday we provide 
casework. Tuesday and Friday are mainly for 
community programs and community development". 
Casework has practical applications in that it can 
solve immediate problems, or identify the needs of the 
clientele, and it is used as the main method to address 
social problems [Cox 1983, op.cit: 15]. The fundamental 
problem with casework is that it deals with issues that 
are very restricted, and the danger from the application of 
casework is: 
"...(that) if social work concentrates on the 
individuality and uniqueness of each client, the 
possibility of locating and resolving social 
problems within the structure of society, are 
limited [Social Work Practice 1981: 42]. 
The consequence of casework practice by the secular 
ethno-specific organizations is that it strengthens 
individualistic perceptions, and thus the primordial aspect 
of the individual's social position and problems. Another 
issue that is a source of value conflict for ethnic social 
workers and NES migrants, is that welfare concepts and 
practices, despite their primordial reinterpretation, 
operate through a middle class Anglo-Australian cultural 
perception. 
Mackie in her study of Turkish and Lebanese families 
in Melbourne, raises the issue of state intervention and 
its possible consequences on migrants groups characterised 
by strong personal and informal networks of organization: 
"In such a cross-cultural situation, principles 
upon which welfare policy, organization and 
delivery are based can be (without necessarily 
having that intention) diametrically opposed to 
principles upon which the culture of the 
recipients is based. If this is not understood, 
resistance towards welfare...can be 
misinterpreted simplistically as a single motive 
of the preservation of culture, with a resistance 
to change". [Mackie op.cit: 12]. 
The respondent from LWC echoed some of Mackie' s 
remarks in her following statement: 
"Try to look at the attitude of the community 
towards welfare. No welfare system exists in 
Lebanon, so the concept of welfare and welfare 
structure in Australia is quite new to the 
Community... Community involvement and 
meetings... I don't think the (Lebanese) Community 
understands exactly the role of the welfare or 
social worker is". 
In the statement the respondent queried the 
appropriateness and relevancy of the community work concept 
imposed by the state on the Lebanese community. The 
concepts of community work and community development are 
state strategies designed for the achievement of social 
control, whereby the state imposes as real the imaginary, 
participatory and cohesive concept of community. The DIEA 
and YACS are two government departments, that have 
persistently pursued this policy in their allocation of 
funds. 
For the Lebanese the community concept has a strong 
localistic/geographical importance. The majority of 
Lebanese welfare organizations are found in areas where 
there is a high concentration of Lebanese population, in 
the South-western suburbs of Sydney, in Lakemba, Belmore, 
Punchbowl, Bankstown, Merrylands, where most of the new 
arrivals are concentrated. The names of most Lebanese 
welfare agencies refer to the particular area they serve, 
or origin from Lebanon, thus reinforcing the community 
concept both in primordial and geographical meanings. 
In the case of the GOC its specific location has been 
an additional contributing factor in its decline. Until the 
late 60s the majority of Greeks lived in the inner 
suburbs of Sydney, and the GOC's location in Paddington was 
accessible. However, after that period the Greek population 
dispersed in other suburbs, making the GOC less visible and 
less relevant to the people's needs. Only in the last three 
years has the GOC started a decentralisation drive towards 
the Canterbury/Bankstown area, where incidentally the 
Archdiocese's presence is not very strong. 
8a.4: Identification of needs 
The large number of Lebanese secular welfare 
institutions has resulted in wastage of resources and 
skills, and the creation of small power centres. More 
importantly, this large number of welfare agencies 
contributed to a fragmented perception of the welfare needs 
of the Lebanese working class and of other marginal groups, 
and this was reflected in the respondents' statements. 
All Lebanese respondents shared a common pattern of 
thinking, in the sense that they emphasised and prioritised 
as important social needs those needs of their 
institutions' clientele and membership, and invariably they 
presented these needs in generalist terms, as being 
'Lebanese'. 
For instance, the respondent from AWLA identified as 
one of the most important needs of the Lebanese the 
provision of culturally relevant services to the aged: 
"There's a great problem with the Aged...We have 
completed a study on the Lebanese Aged. We have 
established an Aged (persons) group...providing 
English classes, establishing a centre for the 
Aged...The main problems are accommodation, 
isolation, language problems...". 
The welfare provision to ethnic aged persons is very 
underdeveloped, with generalist services, like the Senior 
Citizens Centres, being either irrelevant to the needs of 
ethnic aged, or inaccessible ['Ethnic Aged', Migration 
Action, Vol V No.l, 1981: 20-24]. Thus much of the 
responsibility of caring the ethnic aged falls on the 
family, mostly on women, or on the limited resources of the 
community. For the above statement to be fully understood 
in its reference to the Lebanese aged, it has to be looked 
on from the perspective of the AWLA. 
Most of the membership of the AWLA, and a sizeable 
percentage of its clientele are old Lebanese settlers, and 
mostly Christian. So although the Association's services 
for the aged may well be designed to be generalist in 
character, the religious aspect of it and the length of 
settlement of some Lebanese aged, are important variables 
in determining the relevancy and the priority of this 
particular service to the general needs of aged Lebanese. 
Most of the Lebanese respondents regarded unemployment 
as one of the most serious social problems facing Lebanese 
at present. The respondents perceived unemployment in terms 
of lack of employment opportunities, and most 
significantly, in terms of its impact on the family and the 
community at large. 
To the respondent from Tripoli El-Mina Association, 
which has a predominantly Muslim clientele, unemployment 
was a very important issue: 
"The government doesn't know how to solve the 
problem in the community, in the country, how do 
you expect people to do anything about it?...How 
about grown up men with families, where are they 
to go?...They lack the language, they know little 
of what is required... For example, if you want to 
be a process worker you have to have 5 years 
experience. Where are you going to get that 
experience if they don't give you the chance?". 
The respondent saw unemployment as a general social 
problem for which there is no immediate solution. In 
relation to the Lebanese the respondent regarded linguistic 
ability in English, as one of the reasons for the high 
unemployment levels experienced by the Lebanese, and the 
the lack of work experience. 
Lack of English is an additional hurdle for the 
employment prospects of recent Lebanese arrivals. This is 
more pronounced for the unskilled Lebanese workers, who are 
trying to secure employment in a declining manufacturing 
sector. And for the skilled Lebanese workers linguistic 
difficulties, and lack of recognition of their overseas 
qualifications, make their employment possibilities not 
very promising. As the respondent from Tripoli El-Mina 
noted: 
"They're required to do tests and they don't know 
the language. For example, a tradesman, a 
carpenter, works as a cleaner, a professional 
will work as a bus driver, solicitors working in 
factories... ". 
Economic necessity is forcing skilled Lebanese 
migrants to undertake unskilled, or other irrelevant to 
their qualifications occupations in order to live. Similar 
examples and comments were made by other Lebanese 
respondents. 
Humphrey in a paper he delivered in 1985 at a seminar 
on the Arabic community in Sydney and titled 'Racism and 
Unemployment among Lebanese Immigrants', summarised well 
the increasing marginalisation position of Lebanese, and 
its consequences: 
"...the struggle between capital and organised 
labour in the present economic climate results in 
the increasing marginalisation of workers in the 
secondary sector jobs. The response of these 
workers is increased dependence on the welfare 
system, the informal economy and family and 
community networks". [The Arabic Community: 
Realities and Challenges]. 
The issue though that dominated the comments of all 
Lebanese respondents was the changing nature of the 
Lebanese family, and the protection of its values was 
identified as the most important need for Lebanese. 
Humphrey points out the central role of the migrant family 
unit in the settlement process: 
"The family as the basic cultural and 
organizational unit surviving in migration 
mediates the process of incorporation of 
individuals into the Australian system of class 
relations". [In Bottomley 1984 op.cit: 184] 
The high priority given to family life and values by the 
respondents stemmed from a variety of reasons. Firstly, for 
the Lebanese primary relationships, like family ties and 
loyalty, religion and regional identities, are stronger 
than institutional relations, i.e the ones related to the 
state. For example, Lebanese political parties have been 
founded by large families, which have provided the 
successors to the leadership of these parties, and thus 
have acted as source of loyalty. 
Secondly, the village and regional associations were 
initially founded on the basis of strong familial ties, and 
to act as support groups to families. The secular 
organizations of the sample have retained this particular 
interest on the welfare of the family. 
Thirdly, there is a general community concern 
expressed by the social workers of the sample, about the 
impact of unemployment and migration on the Lebanese 
family. 
The respondent from LWC described the situation many 
Lebanese unemployed and their families find themselves in: 
"The family unit is actually in a very 
threatening position. It's not as quite as stable 
as previously, because there's a lot of 
conflict (due to) migration, economic hardship, 
a lot of marital discord, and also generational 
alienation. And all that because of the high 
level of unemployment in the Lebanese 
Community... and the consequences of high 
unemployment are quite drastic". 
The respondent from Tripoli El-Mina expressed similar 
views: 
"Imagine a person who used to go to work 
everyday, and come back at night and find his 
wife and his family waiting for him.They enjoyed 
life. And suddenly he's unemployed, he's staying 
24 hours a day at home. He's staying at home with 
his kids, with his wife, problems are created and 
tension, and wife and husband start abusing each 
other about the present situation in the 
family...And this is where the problem starts, 
that they can't provide the family with 
the necessities of life. On the other hand she 
has the expectations from the husband...". 
What the two statements do point out is the human and 
social cost of unemployment on those affected by it, as 
economic hardship and cultural alienation combine together, 
in creating complex social and psychological conflicts that 
affect every aspect of a person's life. 
The last statement gives an image of a family 
discontent as viewed, largely, from the husband's 
perspective. That is, unemployment causes the loss of the 
traditional role of the Lebanese man as the breadwinner and 
the head of family, and the consequent erosion of his 
authority and happiness affect all family members. 
It was this last issue that underlined the most 
significant concern of the respondents, namely the changing 
nature of the sexes' relations in the family, the perceived 
change in the sexual division of labour. The respondents 
saw the family as the primary unit of socialisation, and 
therefore the primary carrier and transmitter of sex roles 
and relations as defined by primordial values. The 
respondents focused their concern on the changing role of 
women in the family, and how this change affects the 
relations between the sexes and the nature of family. 
Before discussing the respondents' views on the 
subject of family, a general description of the Lebanese 
family is needed. Although the Greek respondents did not 
address the subject of Greek families, a bibliographical 
comparison between the family types and values of the two 
groups is necessary to ascertain any similarities or 
disimilarities. 
For both Greeks and Lebanese there is very little 
data available on their family structure and family 
relations in Australia. Socio-economic and cultural 
differences within each group would indicate different 
levels of structuration, thus making the acceptance of 
traditional family model not very reliable. For instance, 
middle class Greek and Lebanese families would tend to have 
family and life values closer to the Australian model of 
middle class families, than with the Greek and Lebanese 
working class families. 
One of the few sources that can provide some idea of 
the Greek and Lebanese family structure in Australia, be 
that may be limited, is statistical. In 1981 the ABS 
statistics showed that both Greek and Lebanese had identical 
percentages of male headed family type of 'head spouse and 
dependents', or nuclear family, at 56%, 20% higher than 
that of the general population table [17]. 
If the statistical family type 'head, spouse, other 
adults and dependents' means the extended family, then 15% 
of Greek male headed families and 18,5% of Lebanese belong 
to this family type. When these figures are compared to the 
national figure of 9.3% are high, but not that high as to 
make the extended family type structure, as it usually 
suggested for Mediterranean migrants, the dominant one. Of 
course what the statistics can not show, is the level of 
outside support to families, which is unknown, but usually 
includes child care, household duties, and other forms of 
self-help. 
Table 17: Families by Family Type by Birthplace and Sex of 
Head 1981. (%) 
Family type Birthplace 
Australia Greece Lebanon Total 
M A L E S 
Head only 
Head with dependents 
Head & spouse 
Head spouse & depen. 
Head & oth. adults 
Head oth adults & dep. 
Head spouse & oth ad. 
Head spouse other 
adults dependents 
Head only 
Head with dependents 
Head & spouse 
Head spouse & depen. 
Head & oth. adults 
Head oth adults & dep. 
Head spouse & oth ad. 




Source ABS 1981. 
14.6 4.2 5.6 13.9 
1.0 0.5 0.6 1.0 
28.0 13.2 10.8 27.2 
35.5 56.0 56.0 36.5 
2.2 0.8 1.7 1.9 
0.3 0.3 0.6 0.3 
9.8 9.4 5.5 9.8 
8.5 15.3 18.5 9.3 
F E M A L E S 
51.3 27.6 17.9 51.2 
18.4 24.7 23.5 18.3 
6.3 5.1 5.1 6.3 
4.4 10.6 10.9 4.6 
13.0 17.4 20.2 12.9 
4.4 8.9 16.6 4.4 
1.2 2.2 2.2 1.2 
0.8 3.3 4.2 0.9 
72.9 91.0 90.8 75.4 
27.1 9.0 9.2 24.6 
Most perceptions about the 'Lebanese family' are based 
on its traditional form found in Lebanon, where is supposed 
to be a patriarchal endogamous structure, with wide and 
complex kinship ties [In Storer ed. 1985: 180-83]. It is 
an extended type of family unit, one household which acts 
as an economic, social and welfare structure. However, 
religious factors among the Lebanese give rise to different 
familial forms and relations, as in the case of Muslim 
families where traditional collective and social values are 
encouraged, the sexual division is maintained, while men 
are the heads of the family and responsible for the moral 
and social position of women [Humphrey in Bottomley op.cit: 
185]. 
Generally the extended family unit in the absence of 
extensive Lebanese state welfare structures has been the 
major welfare provider. The family is supposed to look 
after the children, the sick and the old, and provide 
financial assistance to its members. 
Whether this family structure is or was the norm in 
Lebanon it can not be said definitely. The protracted civil 
war, increased urbanization, migration and religious 
factors, may all have affected changes in family structures 
and the roles of the sexes in the family. 
In relation to Australia it is even harder to 
ascertain with confidence the structure of Lebanese working 
class family. Humphrey notes in his study of the Lebanese 
that due to migration they have established more nuclear 
households, they are more composite, while Muslims tend to 
have larger nuclear households, 6.2% as compared to 5% for 
Christians [Humphrey 1984:38-9]. Nevertheless, whenever the 
Lebanese respondents discussed changes in the family, their 
assumptions were based on the traditional view of the 
Lebanese family. 
Although Greeks have been longer in Australia, 
research on Greek working class families is not much better 
than that for the Lebanese, a point noted also by Susan 
Hearst in a study of her own on Greek families [In Storer 
op.cit: 121-142]. It is difficult, therefore, to reach 
definite conclusions as to the structure and sex relations 
of the Greek working class families in Australia. 
Most of the literature on the subject of Greek 
families is based on anthropological studies of small Greek 
rural communities, and it is doubtful whether they apply 
to the Australian social milieu. In its typical form, the 
husband of the nuclear Greek family is supposed to be the 
breadwinner and the disciplinarian, while the wife has a 
more subordinate role, concentrated on her home duties and 
the welfare of the family members [loc.cit]. 
The usually low wages paid to working class men in 
Australia, forced an increasing number of Greek women in 
the workforce to supplement the family income. Martin and 
Cox observed about the Greek working wives: 
"There is no basic cultural objection to (Greek) 
women working, but there are problems when they 
come to Australia and the women start to 
work...As their husbands are often unskilled, 
the women often earn as much as the men, and this 
threatens the husband's predominance in the 
household". [Martin and Cox 1982: 44] 
The traditional sexual division of labour of the 
Lebanese families is being challenged under the 
contradictions generated by migration, socio-economic 
hardship, and the different value system found in 
Australia. These contradictions between the 'old' and 'new' 
way , leads to conflicting expectations between the 
spouses. The respondent from LWC described some of the 
changes in the role of Lebanese women: 
"There's a change of the role of women here. 
Their role in Australia has taken a more varied 
role...She has house duties, because of 
economic necessity works, and she's exposed to 
quite a different environment. Migrant women here 
take both the man's and the woman's role. She's 
working and she's expected to do her house 
duties. There is an awareness of rights...With 
family problems, gambling, drugs, and alcohol 
also affecting the family unit". 
This statement includes the basic predicament of 
migrant working class women. Their work exposes them to new 
processes and ideas, thus creating a new awareness and 
identity of themselves, but they are still expected to 
fulfill their traditional roles, as the emotional 
providers, especially if the family is facing the kind of 
problems mentioned in the last paragraph of the statement. 
This emotional and supportive role of Lebanese women 
towards their family and husbands was seen by the 
respondent from AWLA as weakening. He perceived Lebanese 
women as being no longer strong to fulfill their 
traditional roles as wives and mothers, and although this 
change is viewed as threatening to the husband, a 
compromise is regarded as the best possible way to 
reconcile and cope with the new demands and roles of the 
two sexes: 
"Women aren't strong a n y m o r e N o you can't talk 
to me in this way anymore, you can't insult me 
anymore. We're equal in this country'. She's 
threaten him...Unless there's some 
understanding...". 
The same respondent blamed also the lack of English by 
many Lebanese men, as primarily responsible for the loss of 
their social esteem and authority in the family and the 
community: 
"The father who used to be a respectable member 
of his community in the village or town, and now 
he's in a place where he doesn't even speak the 
language, can't communicate properly. He's got to 
rely on friends, relatives, children and social 
workers. This is a demoralising thing... They 
think they have a problem, a deficiency of some 
kind. That will generate a lot of stress, and has 
to explode in a way". 
Command of the English language is an additional 
problem that undermines an individuals social esteem, 
the ability to externalise his/her thoughts, and 
communicate with new environment. Absence of competent 
linguistic ability impedes an individual's social 
integration and development of his/her personal identity. 
To a large extent, however, the respondent's statement 
implied a pathological approach to the linguistic problem 
faced by many Lebanese people. That is to say, if that 
particular problem can be overcome, then most other 
problems will be overcome too. And although command of the 
English language may provide a medium of communication, 
such a diagnosis does not address the structural changes 
and problems - familial, socio-economic and cultural - that 
can override language incompetence, and may well enhance 
it. 
Length of residence, socio-economic position, cultural 
and religious factors, can all combine to place limitations 
on the position of Lebanese women. The respondent from LWC 
gave an example on this issue: 
"Then you have women who have worked, interacted 
in the community, they have a lot of problems 
realising their position. What happens, 
they're restricted by their husbands in terms if 
they want to follow up education. They've found 
out that their children have grown up, and they 
want to develop their personalities, and their 
husbands are the barriers". 
The respondent is the only female respondent of the 
Lebanese secular ethno-specific sample, and her sensitivity 
and concern about Lebanese women's position is more evident 
than that of the other male respondents. In her statement 
the respondent referred mostly to problems encountered by 
Lebanese women who have been settled in Australia for a 
long time, and are usually of petit-bourgeois Christian 
background. 
The respondent from Tripoli El-Mina gave a different 
perspective of the problems encountered by Muslim women in 
search of employment: 
"For Muslims there're different problems... 
Harassment at work, sexual abuse at 
work...Husbands worry about their wives, they 
don't go to factories to work, especially with 
males, because they hear a lot. You can't blame 
them They (the men) live in similar 
situations...The males are not working, how about 
the women...". 
The respondent's statement highlighted the generally 
degrading work practices encountered by migrant women in 
the manufacturing sector. For the Lebanese Muslim husbands 
their concern over such practices, however justified, is 
probably used as an additional excuse not to allow their 
wives to work. In this way the possibilities of improving 
their family's standard of living is further reduced. 
This attitude of Lebanese Muslim husbands towards the 
employment of their wives may also stem out of the idea 
that large families form an important element of their 
identity in Australia, and this idea controls the 
development of alternative attitudes among Muslim women. As 
Humphrey remarks: 
"Large families place demands on women to remain 
in the home, reinforce the traditional sexual 
division of labour and help promote a sense of 
family identity and belonging".[Humphrey 1984 
op.cit:46]. 
It is interesting also to note on table [17] that 
10,9% of Lebanese women and 10,6% of Greek were heads 
breadwinners- of nuclear families as compared to 4,6% of 
the total population. It could be argued that one of the 
main reasons for the high percentage of female heads of 
nuclear families, is the high rate of unemployment among 
their husbands. 
The lack and accessibility to child care services is 
another factor that affects the employment opportunities of 
Lebanese working class women, as well as most working class 
migrant women. Government agencies have long assumed that 
the extended family is prevalent among NES migrants, and 
therefore there is not much need for such services. An 
additional problem for migrant working class families is 
their limited financial ability, and sometimes the cultural 
relevancy of existing child care services. 
These factors put more pressure on the family unit, as 
they restrict its ability to earn extra income, and also 
restricts women who wish, or have to work. The respondent 
from LWC explained the dilemma faced by Lebanese families: 
"Employment and child care are interrelated. The 
lack of child care support and affordable child 
care...A working woman, if she finds child care, 
has to pay $180 p/w...Because of their economic 
situation they need to work, but because of their 
skills, the language -those two aspects- that's 
the problem...If you look at the services for 
women, as a whole, are limited... They're not 
culturally relevant". 
Humphrey in his study of the Lebanese families in 
Sydney raised the issue of child care provision among 
Muslim Lebanese women [ibid: 90]. In his study sample he 
noted that there were some notable differences between the 
two Muslim sects, the Sunni and the Shiites, in the 
provision of child care. 
Child care arrangements by both groups were almost 
exclusively made through family and friends, rather than 
institutions. The Shiites had a larger level of settlement 
concentration, in Rockdale, and thus they were able to 
utilise community networks more than the Sunni [ibid.:89]. 
As a result of that, Sunni women had lower employment 
participation rates (14%) than Shiites (21%), which was 
also correlated to family unit size, 6.2 to 5.9 
respectively. 
The final subject of concern about Lebanese women by 
the respondents was related to separation or divorce. 
In either case Lebanese women find themselves under 
enormous social and community pressure to reconcile with 
their husbands. If these women stay separated or divorced 
from their husbands, they then face an alien socio-cultural 
environment, with usually no appropriate skills to cope 
with, and usually with many children to care for. 
According to the respondent from LWC some of the 
problems facing single Lebanese mothers are: 
"A lot of women I see are on supporting parents 
benefit, and don't have any other support... They 
have added responsibility... They've come from 
complete dependence to nothing at all. They've 
got to be self-dependent, self-reliant, and 
that's quite hard, it's left isolated. There're 
women who haven't worked at all, and were 
completely dependent on their husbands". 
The respondent's statement is supported by the figures 
on single parent families on table [18]. Greek and Lebanese 
women in 1981 had a larger proportion of single parent 
families than the total population, and given their limited 
occupational and educational skills they were more likely 
experiencing very difficult living conditions. 
The percentage of separation and divorce among Greek 
and Lebanese persons was lower than that of the total 
Australian population,table [18]. However, between 1981 and 
1986 the rate of divorce of Lebanese and Greek women was 
double of that of the national total, while Lebanese 
women had similar separation percentages as the rest of the 
country. These increases in the divorce/separation rates of 
Greek and Lebanese women between 1981-1986 were bound to 
deteriorate their individual position and that of their 
families. 
Table 18: Total Persons by Marital Status (%) 
Marital Status Year Aus. Gr. Leb. TOTAL 






















































































F E M A L E S 
Never Married 1966 48.3 26.7 31.5 \ 44.5 
1981 46.8 9.4 28.7 1 41.7 
1986 47.0 7.2 23.0 1 1 41.5 
Now Married 1966 41.7 67.6 60.4 i 45.0 
1981 40.3 80.3 63.7 1 44.8 
1986 40.0 80.5 67.2 1 44.2 
1966 1.5 0.6 1.0 1 1.5 
1981 2.0 1.1 1.4 1 2.0 
1986 2.0 1.4 2.1 1 2.1 
1966 0.7 0.3 0.4 i 0.9 
1981 2.9 1.7 0.9 1 3.1 
1986 3.8 2.5 2.0 j 4.0 
1966 7.6 4.5 6.7 j 8.1 
1981 7.9 7.4 4.9 1 8.4 
1986 7.6 8.4 5.6 1 8.2 
1981, 1986 (microfiche) • 
In relation to Lebanese incidents of separation and 
divorce, there is some resentment among Lebanese in the 
legal intervention of the state in matters of family law. 
Hvunphrey in his article "Religion, Law and family disputes 
in a Lebanese Muslim Community in Sydney", examined the 
conflicting ideologies of traditional Islamic law as 
practiced by Lebanese Muslims, and Australian Family Law, 
and their effects on those Lebanese persons involved 
[Humphrey in Bottomley op.cit: 183-197]. These conflicting 
ideologies come to a head in cases of marital breakdowns: 
"Islamic law forms a central ideology in the 
recreation and perpetuation of family relations 
in migration. It espouses a traditional moral 
view...Australian family law puts aside questions 
of moral blame in favour...of ensuring 
satisfactory social and economic security for 
individuals after the divorce", [p: 196]. 
The role of state personal state services, and some 
forms of legislation, are designed to allow the state to 
intervene in working class families in order to maintain 
the family structure by re-socialising family members to 
values that contribute to the process of proletarianization 
and support dominant ideologies. As Gough remarks about the 
role of the welfare state in relation to the family: 
"The welfare state denotes state intervention in 
the process of reproducing labour power and 
maintaining the non-working population. It 
represents a new relationship between the state 
and the family in this process. The dynamic of 
capital accumulation continuously alters both the 
requirements of capital, particularly with regard 
to the first, and the capacity of the family to 
meet these requirements", [op.cit: 49]. 
The Lebanese respondents of the sample described their 
role as educating their community into the new values of 
Australian society, institutions, and the welfare system. 
All of them did not question their role as they took it for 
granted. However, as Humphrey's study on the conflict 
between the practice of Islamic Law and Australian family 
law indicated, Lebanese working class people do not appear 
to favour state intervention in their familial relations. 
The greatest resistance to this intervention appears 
to emanate from the Lebanese men who perceive the 
preservation of the primordial values of their families, as 
the last bastion of resistance to external cultural and 
social pressures. These pressures are personal, obvious and 
direct in the way they affect their roles as men in the 
family and society. The intervention of social work in 
Lebanese families, therefore, would be opposed more by men, 
because it is seen as an attempt to re-arrange the 
relations between spouses and children, which invariably 
weakens the position of men in the family. 
Resentment against the intervention of social 
workers in the Lebanese family may develop if it 
challenges traditional ideologies that do not encourage or 
enhance the availability of family members for wage 
labourers. For instance, values that encourage women to 
work. This perpetuation of oppressive ideologies and 
practices to women, could be also seen as a response to the 
economic and personal insecurity individuals experience 
outside their household. 
On the other hand, the traditional sexual division of 
labour in Lebanese families could be actually reinforced 
more by the social work practices of conservative secular 
ethno-specific institutions, particularly as some of the 
male respondents' belief in the patriarchal values of the 
Lebanese family implied. 
Morgan argued about the impact of patriarchalism on 
women, children and society at large: 
"Patriarchalism, then, involves two dominances, 
that of men over women and parents (particularly 
fathers) over children. These patterns of 
dominance are learned in the family, projected in 
the wider society, encountered in the wider 
society and reflected back from that society on 
the family". [Morgan 1975: 211]. 
Overall, in the case of both Greek and Lebanese 
working class families the traditional division of labour, 
the relations between parents and children, and the nature 
of the family unit itself, appear to be in a continuous 
i( 
flax. It is difficult to point out which changes in these 
families are positive or not, though changes that have a 
positive effect on the subordinate status of women should 
be encouraged. 
What makes personal and social change for working 
class Greeks and Lebanese more difficult, and even 
resentful, are the circumstances under which these changes 
are happening. For the Lebanese in particular, who in their 
majority have recently settled in Australia, high 
unemployment levels, economic recession, cultural and 
racial intolerance and discrimination, make their 
integration very problematic and difficult. Any form of 
personal or social change under these conditions is bound 
to strip away from individuals a great deal of their human 
and social dignity. 
The respondents from the GOC and the LCC did not go to 
any detail over specific welfare needs of their respective 
community members. This was so as both of them were not 
social workers, and their organizations have a broad 
community role, that a specialised welfare. 
The GOC respondent's following statement summarised 
the organizations' view of the Greek individual and 
community: 
"The primary approach of the Council, the 
(social) worker and myself is not much of an 
individual problem, but structural Capitalist 
society is in decline, going into recession. 
We're looking at the individual at the bottom of 
the heap...". 
The respondent identified as the major source of 
inequality for the individual the capitalist system itself, 
and realised the powerlessness of his organization to 
change these inequalities. 
The respondent from the LCC saw the needs and problems 
of the Lebanese as more dependent on administrative and 
bureaucratic policies: 
"Generally (the Lebanese) are a young community, 
the impact of migration is being very high...The 
community was not able to contain all these 
people...After arrival services weren't followed 
up...That's why the present problems. They had to 
organise themselves anyway they could...What they 
lacked was official backing. They had to do it 
themselves". 
The social worker from the ALA made few written 
statements which, nevertheless, indicated clearly the 
conservative attitude of the organization towards welfare: 
"There's too much expense in welfare...Some 
workers create more problems in order to 
perpetuate the system...! believe in self-help 
rather than perpetuating the system". 
And he also added the following: 
"The increased availability of welfare services 
created more problems... In the 60s they (the 
Lebanese) were better citizens. Now they rely a 
lot on government help... They've lost the 
initiative...(state welfare) is getting out of 
control...waste of money. Self-help, self 
reliance and work by volunteers is needed". 
It is guite obvious that the respondent expressed the 
ALA'S ideology, that of a Maronite middle class, business 
oriented ideology. In the respondent's statement there was 
a continuous repeat for self-help practices, while state 
welfare provision was seen a been manipulated by both 
social workers and recipients alike, which in turn has 
contributed to the loss of individual initiative in the new 
arrivals. 
8a.5: Multiculturalism and Mainstreaming 
The majority of the respondents approached the 
question of multiculturalism more in terms of its wider 
social implications, than in terms of specific state social 
policies. All respondents supported multiculturalism as an 
ideal way of social organization, though they had many 
reservations about its actual practice. 
Most Lebanese respondents expressed strong feelings 
towards the discrimination and racism encountered by 
Lebanese, and generally the Arabic speaking people in 
Australia, which affects every aspect of their life. Some 
respondents had some reservations whether Lebanese 
themselves understand the concept of multiculturalism. As 
the respondent from LWC commented: 
"At the moment the whole community isn't ready. 
(Multiculturalism) is a new thing, and I don't 
think they have a clear understanding...I mean 
you're talking about diversity. It's a theory at 
the moment, it's not a practice as yet". 
This lack of understanding of multiculturalism by 
Lebanese, stems partly from their strong familial, 
regional, and religious identities, which do not make the 
acceptance of non-primary concepts and relations easy to 
accept. Nevertheless, there are other important intervening 
factors that pose barriers, making multiculturalism an 
illusory way of life, rather than real. Humphrey explains 
the most important factor: 
"During periods of economic recession when 
competition for jobs gets worse so discrimination 
and racism often become more explicit. Ethnic 
group or national origin becomes the focus for 
stereotyping and cultural and personal attributes 
are put forward to explain poverty and 
disadvantage...Presently, throughout Western 
industrial countries, poor and disadvantaged 
immigrant minorities are blamed for causing 
unemployment among native workers and have 
become the focus of discrimination... in 
Australia (are) the Lebanese, Indo-Chinese 
and Aboriginal population. [Humphrey 1984 
op.cit.: 3]. 
The LWC's respondent echoed in her statement 
Humphrey's comments: 
"Racism is a feeling throughout all of them, 
whether is women, employment, education, youth, 
teachers. A lot of racism. Of course we're the 
most recently arrived community, and I think 
every new community goes through that. But we've 
be going through that for a long 
time...Compensation frauds, events in Lebanon as 
presented by the media, affect the people, 
especially Muslims. A distorted image for the 
Arabic community, and the Muslim community as 
well". 
And the respondent form Tripoli El-Mina expressed 
similar views on multiculturalism as the LWC respondent: 
"Frankly speaking (multiculturalism) is a theory. 
In practice it's not there. There's no trust in 
the government to apply it in the 
community... It's a folkloric approach, dancing, 
dresses...This's (they say) multiculturalism. 
This isn't it. Multiculturalism is understanding 
each other, let's put something new in the 
community, and accept it by other people in the 
community. It's the understanding of the needs 
of different community groups. Let them get to 
know each other more, understand them more, 
accept their contributions as fortunate for the 
country". 
The stigmatisation of certain groups on the basis of 
their race or ethnicity, raises many questions about the 
real achievements and impact of multiculturalism on 
Australian social relations. In a capitalist society, an 
ideology and state social policy that interprets socio-
economic, political and cultural inequalities in terms of 
ethnicity or race, is bound to create distorted perceptions 
for those groups of people identified in such terms. 
Multiculturalism further undermines working class 
solidarity, and inadvertently strengthens racial or ethnic 
stereotyping. 
Contrary to the other Lebanese respondents, the one 
from the LCC was more supportive of multiculturalism: 
"It responds to the basic human right of a 
person being himself. I think (multiculturalism) 
is the only way to mold the Australian society 
as a whole unity in diversity. (It's) a powerful 
formula in any aspect of social life". 
The Greek respondent from the GOC also stressed the 
difference between the theory and practice of 
multiculturalismi mainly drawn from the experience of his 
institution with state welfare funding: 
"I see multiculturalism as a positive 
thing...It•s progressive because it allows 
diversity...However, there's a difference in 
ideology and practice to a certain extent. The 
ideological theme should be justice, 
access...While in practice of course this isn't 
the case". 
The reaction of the respondents to the question of 
mainstreaming was similar to that of multiculturalism, that 
is, positive in theory, uncertain about its implementation. 
The respondent from AWLA thought of the success of main-
streaming as more dependent on its successful 
implementation in the linguistic terms: 
"I don•t mind it. But they (the government) 
have to provide interpreters, bilingual 
workers... The policies are good, but the 
population has to support it... If you solve the 
language problem, you can direct everything back 
to the mainstream". 
While the respondent from LWC added: 
"It should go hand in hand with ethno-specific 
services. They're not in touch with the grassroots 
level. In the long run you have to send them back 
to mainstreaming. You need interpreters, 
bilingual officers... Mainstreaming can't fulfill 
the role of advocacy and independent assistance and 
advice... (the governments) are tokenistic at the 
moment". 
This respondent too saw the need for mainstrecim 
services to be linguistically accessible to migrants, and 
the need for ethno-specific institutions to continue to 
function, and perfomn a social work role which can not be 
done by mainstream services. This last point also implies 
the need for state funding to continue for ethno-specific 
organizations, which is almost imperative for their 
existence. All Lebanese respondents saw the welfare state 
as the only one capable of responding to the needs 
aspirations of the Lebanese. 
8a.5: Conclusion 
The proliferation of Lebanese welfare secular 
institutions was not only due to the particular ' ethnic ' 
characteristics of the Lebanese. More importantly these 
institutional formations were also products of state 
welfare funding, which helped the growth of these 
institutions. 
The high number of Lebanese welfare organizations, and 
the establishment of the LCC, were clear indications that 
multiculturalism's intervention was shaping the development 
of ethnic institutional structures of new migrant groups 
more than the 'old' ones, thus making the dependence of the 
former almost complete on state resources. 
The implications of the above observation could be 
seen when the GOC and the Lebanese welfare institutions 
were compared. The welfare role of both Greek and Lebanese 
organizations did not extent beyond the limits of 
information provision, advocacy, casework and some 
community development. However, the GOC, despite its rather 
limited political influence in the community, as a larger 
community structure with progressive social values had the 
potential to affect some form of change within the Greek 
community. 
As far as the Lebanese institutions of the sample were 
concerned though small individually, in their totality had 
a high visibility in the Lebanese community. The specific 
welfare function of the these institutions, their petit-
bourgeois outlook, their complete financial dependence on 
the state, their conservative social values as in the case 
of women and their willingness to perpetuate their cultural 
separateness, meant that they would continue to perform a 
social control role. 
SECTION 8B 
RELIGIOUS ETHNO-SPECIFIC INSTITUTIONS 
As it has already been stated the study's primary 
concern with the subject of religion was not to deal with 
the intrinsic values of each religion of the sample. Rather 
religion was treated as an ideology. The efficacy of an 
ideology does not lie in its intrinsic value or truth, but 
in its ability to mobilise social forces to seek and 
establish power and social control within their social 
milieu, as well as to act as social 'cement' [Thompson 
op.cit: 30-65]. The social control aspect of religion is 
manifested in its metaphysical interpretation of social 
experience based on the primacy of the moral and spiritual 
condition of Man for the sake of peace and order. 
In Chapter 7 on the Assimilation period some important 
points emerged as to the role of religion as an ideology 
and a form of social organization. 
Firstly, religion's universalistic perception of human 
and social relations means that it will tend to dominate 
every aspect of social organization, exercising social 
unity and control towards the achievement of this goal. 
This practice is realised through the concept of 
community, the unification of believers in a single moral 
community, in the Church, where the sacred assumes 
dominance over the empirical. 
Thus in this kind of community the form of social 
organization and relations can only be realised through 
their subordination to the spiritual and moral values of 
religion. Where religious and national communities are 
identified as mutually reinforcing, as in the case of 
Greeks, then the Church assumes the role of the sole 
guardian of ethnic identity. 
Secondly, the original religious charismatic community 
becomes institutionalised as formal religious structures 
develop. This occurs as religion in its quest to dominate 
the social and spiritual world accepts, supports and 
allies itself with the ruling class and its institutions. 
However, religion can also be used by a subordinate class 
as an ideological and organizational instrument, through 
which that class can promote its interests, become the 
hegemonic class of a new alliance that will contest the 
dominance of the ruling class in all its forms. 
This last example of the religion's role was 
demonstrated in the split of the Greek community. Both the 
Archdiocese and the GOC tried to use Orthodoxy as a means 
of promoting the socio-political interests of the 
conservative and progressive alliances respectively. 
Furthermore, the establishment of an independent 
Archdiocese from the GOC represented a new institutional 
structure of the Greek Orthodox Church. To this extent # the 
establishment by the Archdiocese of parishes-communities 
was designed to preserve an image of informal communal 
relations, and thus maintain a firmer ideological control 
over the working class population of these parishes. 
The Maronite priest gave a good example of the 
establishment of an institutionalised religious community 
and the subsequent changes of relations between the church 
and social classes. According to the respondent it was not 
until after the II Vatican Council in the 1960s, when the 
Vatican agreed for the Maronite Catholic Church to be able 
to establish their own Dioceses in immigration countries. 
The first Maronite Diocese in Australia was established in 
Sydney in 1973 and its first, and still current. Bishop 
was the Archbishop Abdul Khalife. 
The following statement by the Maronite priest is 
important to understand religion's concept of community as 
viewed by the church itself: 
"The timing coincided with Rome appointing an 
Archbishop for the Maronites, which meant that 
the nature of the community was going to change, 
its structure was going to change. There was 
going to be a visible head of the community, 
transforming it from a community to a Diocese, 
which meant that everything that goes with a 
Catholic Diocese, hierarchy, organization, 
structure...And these short of things meant that 
people who might have enjoyed a certain type of 
power, because they were somehow seen as people 
of influence in their own particular areas of 
activity, now had to realise that they may have 
to share that with, or relinquish that to a 
parish priest. To that fact the bare association 
is no longer the only, or say the most powerful 
association, but there's really that something 
that overrides that. And that's it the Diocese. 
There was a compromise between the secular and 
the religious. (Before) there was only secular 
organization. Once the Archbishop arrived, it was 
his duty to bring with him and to establish order 
and organization. And we're still in that phase 
of transformation, though the most difficult part 
has passed". 
And he added to that statement: 
"We're a religious community, not a secular 
society. We're a religious society. By that I 
mean that our religion and values, and 
structures, which are given by our particular 
religion, overflows and strongly affects the 
quality of our social life structure". 
Both statements are quite explicit and clear, but some 
important comments need to be made in relation to both 
statements. The creation of the Maronite Diocese, as in the 
case of the Greek Archdiocese, represented the 
establishment of a religious headed institutionalised 
community, which was seen as necessary for order and 
organization within the community, and with the Archbishop 
as the visible and undisputed leader of it. 
This necessity arose from the need to replace, in the 
words of the respondent, the 'bare association', the real 
socio-economic and political relations, with a religious 
one, to instill on this 'association' the moral authority 
and legitimacy of the Church. 
This process entailed a compromise between the secular 
and the religious. On the one hand the Diocese had to 
gain, or demand support from the Maronite bourgeoisie, and 
even rest some power from it in order to strengthen its 
own establishment. On the other hand the Maronite 
bourgeoisie, or at least the section of it that accepted 
this new role of the Diocese, was instilled with a moral 
and spiritual - institutionalised now - interpretation of 
its dominance and superiority. 
The creation of the Maronite Diocese, and the whole 
religious organization of the Lebanese, has to be placed 
within the wider context of the socio-political conflict 
among Lebanese, particularly as it is expressed between 
Maronites and Muslims. 
The failure of the Australian Lebanese Association to 
achieve any religious, or even a tangible class alliance 
with the post-war petit-bourgeoisie Lebanese migrants, 
resulted in the complete rejection of the organization by 
the new arrivals and lost its legitimacy. At the same time 
the Maronite bourgeoisie, due to their economic and 
political power, could exert control over community 
resources through state institutions and political parties. 
The establishment of the Maronite Diocese, therefore, 
can be seen as a reaction to both internal and external 
political factors. Except the obstacle from the Vatican for 
the establishment of ethnic Catholic Dioceses, the two 
other major factors that contributed to the establishment 
of the Maronite Diocese were: 
a. The rediscovery of ethnicity by a section of the 
Maronite bourgeoisie for whom the Diocese became the 
leading new structure to represent their newly found 
ethnic identity. Multiculturalism encouraged this 
process. Thus the Diocese expressed the universalistic 
character of religion, which provided the Maronite 
bourgeoisie with a better institutional form to achieve 
state acceptance and legitimation in the affairs of the 
Lebanese community. 
b. Related to that was the ever increasing number of 
new Lebanese arrivals, especially of Muslims, whose socio-
political experiences were in contrast and conflict with 
those of the established Lebanese settlers, and as a result 
of that the political relations of the Lebanese became more 
fluid and fragmented. This meant that the Maronite 
bourgeoisie had to establish an institution that will have 
a wider moral and social appeal among the Lebanese, so to 
affect the new relations of the Lebanese community. 
The Maronite respondent was quite explicit about how 
the Maronite Diocese perceived the Lebanese 'community': 
"But when you talk about Lebanese of course, we 
don't talk about a Lebanese community, but of 
Lebanese C o m m u n i t i e s . [emphasis his]. 
If we talk about Lebanese, we can talk about 
either Christian or Muslim, or Druze. The Muslims 
are Shiites, Sunnis and Druze sect, or Christians 
about Catholic and Orthodox...". 
Contrary to the Lebanese priest, the Greek priest from 
the Archdiocese saw the Greek community as united: 
"The community isn't divided. The Greek Orthodox 
Community has fewer members, and has schools, 
which is stealing from other communities by 
infiltrating them. There's nothing to justify its 
existence. It's a schismatic, politicised 
organization, which uses the Orthodox 
title improperly". * 
The next part of this section will examine religion's 
perception of social work practices and of social workers. 
8b.1: Religion: Social workers and Social work 
The ability of the ethnic churches to provide for the 
welfare needs of their communities during the assimilation 
period very limited. The lack of state welfare provision to 
NES migrants, and the rural structure and mentality of many 
ethnic churches, meant that the priesthood could not cope 
with the social complexities of industrialised societies. 
The processes of migration and proletarianization of 
NES migrant workers, and the approaches required by the 
ethnic churches to address the problems generated by both 
processes, left the churches with no other choice but to 
try to adjust to the new circumstances. This adjustment is 
seen by Cox as fundamental: 
"If the major function of the ethnic church is to 
serve the religious and social needs of its 
people, and if these needs change with the 
process of integration, then the ethnic church 
must also change or disappear". [Cox 1982: 9]. 
The provision of state funds under multicultural 
policy enabled the ethnic churches to introduce and develop 
new welfare structures, e.g welfare centres. Cox argues 
that ethno-religious agencies have a greater potential for 
development, particularly in the early stages of 
settlement, than ethno-secular [Cox 1983 op.cit.: 13]. This 
is one of the reasons why ethno-religious agencies receive 
a high priority in the distribution of state welfare funds. 
The primary reason though for the distribution of 
state welfare funds to ethno-religious institutions is 
political. The domination of the conservative forces in the 
Greek community of Sydney benefited the Archdiocese as it 
received the lion's share of government welfare funding. In 
1985/86 the Archdiocese's Greek Welfare Centre was in 
receipt of a GIA block fund of $91,230, while the Greek 
Orthodox Community of NSW of a $29,480 GIA fund [ROMMPAS 
op.cit:475-476]. Also both institutions received a variety 
of other State grants. 
In Victoria, where the community power is in the hands 
of the progressive forces, the Australian Greek Welfare 
Society for the same period was in receipt of a block fund 
of $152,050, while the Archdiocese was understood to be 
receiving a lot less [ibid: 477-478]. 
The respondent from the Archdiocese saw the 
institution's first application for a GIA fund in 1975 as 
an attempt to counteract a similar move by the GOC: 
"There was an attempt, also, that the provision 
of social welfare,the organization of welfare, 
will be politicised".* 
In this statement the respondent attempted to project 
the Archdiocese as a non-political institution, as a 
guardian of Greeks against politicised forms of social 
organization. In reality the GOA saw in the provision of 
funds the further legitimation of itself, and of the Greek 
conservative forces by the state, the Australian ruling 
class and the Greek community. 
The respondent from the Greek Welfare Centre (GWC) 
gave a another interpretation of the initial GIA fund to 
the Archdiocese and the GOC: 
"This is a very easy question to answer, and it 
doesn't need any great deal of discussion. First 
of all, there was an application (for a GIA 
grant) and it was approved. The Holy Archdiocese 
is recognised as the (official) Church. It's 
quite clear that for political reasons (the 
government) gave both parties (a grant) so there 
wouldn't be any complaints...They couldn't do 
otherwise. And in my opinion it's a tragic 
mistake by the government that divides the 
community by giving (grants) here and there...".* 
At least this respondent recognised the government's 
political motives in funding both organizations. However, 
the respondent's disapproval of GIA funding to the GOC 
reflected the Archdiocese's desire to monopolise state 
resources and power in the community. For this reason the 
respondent did not regard the GOC as part of the 
Archdiocese's concept of Greek community. 
Similar monopolistic attitudes of community control 
and of state resources was expressed by the respondent from 
the Muslim Welfare Centre (MWC). Actually he was more 
explicit on the subject of the centre's relationship to the 
state than the two previous Greek respondents. He saw the 
MWC as the only appropriate representative body for 
Muslims, as the only organization that can address and 
understand the needs of the Muslim Community: 
"Because we're a welfare centre titled "Muslim 
Welfare Centre", then anything we do it will have 
to have the guidance of Islamic teaching. So 
we're sometimes a guide to government, in how to 
deal with the Muslim community, because we know 
the religion, the culture, and the people. And we 
see ourselves as the most appropriate people to 
be consulted with in matters affecting the Muslim 
community". 
The Muslim respondent's statement reflected an 
identical ideological trend as that of two previous Greek 
respondents. That is to say, the existence of a Greek 
community under Archdiocesean leadership, and of a Muslim 
community under the leadership of the Mosque's Imam, were 
seen by both religions as necessary organizational forms to 
address the welfare needs of their communities. 
The Maronite priest described his Diocese's 
involvement in community welfare in the same ideological 
framework as the Greek and Muslim respondents, though his 
use of language was more subtle: 
"Part of the policy of the Archbishop is to be 
able to allow the Apostolate of the Church to 
enter into the organization of life, and the 
community development phase of the expansion and 
the forward movement of our communities. And for 
that reason his Grace has established, what we 
call, the Maronite Family and Social 
Apostolate...We're structuring ourselves to be 
able to come into that (like the GWC) within the 
next five years. We would probably have something 
very similar to that". 
As far as the Antiochean Orthodox Church is concerned 
it does not have its own welfare centre, though it is a 
member and liaises with both the AWLA and LWC. As the 
Lebanese Orthodox priest, whose church is based at Redfern, 
explained: 
"In the Eastern suburbs (Lebanese Orthodox) are 
more settled. They can look after themselves. My 
services are confined to counselling, marital 
problems, charitable activities. We don't have 
ongoing welfare. No. We contribute by being 
members of other organizations". 
Thus one of the most important social control roles by 
ethno-religious institutions, as this was strongly 
expressed by the Greek, Muslim and Maronite respondents, is 
their desire to monopolise access to resources. This is 
done by presenting themselves as the only guardians of 
their religion and culture, which then allows them to 
define the nature and form of organization for both their 
communities' and the individual's needs. 
The provision of state welfare funds to ethnic 
churches introduced them to new forms and concepts of 
welfare delivery. With the establishment of ethno-religious 
welfare centres came the employment of social/welfare 
workers. The employment of social workers for the welfare 
activities of ethnic churches, reinterpreted and recreated 
new sets of relations between them and the individual, the 
church and the state. 
The following statement made by the GOA priest provided 
the main explanation for the Archdiocese's decision to 
employ social workers: 
When I was the general Manager at the 
Archdiocese's offices many people with nervous 
breakdowns were coming, prisoners...many...There 
wasn't any mechanism to solve these problems. 
Unfortunately, we have the other type social 
worker (according to whom) it's prohibited to 
advice Man of what is right and what's wrong. 
There ' s a new theory that says we shouldn ' t 
impose our cosmotheoretical [world] views and 
solutions, but to leave them in the wind...'Do 
you want marijuana? that's where you'll find 
it'. 'Do you want to have an abortion? That's 
where you should go'. And you don't say that: 
'What you're doing will probably create 
psychological consequences, which may make your 
life difficult'. And that's why the Church 
established the GWC, so it could be in a position 
to offer in a scientific way, with all the 
comforts and the know-how of modern science, a 
correct direction".* 
The Greek clergy's mentality and training was geared 
to the needs of a largely agrarian society whose mode and 
relations of production, and the ideological constructs 
required to interpret them, were quite different than those 
found in industrialised Australia. The clergy did not 
possess the skills, knowledge and resources to respond 
effectively to the new social needs encountered by the 
Greek working class. Thus the Archdiocese embraced social 
work and social workers as the new mediators between itself 
and the individual, the individual and the state. 
Social work shares some fundamental conceptual 
similarities with religion in relation to the individual's 
social position. Social work has a humanitarian approach to 
the social needs of the individual; it has a commitment to 
care for him/her, and realises the individual's potential 
for survival and growth. As Davies explains: 
"The practice of social work can be seen as a 
form of pastoral care in a secular society. Like 
the medieval church, contemporary state welfare 
agencies have a variety of functions, -punitive, 
protective, compensatory, watchful- and like 
priests social workers are at their best when 
their attention is focused on the needs of 
individuals, or small communities, it then that 
they act to represent the interests of ordinary 
men and women to the state and vice versa". 
[Davies 1981: 210]. 
As the Greek priest explained in his last statement, 
the main concern of the Church, except its political 
considerations involving the allocation of funds, was the 
spiritual and moral position of the individual in the 
community and society at large. This concern for the 
individual forms the basis of all religions. Religion has a 
universalistic conception of Man, which implies the 
inseparable dichotomy between his position in the universe 
and his social position. 
The priest from the Greek Archdiocese explained how 
the Church views the individual: 
"It's difficult to separate philanthropy 
[benevolence] and the material support from the 
Church, because by nature the Church has always 
been on the side of Man...The Church sees Man as 
a whole, and takes care as much as it's possible, 
and for the soul of Man, to which of course it 
gives priority, and is committing a crime whoever 
also ignores the needs of Man within society".* 
And the respondent from the Muslim Welfare Centre 
expressed the same idea about Islam's perception of Man: 
"Islam isn't a religion that only deals with the 
spiritual side of a human being. No. We consider 
Islam as to be a whole life system in itself..". 
In the context of the universality of Man religion 
then views the moral and spiritual condition of the 
individual's social position as the primary source of 
suffering [Ronald 1969: 46]. A priest or a believer, 
express their feelings towards a certain condition of the 
individual in the form of benevolence. Benevolence 
constitutes an emotional attitude of good will towards 
another man in a state of misfortune [Roberts 1973: 97]. 
However, there is a rational hierarchical order that 
determines to which person benevolence should be directed 
to. Benevolence is therefore based on subjective criteria, 
that is to say, the subject sees the object of his emotion, 
even if the diagnosis is wrong, as he/she believes it to be 
[Roberts ibid: 10]. 
In other words, a person in misfortune to whom 
benevolence is directed , becomes the deserving needy 
only if he/she acknowledges this act of benevolence. The 
reciprocity of benevolence reinforces the bond between the 
benefactor and the person in misfortune, and only then 
benevolence is realised. Such an act basically entails the 
spirit of self denial of material world, forgo one's rights 
for the salce of peace. 
For instance, for religious institutions the 
deserving poor is the poor person who will accept 
benevolence as a means of malcing poverty less 
satisfactory, A than the one who does not accept poverty at 
all. Thus the concepts of benevolence and of the deserving 
needy form the basis of religion's social control role, 
because by making the deserving needy feel as members of 
the community these concepts contribute to the acceptance 
and preservation of the dominant values and structures of 
society. 
The Church's benevolent ideology and its 
identification with charity has posed some problems for 
ethno-religious welfare agencies. As the respondent from 
GWC explained: 
"At the beginning we had many misunderstandings 
with social welfare...They (the clients) thought 
of it as financial support for poor people. And 
one of the main aims of the Centre is to educate, 
to inform the Greek community that the Centre 
doesn't exist for that reason...but it can 
provide a service...We still have difficulties, 
but many people understand what the Centre 
offers".* 
The introduction of the new forms of welfare provision 
by the Greek Orthodox Church represented a re-
interpret at ion of its traditional welfare role. Although 
the GWC still relies for the finance of a significant part 
of its activities on fund raising from the community and 
the Archdiocese's churches, its primary role is to educate 
the community in the welfare and dominant societal values 
of Australian society, and not deliver charity. 
The Maronite priest described his Diocese's 
involvement in the organization of welfare as also driven 
by its concern with the spiritual and moral condition of 
the individual and the community: 
"... In this (the Maronite Family and Social 
Apostolate) we have a youth worker, a family 
planning ministry. We're looking for a 
professional Apostolic group for doctors, for 
solicitors, for engineers, people of this 
caliber, to be able to use their professional 
skills to the expansion of the work of the Church 
on the religious, on the social, the welfare 
level". 
At the time of the interview the Maronite Diocese 
seemed to be more concerned with the provision of welfare 
services to the youth. As an overall welfare strategy the 
Diocese was seeking to win over a wide range of 'organic 
intellectuals' to spread its ideology and influence. 
The Lebanese Orthodox priest's expressed concern was 
that the spiritual and moral well being of the individual 
is not taken into account by the social workers: 
"Today this is one of the most serious things 
lacking in communication between clientele and 
the social worker.. You'll find a lot of people 
are trying to solve the problem by the book, or 
by the way they were told, systematically. And 
people tend to resent this. While you're helping 
the person, he needs to feel that you're feeling 
with him. Feeling is lacking...". 
What has emerged thus far from the respondents' 
statements and the discussion, is that both the Greek and 
Muslim religious institutions regarded the provision of 
state welfare funds as crucial for the continuation of 
their welfare services, and their domination over their 
respective communities. The Maronite Diocese did not see 
state funding as the main means to support its welfare 
services, because it relies more on self-help strategies, 
as its search for organic intellectuals will suggest. 
However, all three religious orders saw the organic 
intellectuals as the new mediators and articulators of 
their ideology, and thus indispensable members of their 
secular activities. 
The respondents' opinions on the role of the social 
workers and the form of welfare provision was not 
unanimous. This difference of opinion had rather little to 
do with the intrinsic values of each religion. It was 
related more to their disparate and opposing socio-
political ideologies and interests they represent both 
inside their own communities, or with the state and the 
social order generally. 
For instance, the Lebanese Orthodox priest did not see 
the Lebanese welfare religious institutions as the proper 
agencies for the provision of welfare to Lebanese people: 
"The number of newcomers leans more towards 
Muslim composition. If they go to the Lebanese 
Muslim Association, or to any other Muslim 
organization where there's welfare (service), 
there're always restrictions because of the way 
these services are rendered, in line with their 
beliefs, and it's more or less a binding short 
of a service... They prefer to go to Australian 
or mainstream organizations, where they'll not 
ask them, 'what do you believe?', and all that... 
and they'll feel more at ease, and also because 
of their pride...Because if I go to this 
organization they know that I'm seeking help. 
So for them poverty is a stigma, and they don't 
want to be finger pointed". 
In his statement the respondent is opposed to the 
delivery of welfare services by Lebanese institutions that 
often follow strict religious and cultural eligibility 
criteria, which identify clients as the deserving needy, 
thus denying them of their self-esteem. As far as the 
number of Lebanese Muslims is concerned in 1986 there were 
20,108 out of a total Lebanese born population of 56,341, 
or 36% of the total [ABS 1986 (microfiche)]. 
The same respondent was equally critical of the 
welfare role of most of the village and regional 
associations: 
"Some of them are doing their best... However, I 
think those which are more or less controlled by-
village and regional organizations, are using the 
welfare activities as a facade, a widow to 
justify their existence, or to boost their or as 
ways and means to get funds from the government". 
The criticism and rejection of most of the Lebanese 
religious and regional organizations by the priest as 
appropriate welfare agencies, reflected his political 
view of a Lebanese community united on a secular basis. 
Such a fojnn of social organization was perceived by the 
respondent to be based on the rights of individuals as 
citizens, on a Socio-Democratic concept, and not as members 
of sects. That is why the respondent promoted the idea of 
the LCC as the only hope for a Lebanese secular leading 
organization: 
"The LCC isn't affected by religion or politics. 
That's the only organization which enjoys freedom 
from mainstream organizations ... I left them also 
because of the charter...I'm a priest...but I 
thought if I'm still on the Council they'll use 
it against the Council, they'll say 'there's the 
clergy'. I think this (the LCC) is the only 
solution that the Lebanese community can come 
into some short of success in rendering service". 
The Maronite respondent compared the role of the 
social worker in relation to the other Lebanese religious 
sects: 
"If I could say this respectfully, and I hope 
I'm not misrepresenting anybody... and it seems 
that the welfare officers now employed within the 
Muslim community, these are people who are making 
a very very important contribution... meeting 
the needs of the Muslim inquirer in respect of 
whatever their problem or need might be... The 
Maronites have not had that problem. Because 
they've always had their clergy, it's always been 
the responsibility, seems to be the of the to 
come for all these things, because of their 
background...The parish priest is the leader of 
the community...". 
And further down he added to that statement: 
"Where they (the Maronites) have had needs, they 
can, especially if they can speak English, go and 
see a Catholic priest as well, or Catholic 
Diocese agencies, which is an important thing to 
remember...But, by and large, if the Maronite, 
has been found, isn't able to go to one of the 
clergy, or to some other person within the 
community who's a solicitor or accountant for 
instance, very often they just sit and suffer". 
The Maronite priest acknowledged the real need for 
social workers within the Muslim community, though the 
perceived limited welfare role of the Muslim clergy was 
seen as a disadvantage. However, the use of priesthood and 
various organic intellectuals for welfare purposes by the 
Maronite Diocese, appears to be the preferable method 
because it encourages self-help and other types of residual 
welfare practices. 
The demand for welfare services depends on the socio-
economic and cultural position of a class, or group of 
people and this was realised by the Maronite respondent, 
when he compared the Maronite with the more recent Lebanese 
arrivals: 
"The Maronites have, because of their 
resourcefulness and their success in the business 
world, I suppose, had had some degree of immunity 
from the acute needs for counseling, referral 
etc... . 
However, the respondent's statement was expressed in 
such a way that implied the superiority of the Maronite 
bourgeoisie in economic activities as an explanation for 
the absence of welfare need for the Maronites. This idea of 
social, political and economic success of the Maronite 
bourgeoisie interwoven with the Maronite religion, 
constitutes the ideological cornerstone of Maronitism. 
Maronitism is an ideology that perceives the class 
position of the Maronite bourgeoisie, and the creation of 
bourgeoisie itself, as based on innate 
characteristics. Thus these innate and superior human and 
social traits place the bourgeoisie Maronite in a 
privileged position in society. 
This ideology was more explicitly articulated by the 
Maronite respondent when he compared the Greek and Maronite 
bourgeoisie, and it was presented as a Lebanese trait that 
the recent arrivals should aspire to: 
"And Australia, of course, having such a 
wonderful reputation as being a land of 
opportunity for everyone who's willing to work 
hard and apply themselves...Similar to the 
Greeks, the Lebanese are very very enterprising, 
they have a real flair on a merchant oriented 
economic system. Despite, in the main, of their 
humble educational background, were (the 
Lebanese) able to do exceptionally well in the 
business world, by virtue of the fact of their 
enterprising spirit, and their willingness to 
work hard... Old families set up themselves in 
such a way that they're virtually seeing 
Australia as their country, and have entered 
politics and have been very successful. They 
have assimilated completely". 
Contrary to the Maronite priest, the Muslim respondent 
saw the role of social/welfare worker and social work, as 
having two major roles: a) To act as a link between the 
state and the Muslim community, via the MWC. b) As the link 
between Islam and the individual. In the words of the 
Muslim respondent: 
"The role of the welfare worker is to try his 
best to bring information within the community, 
and to bring about community awareness. For 
instance, to hold sessions from different 
government departments, hold seminars, 
conferences, in order to make these people aware, 
and to encourage them as much as possible in the 
community". 
The respondent saw the role of the Muslim social 
worker as integrative, introducing the Muslims to state 
institutions, values and practices. This desire to seek 
wider state contacts is due to at least two main reasons. 
Firstly, the Muslim community does not have the level of 
resources and expertise to meet the complex welfare demands 
of working class Lebanese Muslims. According to the 
respondent: 
"The Muslim community, I say frankly, depends to 
a large extent on donations from its own members. 
So we're totally dependent on community donations 
and contributions". 
This lack of community resources can be partly 
attributed to the fact that the Muslim community is newly 
established. Another factor is their religious organization 
centred around the Mosque is not as institutionalised and 
organised as that of the Christians. Moreover, the socio-
economic basis of Muslims is not well established, with a 
comparatively small petit-bourgeoisie, and a large working 
class suffering from high levels of unemployment and family 
breakdown. The absence of a strong petit-bourgeoisie with 
wide state, socio-political and economic links puts Islam 
in a disadvantaged position, while the fragmentation of the 
Lebanese working class along religious lines means that 
there are no effective alternative secular institutions for 
the Muslim workers to express themselves. 
Secondly, and the most significant reason for Islam's 
pursuit of state linkages and acceptance, is that 
Lebanese 'community' resources and access to the state and 
political organizations, are to a large extent controlled 
on the basis of religious and class affiliation. One can 
not speak of a single Lebanese community, but of various 
religious Lebanese communities, of which the Maronite is 
seen by the Muslims and other Lebanese groups, as the one 
in control of most resources, and access to state and 
social power and status. 
This instability in the Lebanese 'community' and the 
process of migration have strengthened Muslim identity. For 
both structural and political reasons then, the Imam, the 
religious leader of Muslims, -like the Greek and Maronite 
Archbishop's- has assumed a political role in his 
involvement in communal affairs and in securing welfare 
funds. As Humphrey explained: 
"...the mosque has increasingly eclipsed the 
parochial village and urban-quarter community-
based voluntary associations and the secular 
political organizations active in the Lebanese 
Muslim community. Secondly the mosque, following 
the lead of the Lebanese Christian churches, has 
emerged as an important political focus in the 
contest to influence Australian public opinion 
over the continuing social upheaval and political 
violence in Lebanon...(While) among Lebanese 
Muslim migrants Islam also assumes the character 
of a sectarian ideology counterpoised to the 
ideology of Lebanese Maronitism. In Australia, 
Lebanese Muslims continue to experience 
Maronitism as an ideology of a relatively 
privileged group...The Lebanese Muslims regard 
with suspicion the Maronite's apparent ability to 
have their views and interests prevail in 
government circles. In this way Islam assumes a 
sectarian character and becomes a focus for 
counter-political mobilization". [Humphrey in 
Bottomley op.cit: 196-197]. 
The Mosque at Lakemba, to which the MLW belongs to, 
has been at the centre of a continuous political 
controversy over the past few years. At the centre of the 
controversy has been the Imam of the Mosque Sheihk al-
Hilaly who has been identified by the state and 
conservative Lebanese Christian leaders as a supporter of 
Iran's version of Islam, and consequently as disturbing 
social peace in the Lebanese community. 
However, Humphrey in a Sydney Morning Herald article 
on the Lebanese in Sydney argued that the controversy 
surrounding the presence of Sheihk al-Hilaly had little to 
do with religious affairs in the Lebanese community, but 
more with the threat the Imam's presence meant to the 
political influence of conservative Christian leaders at 
the state level: 
"...(it) is not so much a matter of traditional 
Christian versus Muslim rivalry but a contest 
between new leaders seeking to give a voice to 
the younger, weaker Muslim community, and 
established Christian Lebanese leaders who resent 
losing their previously exclusive right to speak 
for the Australian Lebanese". [SMH 30/1/86]. 
These observations were echoed by the Muslim 
respondent's comments on the need to forge closer relations 
between the state and the MWC: 
"So what we're trying to do when we try to have 
ties with the government, is to ask them, 'if you 
want anything, we're more than happy to provide 
you with'. So the Muslim Centre here plays a very 
important role int two ways, enlightening the 
government to know more about the Muslim 
Community, and vice versa to enlighten the 
community itself of what the the government is 
providing to them, and what are their rights 
and obligations towards the country. So any 
action we do has to have Islamic guidance with 
it, and this can be gained through the Imam who's 
the leader of the Community...". 
The social workers, therefore, under the guidance of 
Islam and of the Imam are expected to express and re-
define in an Islamic way the new social, political and 
welfare experiences of Muslims. According to the respondent 
from the MWC: 
"The role of the Muslim employed social worker is 
different, because when we go out to solve the 
problem, we don't attend to it in a way a 
different social worker will do. We have our 
religious background. That's why we stress that 
the person who comes here, to have a little bit 
of knowledge, because that will help him very 
much to solve the problem in an Islamic way...". 
This statement verifies that the selection criteria 
for social workers in ethno-religious organizations appear 
to be based more on the personal and religious beliefs of 
the worker. This does not mean automatically that all 
social workers employed by such organizations share all the 
values of the latter, as there may be other considerations 
for seeking employment there, like occupational, financial, 
and professional ones. What is important though is how the 
organizations themselves see the social workers they 
employ. 
In the opinion of the Archdiocesean priest the social 
workers' role was seen as: 
"They (the social workers of the GWC) didn't take 
their task as a kind of occupation, but as a 
mission...as charitable care in the 
Community... They're conscientious people... 
nobody's working over there for his salary".* 
8b.2: Identification of needs 
In the preceding part the discussion was centred on 
the reasons the ethnic churches needed to establish welfare 
agencies of their own, and how they viewed their welfare 
role and of the social workers. This section would deal 
with the way the ethno-religious organizations perceive and 
interpret the specific social needs of their individual 
members, and of their own community. 
As the primary concern of religion is the moral and 
spiritual well being of Man, the interpretation and 
identification of social needs, are directed towards the 
ones perceived as the most harmful to the psychological and 
emotional state of the individual and the community. In 
other words, religion is more preoccupied with the 
consequences of social problems, than addressing the causes 
of social problems. 
Religion's concern with the inner self and peace of 
mind of Man means that social work practice through 
religious organizations will tend to be conservative. 
Social problems and needs, therefore, would be diagnosed as 
individual, as pathological, where professional therapy -
casework and counselling- would be the main methods of 
dealing with these problems. 
More specifically on the ethno-religious 
institutions Cox argues that they tend to be more identity 
related, concerned with interpersonal needs and community 
support structures, and thus concentrate more on casework 
than community development [Cox 1983 op.cit: 13-15]. 
The welfare approach of ethno-religious institutions 
could be better understood by the following statement of 
the Greek respondent from GWC, where he defined the welfare 
needs of Greeks as perceived by the Church: 
"Certainly (the worker) is to help as much as 
possible the client to feel in the foreign 
country he lives more comfortable, and be 
serviced this way. From the various pressures he 
had in the first years (of settlement), because 
he didn't have this short of office, which could 
help and understand his problems, and in this way 
suppressed everything he suffered. They (the 
Greeks) have quite few psychological problems".* 
The respondent identified as psychological and 
cultural the main needs of Greeks. The processes of 
migration and proletarianization and the strong feelings of 
alienation they generated , have left many psychological 
scars on Greek working class people. So the need to address 
these problems is important. However, this psychological 
approach in the identification of the social needs of 
Greeks has important implications because it implies 
religion's notion of benevolence. 
This means that the social position of the Greek 
client who seeks welfare is viewed by the Church as 
misfortunate, and the ensuing psychological consequences 
created by his/her social position are seen as needing most 
of the attention. Consequently efforts to address this 
condition are directed at the impact, rather at the initial 
causes of the problem which are located in the dynamics of 
the social relations of capitalist society. 
On the psychological condition of migrants Nikolinakos 
makes the following observation about S. European migrants 
in W. Europe: 
"Discrimination against foreigners in employment, 
housing, and education, which is usually 
understood as a psychological phenomenon, is in 
reality integral to a system of migration 
engendered by the capitalist process of 
accumulation", [de Lepervanche op.cit: 198]. 
The other issue raised by the respondent's statement, 
that of cultural and linguistic familiarity offered by 
ethno-religious institutions, is important as well. This 
familiarity helps to breakdown a realistic barriers of 
communication, and trust is established between the social 
worker and the client. That is why the respondent described 
also the GWC as a cultural sanctuary in a 'foreign' land, 
thus reinforcing the ideology of Hellenism. 
The use by the Archdiocese of both psychological and 
cultural interpretations about the Greeks' social needs, 
plays a social control role by obscuring the causes of 
these needs, and by not providing any alternatives to 
improve their social position. 
As the social workers' role is to change the way of 
thinking of his/her clients, and to the extent the clients 
co-operate, then they would be able to utilise that 
personal service. Both religion and social work have 
punitive and compensatory functions, so the selection 
criteria for servicing individuals and groups in an 
institution like the GWC will tend to be conservative in 
nature. 
That is to say, the GWC would favour those clients who 
are more prepared to accept the Centre's services as are 
offered to them, and whose social needs do not demand 
the pursuit of wider social issues, or challenge the 
dominant values of the community and society. In other 
words through this selection process of the deserving needy 
social control is exercised. 
The respondent from the GWC explained how the client 
selection criteria functioned in the Centre: 
"The criteria are...If they can't be really 
serviced by a government department, and at the 
end if there's a need, he will be serviced (by 
us). If there's no need he won't be 
helped... there're needs and needs.If we feel that 
the case deserves to be serviced, is always 
serviced. Depends on the person who sees the 
cases to decide that..." 
Turning now to the Muslim Women's Association, the 
primary concern of which is the Muslim women's place and 
needs in the workforce and in the family. Muslim women due 
to their religious background, their culture and the type 
of jobs are seeking, mostly unskilled, are even more dis-
advantaged and discriminated than other migrant women. 
According to the respondent from the Association: 
"The practicing Muslim woman has to cover her 
face, (and this) causes problems in the 
work field. No one will employ a woman dressed 
like that. We feel this is discrimination... 
(However) the dress isn't the main thing...Some 
Muslim women are very educated and 
skilled...We're answerable to God if we don't 
work and do everything with consciousness... We 
prove ourselves in work, and the dress shouldn't 
be a barrier". 
The way in which some Muslim women dress was seen by 
the respondent as an obstacle for their employment 
opportunities, though the non-recognition of their skills 
in the workforce was treated as a more important obstacle. 
The respondent also justified the Muslim women's ability 
and capacity to work as being dictated by primordial 
characteristics, by their religion. 
In the consequent statements of the same respondent 
some interesting conservative petit-bourgeois concepts 
emerged about the role of Muslim women in the workforce and 
the family. For instance, the respondent saw fit for a 
skilled Muslim woman to engage only in typical white collar 
female occupations: 
"A Muslim woman can work as long as she chooses a 
field that will not cause her to be in the middle 
of men, or racing [competing] with men. Like she 
can choose the field of welfare, be a doctor, a 
nurse, a teacher... (She's) feeling better than 
being an engineer...working in the middle of 
men...". 
When the respondent was asked to identify the Islamic 
guidelines for Muslim women who do not possess such skilled 
qualifications, she replied: 
"If living is forcing them to do that, yes...but 
there's a difference. There's a necessity and 
there's a luxury. Our religion will tell us 'you 
should be content with what your husband brings 
home'. If you have a good living, fair enough. 
But if you're in debt and if you're in trouble -
if you don't want to bring up your family in an 
average way- that's different. If it's a 
necessity the wife will go out to work, and if 
there aren't any other jobs except those (factory 
ones) it's an option for her to take". 
According to the respondent, therefore, a Muslim woman 
or rather a working class Muslim woman, should be working 
only if circumstances demand it, through no fault of her 
family. While unskilled occupations could be taken up only 
if she opts to do so. Sexual harassment and discrimination 
in factories with a high concentration of migrant women, is 
one reason the respondent may implicitly objecting to, and 
this is understandable. Nevertheless, the values espoused 
by the Muslim respondent do not offer any constructive 
help to the critical socio-economic position many working 
class Muslim families find themselves in, but rather they 
retain the traditional sexual division of labour in the 
family. 
Humphrey in his study sample of Lebanese families in 
Sydney found that Sunni Muslims had the lowest proportion 
of all age males and females in paid employment, with 34% 
and 11% respectively, while the figures for males among 
Shiites was 53%, Antiochean Orthodox 52%, and Maronites 45% 
[Humphrey 1984 op.cit:90]. The overall Lebanese employment 
levels were 50% for males and 22% for females [ibid: 90]. 
Humphrey gave as the major reason for the low proportion of 
Sunni Muslims in employment their high concentration in 
unskilled occupations 75%. 
In the section on secular ethno-specific organizations 
the issue of child care provision was sighted by some 
Lebanese respondents as one of the main reasons of the low 
employment participation levels of Muslim women. 
Considering then that the Muslim Women's Centre belongs to 
the Sunni sect, its views on the Muslim women's role and 
position assume greater importance: 
"Like any other woman to bring up her children 
properly, to look after the house, to do her best 
to have a successful family, a happy family. We 
feel that if women had fulfilled their role at 
home, then we feel she should be able to go out 
and do something else. But number one (priority) 
is her house, and if every mother and woman 
looked after her family and children properly, we 
wouldn't have the present rate of divorce, and 
the number of children with drug problems, with 
misbehaviour". 
If external factors like employment opportunities and 
discrimination make a de cent living difficult for Muslims, 
then such ideas about the role of Muslim working class 
women is an additional obstacle. The maintenance of this 
kind of cultural beliefs strengthens the traditional caring 
role of women in the family and community, despite the 
adverse impact it may have on familial and social 
relations. The the same respondent added to her last 
statement: 
"The supervision of children by the mother at 
home is necessary. And we believe that everything 
that's happening in the world these days, is 
because of the mother going out to work, and the 
children aren't supervised properly". 
It is evident then from the last two statements of the 
respondent that the role of the Muslim social worker would 
be to intervene in the family unit, and this intervention 
would be explained as the spiritual need of Islam to 
maintain the family's moral values under the Islamic law. 
As the respondent commented: 
"Our aim is to bring families together. We try to 
counsel...We're against the urge and easiness 
that other social workers take as people get into 
problems, 'you go your own way'...We're trying to 
speak to him and her, and if we can't reach a 
solution, we take to our Imam to solve our 
problem. And if there's nothing else (we can do), 
then we proceed with separation and divorce...". 
The last reference by the respondent on separation and 
divorce is significant. It would appear that the rate of 
marital breakdown among Lebanese Muslims has reached a 
critical level. This assumption can be drawn by the 
following statement of the MWA respondent, where she 
mentioned the intention of her organization to seek 
government grants for the establishment of a Muslim women's 
refuge: 
"A refuge house for Muslim women, rather than go 
to a normal refuge house, because often they go 
there and change completely. We have our customs, 
and we do things that other refuges will not 
accept to do in theirs...". 
Generally religious institutions do not encourage 
women to use women's refuges, let alone seek to establish 
such institutions. Nevertheless, it seems that Islamic 
perceptions about marriage, and the practice of the Islamic 
law have become increasingly incapable of responding to the 
different socio-cultural needs of Australian society. 
Thus the idea of a Muslim women's refuge centre by 
the MWA is a response to a situation that can not be 
contained any longer within the family. If social control 
can not be maintained within the family, then a Muslim 
refuge will extend the conservative petit-bourgeoisie 
interpretation of Islam over Muslim women outside the 
family unit. The idea of a Muslim women's refuge then 
represents an adoption of new institutional forms to 
overcome the new social problems faced by Muslim women. 
If one was to compare the following principles of the 
Islamic law with the idea of a Muslim women's refuge, then 
the latter would not appear as a complete contradiction to 
the former: As Humphrey explained about the Islamic law: 
"Islamic law offers a coherent ideology for 
organising family relations, and observance of it 
is a concrete expression of one's Muslimness in 
migration. Moreover, it is an ideology which 
claims to transcend the limitations of temporal 
political power and places the responsibility for 
realising the correct moral order in the hands of 
individual believers. In other words, the 
political environment the 'correct way' can be 
lived, albeit often in isolation from the rest of 
the host society". [Humphrey in Bottomley op.cit: 
197] . 
The other respondents expressed similar ideas and 
sentiments about the family and the role of women. The 
Maronite priest regarded the changing moral values of the 
family unit and family relations as the main causes of 
familial discontent. And this concern was viewed as 
traumatic for the Church: 
"Family life in Australia has a completely 
different value than it has in Lebanon. 
Everything in Australia is so economically 
determined. Economic expediency is almost a law. 
Morality is based on economic expediency. This is 
totally unacceptable to us. Tantamount to 
immorality. The integrity and sacredness of 
family life, the authority of parents with 
children, the respect and duty children have 
towards parents. These used to be important 
aspects of the foundations of the Australian way 
of life, but it isn't any more like that...No 
rest houses for Lebanese in Australia. Why? These 
things are a cause of pain and indignation...". 
The respondent's reference to the economic expediency 
of relations between sexes is probably drawn from his own 
experience of middle class Maronites. He also regretted the 
loss of the Australian middle class familial values which 
many Maronites have assimilated to. 
The Greek priest identified as the main needs of 
Greeks those related to the family, and particularly the 
isolation of women and the lack of moral values in the 
young: 
"The problem is the young generation. The people 
of our generation have not yet understood that 
we're loosing our children by giving them only 
food and a good house, and not family and good 
upbringing like they themselves had. People in 
their 40's and 50's... there's a language problem. 
Isolation of old people. Young mothers who don't 
know the language to get out to participate in 
local organizations and talk. The reasons for 
that are: 1. They work. 2. They have families. 3. 
They can't communicate. They're denied of all 
opportunities provided by the whole 
environment".* 
The Greek priest, like the Maronite one, expressed 
concern about the future of their young generation, about 
their values being determined more by materialistic 
interests than spiritual, and he blamed the Greek parents 
for this situation. This concern of the ethnic church for 
the young ethnic generation is important, because it needs 
to instill it with the religious and cultural heritage, 
which in turn will guarantee the survival of the ethnic 
church after the first generation migrants have gone. 
For the Lebanese Orthodox priest the major problem 
facing the Lebanese today is their religious, political 
and regional fragmentation. He understood this 
fragmentation as the main obstacle to improve the general 
welfare of those Lebanese migrants in 'need': 
"The most serious problem facing the Lebanese 
today in Australia, is their ability of detaching 
themselves from the politics and chaos which is 
plaguing Lebanon. Fragmentation of the Community 
which is harming the innocent victims, the 
migrant who's in need. More specifically we have 
an aging problem. Our Community has a lot of 
senior citizens. We don't have the 
facilities...Housing problem which is general". 
The respondent regarded his concept of a secular based 
community as the only way to unite the Lebanese, and thus 
reverse the unequal access and distribution of resources 
amongst the Lebanese: 
"We're (the LCC) trying to organise the potential 
we have, the resources, but we find it difficult 
because of the situation in Lebanon. 'I won't 
come and meet with you because you're a rightist, 
or your background is rightist, and mine is 
leftist'. You see this is a silly idea...But that 
will go away in time...". 
The Orthodox priest was looking for a national 
reconciliation among Lebanese in Australia, which he hoped 
could be achieved through a secular institution like the 
LCC. He also saw the problems of the Lebanese community in 
Australia as deriving mainly from the present political 
situation in Lebanon. Although this assessment is partly 
correct, it contradicts some of his earlier statements and 
as a result of that overlooks the political and class 
animosity of the various Lebanese religious groups. This 
statement also sidesteps any critique of multiculturalism 
which encourages the manipulation of primordial 
characteristics, thus making for Lebanese the 
reconciliation process very hard to achieve. 
On the other hand the Maronite priest saw the needs of 
the Lebanese as related both to the community in general. 
and to the Maronites specifically. He described the role of 
the Maronite Diocese as having a moral responsibility in 
consulting and liaising with the government in the 
interpretation and assessment of the 'needs' of the 
Lebanese. In other words through the Diocese the Maronite 
bourgeoisie can maintain control over the allocation of 
state resources to the Lebanese: 
"His Grace has a moral responsibility to work 
with the government departments to make sure, 
the projects and good things the government 
wishes to do, not only for his Maronite flock, 
but for the Lebanese in general, will be relevant 
to and consistent with their real needs. The 
ongoing assessment of needs, as an ongoing 
dialogue between the Archbishop and the 
government is a very very important thing. And 
has to be seen as essential that this dialogue 
takes place". 
The respondent also recognised the economic 
difficulties faced by many post-1975 Lebanese migrants, and 
he considered the non-granting of refugee status to these 
arrivals, as an additional disadvantage: 
"Given the fact that many Lebanese came to 
Australia as refugees after 1975, but they 
weren't given refugee status. People took loans 
with high interest, whereas other people were 
given refugee status, Lebanese were not. Economic 
pressures felt acutely for those who came after 
1975". 
Thus far most of the Maronite respondent's statements 
have been either comparative to other Lebanese groups, or 
he had praised the successes of the Maronite bourgeoisie. 
In one of the very few instances during the interview the 
respondent recognised some of the socio-economic 
differences between the old Maronite settlers and the post-
1975 ones: 
"After 1975...what we had then was virtually two 
types of Lebanese Maronites here. We had those 
who were established or establishing themselves, 
in transition, learning the ropes in the 
business, social world, etc. And then you had 
these Lebanese here who were virtually 
flying the turmoil and insecurity (of Lebanon) in 
order to make a better life for themselves". 
So within the Maronite community there are at least 
two different classes or groups, of which the bourgeoisie 
is the dominant one, while the working class and other 
groups are the subordinate. Humphrey in his study on the 
Lebanese found that the majority of Maronites were employed 
in trade, family business and professional occupations, 
whereas the Muslims had the reverse occupational status, 
concentrated more in factories and labouring. The Lebanese 
Orthodox and the Melkites had a more evenly spread 
occupational representation, though they had an extremely 
low number of people with professional skills [ibid: 78]. 
In relation to unemployment the same study revealed 
that among the various sects the figures were 75% for Sunni 
Muslims, 45% for Maronites, and in the low 50% for the 
other sects. Despite the fact that the sample was too small 
to reflect the national unemployment figures of the 
Lebanese, it nevertheless gave an indication that the 
Maronites as well have considerable high unemployment 
levels, which implies among other things more need for 
welfare provision. 
The Maronite bourgeois ideology of entrepreneurial 
success, independence, hard work, and self-help, peirmeates 
every Maronite institution and defines social relations. 
whether within the Maronite community or outside. In 
relation to the Maronite community this is a very imposing 
ideology over all its subordinate groups and defines^ 
determines and controls all their social being. 
It is for these ideological reasons that the Maronite 
Church is perceived, or has been promoted to be seen, as 
the only appropriate welfare institution for the Maronites, 
and consequently the most suitable to exercise social 
control over the subordinate classes or groups. Contrary to 
the Maronite respondent's belief that the employment of 
social workers by the Church is not a matter of necessity 
or of urgency, himself provided an example which proved 
such a belief false: 
"This came as an experiment we did at the church 
couple of years ago. We offered for our people at 
the church an officer from one of the government 
departments, who was available within certain 
hours, once a week for any short of referral, or 
consultation, or assistance. It was only 
advertised, I think, three times, just briefly at 
parish masses. But the response from that 
continued for months and months and months, and 
it was after that the amount of casework that 
particular government officer had was rather 
amazing. You'd see people coming out of the 
woods! Taking advantage of this, when they 
weren't going to government offices". 
The strong response by people seeking information and 
other services by the government officer came as a great 
surprise to the respondent. However, his main justification 
for this response was that the services themselves were 
located in the church building. So he saw the provision of 
these services from the church as providing the ideal 
spiritual sanctuary from the feeling of alienation, a 
similar sentiment already expressed by the Greek respondent 
for the Greek Welfare Centre. In the words of the Maronite 
priest: 
"One of the reasons, of course, why such an 
influx of people to take advantage of this 
particular service, was because it was located at 
the church, and they felt safe there. They also 
knew this particular man, he was Lebanese...We 
even had people who were not Maronites. We had 
Muslim people, who were quite happy to come 
physically in the offices of the church...and 
have whatever assistance was available there. It 
was part of our policy not to turn away anybody, 
anyone comes for help. It was very 
gratifying...It was gratifying because Muslims 
were coming to the Maronite church, whereas I 
don't think Maronites could go to a Mosque... You 
know there might be all shorts of reasons for 
that...". 
The last two paragraphs of the statement warrant some 
attention. For the respondent it was a gratifying, and 
somehow surprising experience, to see Muslims visiting a 
Maronite church to seek welfare services. On the other hand 
the psychological, or ideological inability, or 
unwillingness of Maronites to visit a Mosque for the same 
purpose, strongly indicates the power of the Maronite 
bourgeois ideology. 
In the opinion of the respondent from the Muslim 
Welfare Centre the establishment of Mosques, was seen as 
the urgent need for Muslims at the present: 
"The main problems Muslims are facing in this 
place (Australia) is religious discrimination on 
the basis of building their own Mosques. We're 
finding a great difficulty in getting approval 
from local councils to build Mosques. We're 
always faced with local residents gathering up 
together, and giving petitions to councils 
saying: 'We don't want a Mosque build in that 
place'. Sometimes the only reason they use is 
that the Mosque will cause traffic jams. While if 
they look at it positively what's causing traffic 
jams more these days, is this one (in Lakemba) 
because it caters for them (the Muslims). 
But if this was spread in the suburbs, where say 
you have Mosques for every community, then the 
load from this centre will become less". 
Islam is a minority religion in a predominantly 
Christian country like Australia. Furthermore, the often 
negative image of Arabs portrayed by the media, reports on 
the cruel Lebanese civil war, and popular perceptions about 
Islamic practices, are seen by some residents as unwelcome 
additions to their daily lives. The hostility shown by some 
local residents, and the use of various technicalities by 
local councils to block the establishment of Mosques, 
represent serious foinns of religious discrimination in a 
country that guarantees religious freedom by law. 
The other important need identified by the Muslim 
respondent, and interrelated to the issue of Mosques, was 
the one concerning the establishment of private Muslim 
schools. Again the local councils provide the main 
obstacle for this to happened, which in a way shows how the 
concepts of community and community development localise 
conflict, and to a large extent detract the wider social 
and political implications of such conflicts: 
"(The Muslims) having their own private 
schools. For example, we know that in Australia 
there're plenty of Catholic schools, and they're 
private. When we apply through the local 
councils, again our applications are almost 
always knocked back. The first application was 
knocked back when we applied for the Chullora 
school, and the second one for Greenacre to build 
a primary school and a high school, was also 
knocked back...". 
Most religious institutions establish their own 
schools. For the ethnic churches the provision of schools, 
mostly at the primary level, is necessary not only for 
religious reasons, but also to transmit their culture, 
language, customs, and history. The Maronites and Greeks 
have even high school education, while the Greek 
Archdiocese is receiving a government grant to operate a 
private school, that of St.Spyridon at Kingsford. 
During the interview the Muslim respondent was also 
asked to give his opinion about unemployment among 
Lebanese, and his reply to this question was: 
"The communities with the largest unemployment 
figures, are the Turkish and Yugoslav, and then 
is the Lebanese community. Among Muslims there're 
a number of unemployed people. There're reasons 
for that. They came from a war-torn country in a 
period where any form of education was almost 
stopped. So they didn't have any educational 
background whatever. We don't blame them, we 
blame the system, the war...". 
The respondent was correct to point out some of the 
consequences of the Lebanese civil war in relation to the 
educational attainment of some of the post-1975 Lebanese 
migrants. However, on the question on the high unemployment 
levels experienced by the Lebanese, and its effect on 
families, the respondent's reply was totally inaccurate, 
though not surprising. This statement serves as a good 
example to demonstrate how a number of ethno-religious 
welfare agencies see the social problems of their working 
class members. 
In fact among the Lebanese respondents only the 
Antiochean Orthodox priest addressed the problem of 
unemployment, and showed awareness about its implications: 
"(There's) very high unemployment among Lebanese, 
and spinning from this problem come also marital 
problems. When there•s unemployment there's 
friction at home...". 
Finally, all respondents indicated that their 
institutions and leadership had varying levels of liaison 
with community or government organizations, or other groups 
in the welfare field. The Greek respondent from GWC did not 
indicate any community institutional liaison, but only with 
individual social/community workers: 
"I don't know about liaison. As far as 
information is concerned there's always 
contact with community workers, different Greek 
social workers, whether from the government or 
not...".* 
Among the Lebanese respondents all said that had 
various forms of liaison with different Lebanese welfare 
organizations, and mostly with those with shared religious 
and political views. All Lebanese religious institutions of 
the sample were members of the LCC, and except the Orthodox 
priest, the others did not seem to regard it as the only, 
or potentially the only Lebanese representative secular 
institution. 
The Maronite respondent confirmed that there was 
mutual recognition and respect between their two religious 
leaders. As the Maronite priest commented: 
"I think it's fair to say that the relationship 
between the Archbishop and the Muslim Community 
has been exemplary. So much so that at the feast 
of St. Maroun, from whom we take our name, his 
Grace invites the Sheihk to speak at the 
Cathedral Hall. And reciprocally, his Grace has 
gone to the Mosque to address the Muslim people 
in their great feast day. This is 
extraordinary J". 
8b.3: Multiculturalism and Mainstreaming 
All respondents regarded multiculturalism as the only 
correct state policy in relation to ethnicity. This came as 
no surprise as multiculturalism recognised the existence of 
the ethnic churches, it legitimised them, and accepted 
their right to participate and advise the government on 
community issues. However, there were some variations in 
the level of support towards multiculturalism, ranging from 
unequivocal support to some criticism as to its actual 
practice, and this reflected the comparative power 
relations of the respondents's Churches within their 
communities, and with the state. 
The Lebanese Orthodox priest described 
multiculturalism in terms of access and equity for migrants 
and ethnic communities: 
"I think that multiculturalism is a door that's 
opening little by little to migrants, to get 
access and to be on the same footing as the 
Australians... It has given to the Communities the 
opportunity to express themselves, to contribute, 
to participate to the political, social and 
cultural life of Australia". 
The Maronite respondent saw the societal effects of 
multiculturalism on the Australian society, though he 
acknowledged that there still is room to improve the 
present social relations: 
"Multiculturalism is virtually like going from 
here to the moon for Australia. It brought 
Australia into a very abrupt awakening. And I 
suppose the physical isolation of Australia from 
the rest of the world, contributed in the build 
up of a very one-eyed view of what it needs to be 
an Australian...But you can only take people at a 
certain speed...I mean you might realise that 
there's a lot that has to be changed. But human 
beings can adjust so much". 
Despite the celebrated rediscovery of its ethnicity, 
the Maronite Diocese is still under the strong influence of 
the Maronite bourgeois ideology. The extent of assimilation 
of the Maronite bourgeoisie to the Australian dominant 
values, make the Maronite Diocese to view critically any 
mentality which attempts to create ethnic community 
ghettoes. The Maronite priest attempted to dispel such a 
mentality as a general characteristic of the Lebanese, 
meaning actually of the Maronite bourgeoisie: 
"But I want to make it very very clear that in no 
way, never has been said or even hinted, that the 
Lebanese or Maronite wants to make a ghetto, to 
construct or to fabricate one...We're far too 
outgoing and we don't just have this way". 
In contrast to the Maronite priest the respondent from 
the MWC was more critical of the implementation of 
multiculturalism by the Federal government. He believed 
that the government did not exercise sufficiently its 
authority to implement the access and equity policies of 
multiculturalism: 
"In fact multiculturalism is not implemented to a 
large extent, even within government departments. 
Although the new premier of NSW is trying, and we 
welcome his moves very much, it's best to 
associate and go out an^^know more about ethnic 
communities. And that's^we would like to see from 
the Australian government. It isn't (sufficient) 
only to say: 'We are multiculturalist'. No, we 
want the (Federal) government to exercise, 
implement multiculturalism, and to bring the 
communities more together, in order that would 
understand and live with every culture of a 
particular place, rather than introducing this 
culture in such a way which would make disunity 
in the community in Australia". 
The Muslim community is newly established and more 
disadvantaged in comparison to the old communities. So the 
establishment of co-operation on more equal terms with the 
Australian state is seen as crucial. Therefore, the 
implementation of non-discriminatory policies by the state, 
was regarded by the respondent as fundamental to counteract 
any possible policies and ideologies that could undermine 
the perception of social peace and unity in the Muslim and 
Lebanese communities, and Australian society. 
The Greek respondent from the GWC interpreted 
multiculturalism not as an integrative form of social 
organization, as the Lebanese Orthodox respondent had, but 
as a social formula to maintain the individuality and 
separateness of ethnic communities, and the control of the 
ethnic church over community affairs. In the respondent's 
words: 
"Multiculturalism has helped in the development 
of welfare. (However), personally 
multiculturalism, whatever is called, I don't 
understanding it myself very much, because there 
have been various interpretations. What I can see 
in relation to Hellenism, is that it can not be 
put together with other ethnic groups. I agree 
we're all migrants. However, everyone is a 
different race, has different customs and 
different language and religion. And we can't get 
them all in a pot and stir them up and call them 
multicultural. The Greeks are Greeks, the 
Italians are Italians, etc. Every organization 
and every community should look after their own 
needs and responsibilities, in their own way, 
within the framework of multiculturalism or not, 
it doesn't matter. But at least freedom should be 
given to every ethnic community to do their own 
things".* 
Thus, the need to preserve the Greek culture, or the 
ideological community of Hellenism in the respondent's 
words, could only be achieved by the Greek Archdiocese. For 
migrants to maintain their cultural identity, ethnic 
institutions should always have access to state resources, 
irrespective of the name of the policy that provides such 
access. 
The Lebanese Orthodox priest had indirectly implied 
throughout his statements his support for mainstream 
services. The Greek respondent from the GWC was one of the 
few respondents that referred specifically to the policy of 
mainstreaming. Given his last statement it was not 
unexpected that he equated mainstreaming as a new form of 
assimilation. He saw the reduction of the welfare role of 
the church as a possible loss of legitimacy and control 
over the community: 
"It's a policy that turns us back 20-30 years of 
assimilation...that's what they're trying to do. 
I don't believe that Hellenism, or any other 
ethnic community is in a position to be 
mainstreamed or to be assimilated. What they're 
trying to do is to force us, willingly or 
unwillingly, to obey what the government thinks 
is right for Hellenism. And I don't believe that 
the government knows what's right or wrong. I 
feel that we, Hellenism, know what's best for the 
Greek community".* 
Contrary the the Greek respondent the Muslim supported 
mainstreaming indirectly, but he did so for other obvious 
political reasons: 
"What we would like to see, is that for the 
government to introduce more bi-lingual officers 
within government departments... It isn't enough 
to get a grant and be away from the actual 
system. We need to be within the system, to 
understand the system in order to help your 
community, and at the same time the government". 
The Muslim respondent saw the allocation of grants as 
insufficient to enhance the political influence of his 
institution at the government level. The direct state 
provision of welfare services were regarded by the 
respondent as means whereby it would allow the Muslims' 
needs to be recognised by the state, thus giving them the 
opportunity to have more input in government decision 
making. 
8b.4: Conclusion 
The overriding theme of all respondents of the sample 
was that the wordly needs of the individual and the 
community could only be met through their spiritual and 
moral salvation. With the exception of the Lebanese 
Orthodox priest, all other respondents expressed the view 
that the salvation of the individual was to be found in a 
harmonious religious community. 
This difference of opinion between the Lebanese 
Orthodox respondent and the other respondents, reflected 
the different political interpretation of the role of their 
Churches in social life, and how social needs and relations 
were perceived. 
The direct confrontation between the Archdiocese and 
the GOC has shifted in the political arena of the state, 
where both are trying to increase their share and influence 
on the provision of state resources. In the meantime intra-
communal conflict is focused more on the attempts of the 
Archdiocese to take over the property titles of independent 
communities. 
Among the Lebanese sample the most obvious intra-
communal political polarisation is that between Maronites 
and Muslims. The readiness of the MWC to seek state 
recognition of Muslim rights, shows not only the level of 
ethnic co-option under multiculturalismi but also the 
extent to which ethno-religious institutions are prepared 
to accept dominant social values for the sake of 
legitimacy and social power. 
Finally, the ideology and social practices of ethno-
religious institutions are likely to be less integrative 
and more assimilationist for their working class 
populations. This is so because the social control role of 
these institutions is exercised through their 
unquestionable acceptance of the status quo, and their 
desire for social peace. In the case of the Greek and 
Lebanese bourgeoisie the Church provided them with an 
acceptable institution in the host society to further their 
socio-economic and political interests, while the religious 
Muslim Lebanese institutions at present seek their 
legitimacy primarily from the state, rather than in 
combination with class alliances in the wider society. 
SECTION 8C 
GENERALIST INSTITUTIONS 
8c.12 Social Work and Social Workers 
The respondents from generalist welfare institutions 
shared the common ideological approach of institutional or 
pluralist welfare. This was in contrast to the almost 
conservative ideological uniformity of ethno-religious 
institutions, and the contrasting ideological variety of 
the secular ethno-specific ones. 
Institutional welfare regards the state as having the 
responsibility to provide direct services to people on the 
basis of their citizenship rights. Institutional social 
work practice is concerned with the welfare policies of the 
state, the pursuit of social/welfare issues, and with 
community development. According to Mishra the main aim of 
this welfare approach is: 
"... It concerns the gap between foimial 
entitlement or existence of rights to their 
actual utilization or enjoyment between formal 
equality, status as a citizen, and the 
substantive inequality resulting from the facts 
of stratification...Thus, how to ensure proper 
utilization of services for the poor...". [Mishra 
op.cit:31]. 
As the institutional welfare approach is a by-product 
of the ideology of Social-Democracy, it does not really 
concern itself with the nature and structure of the 
capitalist system. Social inequalities tend to be perceived 
more in terms of unequal distribution and access to state 
resources, rather than in terms of unequal distribution of 
wealth and poweir relations between classes and. groups * 
However, given the fact that many working class 
migrants experience significant forms of inequalities at 
the secondary level of income distribution, institutional 
welfare practices by independent ethnic social/welfare 
workers can be beneficial and constructive. These social 
workers are called independent because they are employed by 
ethno-specific organizations. 
The pluralist social work concept has its own 
perception of the individual and of the community, and 
therefore a different view of the role of the ethnic 
social/welfare worker. The Greek respondent from 
the Ethnic Child Care Development Unit at Marrickville saw 
that role as: 
"Our role is to educate our own people _ in 
some of the new concepts... It is very hard... 
Intergenerational conflict...The system doesn't 
acknowledge a different value system. We Greek 
social workers are trying to be mediators between 
families and between the system and the families, 
or the individual and the system, so we can 
facilitate communication". 
This statement included the fundamental role of the 
independent ethnic social worker, to link the individual or 
families with the 'system'. The word system refers to the 
the bureaucracy of the welfare state. Thus, the basic 
social control role of the institutional form of social 
work is to define the social inequalities of clients or 
groups as primarily derived from inadequate and 
inappropriate services, or policies of the welfare state. 
In this way a perception is reinforced on clients that the 
welfare state is the major source of welfare, and its 
failure to deliver appropriate services or eradicate 
inequalities, becomes the major target of criticism. As the 
same respondent explained: 
"As far as I'm concerned with my role I used to 
do individual casework, but I didn't see casework 
as just the problem. I tried also to see what was 
the cause behind it. Most often the cause was the 
system itself...The system didn't provide enough 
information, or didn't do the work properly, 
mainly because it didn't have bi-lingual people, 
cultural sensitivity about the different people's 
needs". 
And the Greek respondent from the St.George Migrant 
Resource Centre at Rockdale expressed similar views as the 
last respondent: 
"You look at the immediate needs, you're trying 
to help and solve those for the person or the 
community. But your main obligation is to look at 
the roots of the problem, and try to change that, 
and that obviously is a long term thing, it's a 
struggle. It's the system that's causing the 
problem...The welfare state...". 
So both respondents identified two strategies of 
institutional social work practice to respond to 
individual/group needs: a) At the individual level to use 
casework as a method to address the immediate problem; b) 
At the community or societal levels to tackle problems 
generated by the welfare state, lack of information, proper 
and relative services and access, etc. 
In comparison to the other respondents from the ethno-
specific organizations, a respondent from the independent 
social workers realised the different and conflictual value 
system of state welfare practices in relation to the 
individual migrant client and its intervention in the 
family unit. The Greek respondent from Marrickville 
commented on that: 
"The funding body sets down guidelines and 
criteria under which you have to fit. Of course 
there's conflict. Many times I was approached... 
The man said: 'Stop interfering in the family 
affairs, it's none of your business'. The concept 
of counselling of social workers and 
psychologists is very alien to Greeks...The 
extended family was the one that was solving the 
problems, and was helping, and in a lot of 
situations was very good". 
Halmos argues that both the conservative and 
institutional forms of social work practice have a 
therapeutic mode of thought in treating individuals [Halmos 
1970: 18]. That is to say, both approaches will use certain 
techniques and pathology models to identify, describe and 
rectify social or psychological problems of individuals. 
Despite this, there are some important differences 
between institutional and conservative social work 
practices concerning migrant people as the Greek 
respondent from Marrickville indicated: 
"At the same time is to try to work with the 
people themselves, so you can equip them with 
skills, so they can look after themselves... and I 
think, to a certain extent some of the agencies, 
because of having funding, all this money, they 
don't really want to equip people with skills 
to solve their own problems, because they want to 
have a lead to show with statistical figures". 
The respondent saw as the role of the social worker to 
encourage client independence, provide counselling and 
advice, and through these practices to provide the clients 
with sufficient skills to cope with their lives. Her 
criticism towards some agencies was specifically directed 
towards the Greek Welfare Centre, which in the respondent's 
opinion seemed to be more concerned with producing 
statistics, than to help individuals and challenge 
inequitable legislation that affect both the Greeks and 
their community: 
"For example with the Archdiocese... I think most 
of the workers (of GWC) what they do is see 
people, casework, have a few meetings where they 
discuss about their work, and not really about 
issues that will change the attitude of the 
system, or bring some challenge, some laws, some 
legislation that's not constructive with the 
people they're dealing with". 
The respondent regarded the practice of casework by 
the GWC as exercising social control over the individual 
and the Greek community. One of the negative aspects of 
casework is that: 
"...There is a danger of persuading clients that 
this (casework) will satisfy all their needs, 
that they must accept impoverishment and come to 
terms with it, rather than actively attempt to 
change it". [Social work in practice op.cit: 50]. 
In other words casework enhances the benevolent belief 
of religion and the acceptance of the existing social 
order. The Greek respondent from the Botany Migrant 
Resource Centre at Eastlakes realised the same problem with 
the GWC's welfare practice, its lack of participation in 
welfare issues concerning the community: 
"If you have more workers you become more active 
and more involved...It doesn't mean to withdraw 
or become less active. The GWC has more 
grants...". 
The two criticisms labelled against the GWC by the 
Greek respondents so far, its interest to show statistical 
figures and concentrate on casework, were actually verified 
by the respondent from the GWC, though as proof of the 
Centre's efficiency: 
"... The centre doesn't need to prove anything to 
the government, because everybody shows 
statistics and work...We don't give (statistics) 
to please, but to show where's the best 
service".* 
In 1985 the GWC held a conference to mark the 10 years 
since its establishment in 1975. At this conference a paper 
was presented by a GWC worker titled "Casework". Among 
other things in the paper the criticism against the 
extensive casework practice of the GWC was acknowledged, 
but it did not discuss the issue at any length, nor it 
offered any justification for its extensive practice: 
"There have been, and no doubt we will continue 
to have our share of critics and debates 
regarding the effectiveness of casework. The 
argument being that individualised focus hinders 
general social concern and reforms, but this is a 
debate to be left for another opportunity". 
The Lebanese respondents too saw the role of the 
Lebanese social/welfare workers in ethno-specific 
organizations concentrated mainly to casework. They did not 
deal in detail about the effect of casework on the 
individual, as the Greek respondents did, but considered 
casework's impact more at the community level. They seemed 
to believe that Lebanese social workers should be directing 
their attention and their organizations' resources towards 
community development, and challenging government policies. 
According to the Lebanese respondent from the Migrant 
Resource Centre at Canterbury: 
"A lot of workers do see they have a role beyond 
providing a direct service. They do see there's a 
role in encouraging mainstreaming, advocacy, 
community development...They're so bogged down 
with direct service work..Funding bodies do like 
to see figures on how many people you see 
There's that pressure from funding bodies and 
management committees which may sometimes don't 
understand the concept of community 
development...Small associations are bogged down 
with casework...". 
This statement raised again the inability of ethno-
specific institutions to deliver a satisfactory and 
appropriate welfare service to their clientele, and 
highlighted the pressure the funding bodies exert on them, 
which limits even further their provision of welfare. 
The respondent from the Arabic Welfare Interagency 
[AWI] noted the same problems facing Lebanese community 
welfare institutions, but he identified another very 
important role for the ethnic social worker: 
"Social workers' role is limited to direct 
casework...Community development picked up 
lately. They're concentrating on casework because 
(the Lebanese) are newly arrived 
migrants...(We're) trying to develop a mentality 
of community development, and establish a 
pressure group to tackle the policies instead of 
casework...A good example is the immigration 
policy where people are running against a brick 
wall...All workers realised the government policy 
will get then nowhere...We managed to convince 
these people to tackle the actual policy...I see 
the role of the social worker concentrating more 
at community development, as a lobby group... 
That's the switch. Block voting has to be co-
ordinated linking with workers and 
organizations...It seems that immigration policy 
is one of the things we get a lot of backing...". 
The respondent saw the role of the social workers as 
been in the forefront of community awareness and 
organization, in fulfilling the the precise role of organic 
intellectuals. He saw social workers as giving leadership 
direction and expertise to the Lebanese community 
organizations to act as a pressure and lobbying group. 
Within this context then the respondent's reference to 
block voting and community development is significant as it 
underlies the awareness of the potential ability of the 
ethnic group's political mobilisation. Moreover, the 
respondent's use of the community development concept 
appears to have more a political dimension that restricted 
to that of welfare. 
Thus, the dynamic role of independent ethnic social 
workers as agents of social change lies in their ability to 
mobilise their communities on issues of general interest, 
and by presenting these issues as being devoid of any 
specific primordial characteristics. In other words social 
issues, by far and large, are not presented as important 
for the maintenance of specific cultural characteristics, 
but as issues that affect the everyday and future lives of 
individuals and the standing of the community and its 
members in society. 
The AWI then was seen by the respondent as an 
institution that had the ability to forge alliances with 
community workers, leaders and organizations, and this 
was the primary reason for its establishment: 
"It was an attempt to get away from the sectarian 
and regional structure of the community. To get 
away from the division of the community". 
Lewins argues about the wider social implications of 
the future development of migrant political direction: 
"...ethnics' increased access to key social 
resources has only come about through their 
growing recognition that they are ultimately 
responsible for their own future and for 
initiating structural changes to realise this. If 
one accepts this politicised strategy for ethnics 
to realise their goals, and given that key 
institutions like education, the economy and 
health are controlled by Anglo-Australians, then 
it is obvious that ethnics' political activity to 
increase their access to the resources, which 
these institutions dispense, must take place in 
the confines of the one, common, comparative, 
institutional milieu. Political activity of this 
sort entails confrontation, which, in turn, 
involves conflict and tension". [Jupp et.al., 
op.cit: 33] 
The Greek respondent from Eastlakes was even more 
explicit how she perceived the role of social workers: 
"Some social workers are leaders and are seen as 
such and this is very important. They will 
inspire others, and mobilise others to be the 
people in the future that will mobilise the rest 
of the community in the future. This's one of the 
most important things. They have been catalysts 
with other leaders in the community". 
A good example how organizations like the Arabic 
Welfare Interagency and the Greek-Australian Welfare 
Workers' Association [GAWWA] can organise and mobilise 
sections of the ethnic communities, is the one related to 
the 1986 budget cuts to multicultural programs. GAWWA took 
the initiative to organise a public meeting of ethnic 
workers to protest and take action against government 
policies. However, after the initial spur of protest the 
activity fizzled out as major ethnic representative bodies 
and ethno-specific organizations did not provide any 
substantial political support to this protest. According 
to the Greek respondent from Rockdale: 
"There was a lot of enthusiasm at the meeting, 
and following that for a few weeks because 
we had the set rallies...After the initial furore 
and the Canberra rally, as usual, people lost 
interest and enthusiasm. They felt: 'What can we 
do? We can't change anything. What's the use of 
running around?' A core of 8-10 people was left. 
We felt that we needed to have this committee 
ready for any future things that may come up, 
because we saw it as an attack, and it isn't 
going to stop". 
The respondent recognised the disorganization, 
disenhancement, powerlessness and inability of ethnic 
social workers to affect any real changes without a broad 
base of political support. This highlighted the social 
control role of the conservative ethno-specific 
institutions which seldom criticise government policies: 
"The sad thing is that as welfare workers, as 
social workers, as community people we aren't 
organising ourselves to fight that. We're sitting 
there and we're taking it, and if we're fighting 
we're fighting spontaneously and reacting. We're 
letting ESL being cut and then we're shouting. 
The ALP is attacking the working class 
generally...The government is trying to please 
the business sector". 
This last example is also related to other aspects of 
the role of independent ethnic social workers. Those social 
workers who are employed by generalist community 
organizations, and advocate on behalf of their communities, 
face an important dilemma regarding their relationships 
with their communities. The welfare workers' organizations 
of the sample, the AWI and GAWWA, can be classified as 
Social-Democratic in relation to welfare ideology. 
On the other hand, although social workers form a 
professional group, and their objective class position 
is middle-class, their subjective class position as 
individuals can politically vary from conservative to 
Social-Democratic or even radical. 
The basic problem for the above two organizations of 
the sample^ and for many individual independent ethnic 
social workers, is to what ethno-specific institutions they 
can relate ideologically or forge alliances with them. As 
these workers regard themselves as professionals they can 
not accept easily the primordial dominance of ethno-
specif ic organizations, thus lacking broad institutional 
community political support and resources. 
The other problem for ethnic professional 
organizations can be the lack of wide professional 
membership. This lack of representativeness was recognised 
by the respondent from AWI, and it was actually in the last 
year or so when the AWI membership was extended to non-
government employee and ethnic institutions. In contrast to 
the AWI, GAWWA has membership from all levels of state, 
local and community organizations: 
"We don't claim that we're community 
representative, but of course we have strong 
relations with community organizations because of 
the non-sectarian role we play...". 
However, the lack of community representation of the 
AWI, and its desire to establish a power base independent 
from Lebanese/Arabic community institutions, was seen by 
the Lebanese Orthodox priest as a major drawback: 
"The AWI...Unfortunately I'm completely critical 
of the agency because it is formed of public 
servants...They aren't community based. You see 
I'm always very weary of people trying to form 
organizations when they're themselves social 
workers. Social workers should be supplementary 
to the organization, or the one who will work 
with the organization. Not themselves to compete 
with other organizations. This is the idea". 
The respondent was quite explicit and unequivocal 
about the role of Lebanese, and generally ethnic social 
workers. They should be or see themselves as the organic 
intellectual leadership of ethno-specific organizations. 
The respondent from GAWWA, who at the time of the 
interview was the secretary of the Association and was 
employed in the community services of the Canterbury 
Municipal Council, saw the problems facing community 
organizations and social work practice from a different 
perspective. The major problem in her opinion was that 
community based organizations, both ethnic and non-ethnic, 
are becoming less relevant to the needs of people, and less 
representative. In other words the community concept is 
becoming increasingly unworkable. Among the main reasons 
for that the respondent recognised the complicated 
procedure involved in the establishment and running of 
these organizations, and the dominance of professionals in 
the administration and selection of the social needs of the 
groups they represent: 
"In principal I believe in community based 
organizations... In practice it doesn't work. If 
you look at most community based organizations 
they're dominated by professionals. So it isn't 
really the community. Sure professional people 
often do represent the community, but not always. 
Also community management is becoming incredibly 
complicated just in terms of procedure, 
incorporation etc. I don't know...Often 
organizations don't represent their members. 
There're some centres that work effectively". 
Thus far the respondents' statements have indicated 
two broad areas where independent social workers face 
obstacles in creating alliances, or liaisons with ethno-
specific institutions. Managerial and ideological. Ethno-
specific community organizations have many structural, 
administrative and professional limitations. As the primary 
function of these organizations is cultural maintenance 
they have ideological limitations, and certain welfare 
issues presented to them by independent social workers as 
worthy of consideration, may be treated as being against or 
irrelevant to their specific political and primordial 
interests, and consequently they would be unlikely to be 
supportive of them. 
Of course there would be instances that ethno-
specific institutions will support certain welfare, or even 
political issues presented to them by independent social 
workers. However, this would depend on which class or group 
controls the balance of power within the community, and 
therefore they would define in primordial terms the actual 
class and political importance or non-importance of the 
issues involved. 
The bi-polar Greek community split is a good case in 
point to show the political implications and difficulties 
in establishing alliances between the GOC and the 
Archdiocese and the independent Greek social workers. The 
Greek respondents of the sample had mixed feelings towards 
both Greek community institutions, though some of them, 
like the Greek respondent from Marrickville, was more 
explicit in her views: 
"As a community I'm very disappointed with the 
way we're split up, and don't come to meet on 
common issues. Both the Archdiocese and the Greek 
Orthodox Community are trying to use the money 
they're getting from the government in order to 
show that they have power. The Archdiocese to 
keep a hold on people, because I'm sorry they're 
not helping for self-esteem, in the people's 
rights. We have the nepotism (and the 
Archdiocese) reinforces that; doesn't participate 
in the issues that are really relevant in 
relation to equality, rights, equal opportunity 
and so on. They're the elitist few who have 
access and keep the rest ignored". 
She also added the following clarification to her 
last statement: 
"I'm not against the Archdiocese or the Church 
itself. But I'm against the people who are ruling 
the Church. They're the ones who are causing a 
lot of problems in the community, and amongst the 
people. As an institution the Church is part of 
our culture and we accept it...". 
Clearly the respondent did not object to the Church 
itself, a common criticism used by the Archdiocese against 
its critics, but to the political and social direction it 
has adopted. Furthermore, the respondent saw the role of 
the Archdiocese and of the conservative forces that support 
it, as exercising social control over the community and the 
Greek people that is hindering the improvement of their 
social position. 
The Archdiocese because of its political domination 
in the Greek community has adopted a policy of isolation 
as a method of strengthening its position. For instance, it 
discourages membership and participation of the Greek 
Welfare Centre's social workers to GAWWA, because the 
Archdiocese neither supports nor controls GAWWA, thus 
making professional and community co-operation extremely 
difficult. All Greek independent social workers of the 
sample were at the time of the interviews members of GAWWA. 
However, this policy of isolation by the Archdiocese 
has not worked out completely in its favour. The Greek 
Welfare Centre's staff was reduced from 13 full and part-
time workers in 1985 to about 7 in 1987. Although this 
reduction represents partly the impact of cuts in funding 
to 'established' communities in favour of more recent and 
smaller ones, it also has to be seen as a negative reaction 
to the Centre's welfare policy and strict code of 
employment practices for female employees which do not help 
to attract many applicants for its advertised positions. 
As far as the GOC was concerned, the Greek respondents 
acknowledged that it was more co-operative on welfare and 
community issues that the Archdiocese, but still posed some 
specific problems. As the respondent from Eastlakes 
remarked: 
"The GOC has a small welfare section, not mush 
staff, not well structured. They're getting 
involved with issues, while the GWC isn't getting 
involved. There's liaison. Could be more and 
better co-ordinated, because of the community 
split is difficult to do that". 
While the respondent from Rockdale, who used to be 
employed as a social worker at GOC, observed the following 
structural limitations of the GOC: 
"In the GOC welfare was never seen as a priority. 
If you look at the history of the GOC was set up 
mainly for the maintenance of language and 
religion... The committee is male dominated... and 
women and the young find it difficult to join in 
the Council...It has become a bit irrelevant... It 
has alienated a lot of people". 
The respondent from Marrickville saw the role of the 
GOC as being one of counter balance to the domination of 
the Archdiocese, though she too saw some serious problems 
with the organization: 
"The Community (GOC) is the oldest organization, 
and thanks goodness is there otherwise we would 
have been assimilated. However, they've got their 
own problems too, they're political. Because 
there's a group of people who are dominating the 
whole thing, they have lost a lot of the support 
they had from the community...The people out 
there do accept the community concept, but 
because of these people who are there, they don't 
belong anywhere". 
The respondent's reference on the assimilationist 
impact of the Archdiocese has already been discussed in the 
previous section. Saloutos in an article about the 
assimilation of middle-class Greeks in the USA noted that 
the Greek Orthodox Church played a central role in the 
assimilation of second and third generation Greek-Americans 
[Saloutos 'The Greek Orthodox Church in the United States 
and Assimilation', International Migration Review, 
Vol.VII,No.4, 1973: 395-407]. The Church had reduced the 
identity of these generations to only a religious one, thus 
losing their 'ethnic/national' dimension and accepting the 
dominant values of American society. 
Moreover, the high political profile of the GOC was 
sighted by the respondent as the main cause for its 
declining influence in the community. These comments on the 
political character of the GOC underline other implications 
related to the role of the social workers. Jordan has 
argued that social workers are encouraged to see their 
activity as apolitical, neutral, while in practice social 
work is a political activity [Jordan 1983: 1]. 
In other words: 
"Social work, whether it believes itself to be so 
or not, is a form of political activity involving 
advocacy and client organization, as well as love 
and caring" [Social Work in practice op.cit: 47]. 
So social workers, whether as individuals or as a 
professional group, do not want to be seen as politically 
active or espousing certain political views. Although the 
respondents thus far tried to give this impression, in 
practice they were politically active, and expressed 
definite views on their communal institutions. Furthermore, 
state revenue is the source of livelihood of social 
workers, as well as the acceptance or challenge of any 
state social policies are products of political processes. 
An example that demonstrated the social control role 
of the Archdiocese and the political activity of 
independent social workers, was the case of the so-called 
1978 'Greek Conspiracy' of Social Security. In 1978 the 
Federal police raided the homes of 586 Greek invalid 
pensioners and arrested them on charges of attempting to 
defraud the Commonwealth, by misrepresenting their medical 
condition [Jakubowicz et.al 1984 op.cit: 80]. 
Another 105 invalid pensioners living in Greece, 
together with those arrested in Australia, had their 
pensions suspended. Overall 1,400 people were implicated as 
taking part in the 'conspiracy'. (There is a very good 
report on this issue by GAWWA on the Greek Action Bulletin 
titled, "The FRAUD REPORT", Vol.4, No.l, March 1979, pp.l-
11). 
This government action was an attack against the Greek 
community, and particularly against the Greek working 
class, as those pensioners involved had claimed invalid 
pensions because of the injuries they suffered in the 
hazardous industrial occupations they had been employed 
[loc.cit]. Those who suffered most from the whole affair 
were those personally involved, who saw their personal 
integrity being humiliated, suffered financial hardship, 
broken families and psychological problems. 
The respondent from Marrickville, together with other 
Greek social workers, was one of the persons who played a 
central role in the affair. Her comments therefore on the 
events of this period were significant, and when compared 
with those statements from the respondents of the GOC and 
the GWC, helped to reconstruct a general picture of the 
political situation in the Greek community at the period 
the events of the 'Conspiracy' were unfolding. 
According to the respondent from Marrickville the 
'conspiracy' was the result of: 
"...When the government wants to cut down on 
something, they have to find a s ort of an excuse 
to do that...The whole thing happened at the 
weekend, when we weren't at our offices...We 
found out about it on Monday...they were treated 
like criminals...". 
The respondent's reference to government cut-backs, 
was related to the policy of the then government to 
reinforce social control on the working class. The leading 
role in this policy initiative was played by the Department 
of Social Security, which was instructed by the government 
to tighten the eligibility criteria for benefits and 
pensions [loc.cit]. The 'Greek conspiracy' became a part of 
this campaign. 
Soon after the arrests the GOC organised a series of 
public meetings. The respondent from the GOC: 
"We were the first organization to organise 
against the attacks within the community. We 
organised some very significant meetings at the 
time to try to inform people in what is 
happening. We attacked the government quite 
severely, we lobbied politicians...They (the 
Archdiocese) stayed back and away from the 
limelight... wait and see...They lobbied behind 
the government". 
For about a year Greek social workers and other Greek 
community organizations used to see people involved with 
the 'conspiracy', on the political front though there was 
not much progress with the government. Then the following 
happened according to the respondent from Marrickville: 
"A year later we were in the same situation. What 
really cut us was that when the Archbishop, he 
should be in the church and he shouldn't be a 
community leader and make statements on behalf of 
the community, met with the minister and issued a 
statement, which practically said that he 
believed that these people were really guilty and 
should be punished". 
After that incident the independent social workers 
collected statistics from welfare organizations that used 
to see the accused pensioners, and a delegation made up of 
some of these workers went to Canberra to meet with the 
minister of Social Security to discuss the issue. According 
to the respondent from Marrickville the minister proposed 
at the meeting, to look at individual cases, which was seen 
by the delegation as a ploy to delay the settlement of the 
whole affair. The same respondent on the meeting with the 
minister: 
"The minister, the first thing she said and 
that's very strange, was: 'We acted from 
information of your Greek Organizations'. Now, 
which were the Greek Organizations? I don't know 
really. The minister was misinformed". 
As far as the role of the Greek organizations on the 
'conspiracy' case was concerned, the same respondent 
commented: 
"The GOC held a public meeting and so on, and 
their social worker got involved with the Greek 
Welfare Workers group. [GAWWA's name at the 
time]. The GWC, they said, were doing unofficial 
representation and so on...The Archdiocese said 
they don' t want to become involved in any 
political issue. And of course they saw this as a 
very highly political issue, and also it involved 
justice. Of course it involves justice, but you 
have to see justice on both sides, not one". 
On the other hand the GWC's respondent volunteered 
only the following statement on the 'conspiracy' case: 
"The GWC came into contact with the DSS to help 
people who had lost their pensions to get them 
back. We had meetings with the minister. Whoever 
was sent to the Centre by the DSS was serviced. 
For us it was a great honour, and we felt very 
proud that the Centre had such a great value for 
the government to give us this freedom. The 
Centre offered financial assistance, sent 
telegrams...". * 
By late 1982 all defendants had the charges against 
them either withdrawn or they had been discharged. The ALP, 
while in opposition, had promised to compensate those 
involved in the affair, and once it gained office in 1983 
proceeded in finalising the compensation claims, and at the 
same time made a public apology to the Greek community for 
the handling of the whole affair. 
Thus, the 'Greek conspiracy', however ill conceived 
and badly executed, illustrated clearly the political 
willingness in times of tension in capitalist relations to 
use conservative political ideologies and practices at the 
state level, to apply social control and manipulate racial 
feelings towards whole ethnic minorities. 
At the same time the unequal distribution of welfare 
funds in the Greek community underscored the political 
implications and consequences of this policy. That is to 
say, only the independent social workers, and to some 
extent the GOC reacted against the 'conspiracy', while the 
Archdiocese used its powerful position to limit the 
political damage of the government within the community. 
The Lebanese respondents shared similar views as the 
Greek respondents about ethnic community institutions and 
community relations. Where the Greek respondents could 
actually name the Greek community organizations they 
referred to, because they are only two major ones, the 
Lebanese respondents due to political reasons of their 
perceived independent role could not do that. 
Nevertheless, this did not stop the respondent from 
the AWI from been highly critical of Lebanese religious 
welfare organizations: 
"Unfortunately to have a sectarian welfare 
service is to implement division in the 
community. I don't believe religious sects or 
groups understand the problems of the community. 
They claim to provide (services) to everyone... So 
the only thing they can do is some direct 
service. As far as community development is 
concerned, they can't do it because they have 
special interests, which they're trying to keep. 
So it's against their interests to establish a 
whole community program...And you'll find out 
that the secular group will start to take 
over...because (with) the sectarian group welfare 
services have failed, and it will fail to provide 
a whole community development program...". 
The other Lebanese respondent from Canterbury was not 
as unequivocal as the last respondent on the division in 
the Lebanese 'community': 
"There isn't much difference in what they believe 
in, but there's a difference on what people 
identify as their community...The community isn't 
divided...because divided can mean that people 
don't work together at all, which isn't exactly 
the case, because some of these organizations 
work close together". 
The same respondent recognised also political and 
socio-cultural implications of the welfare practices of 
religious institutions, though not in the same critical way 
as the respondent from AWI did: 
"Churches and Mosques play a very important role 
in providing services. They receive main funding 
from the state, and do fund raising 
activities...Well if you want to get funding for 
your organization you have to know the right 
people and pull the right strings. That's the way 
it works...They [the religious organizations] 
will give a general direction which is compatible 
with their beliefs....At the Mosque, for there're 
certain activities that will not be seen as 
relevant, so they wouldn't be held there,...like 
family planning". 
Like their Greek counterparts so did the Lebanese 
independent social workers faced a problem in establishing 
a political base, or alliance with the Lebanese ethno-
specific institutions. The LCC was established as a secular 
umbrella organization over the fragmented Lebanese, but 
even this was not seen by the respondent from AWI as 
relevant to the interests of the independent social workers 
and very difficult to succeed in uniting the 'community': 
"For the LCC is going to be a very difficult job, 
because their structure is based on sectarian 
groups, (and) they have contradictory interests. 
Theoretically it is very good. It's very hard 
work taking (into account) the situation as it 
is. Events are still happening in Lebanon. (The 
LCC) has only nominal membership". 
The other set of relationships that was problematic 
for independent ethnic social workers, was their 
relationship with the state. As Davies commented about the 
position of the social workers: 
"The social worker is an inherent part of the 
machinery of the state, and must in 
practice operate within contemporary 
policies, whatever their ideological complexion". 
[Davies op.cit: 193]. 
So for independent social workers the main dilemma 
with the state was not the acceptance of its authority and 
legitimacy. The main contradiction these workers 
encountered was in what way they could compromise their 
relations between the state and their communities; how to 
implement or criticise state welfare policies, and at the 
same time be seen as apolitical and professionals. 
This dilemma is even greater for workers or personal 
service professionals who are employed directly by 
government agencies. Although the relationships of this 
group are not the subject of the present study, the Greek 
respondent from GAWWA who was employed by a local 
government instrumentality, raised some important points: 
"I find that workers are getting increasingly 
tired and bureaucratised too. People working in 
government departments have their hands tied on 
particular issues. I'm aware of that and I find 
it frustrating. Some workers don't realise that. 
We say get people in the bureaucracies because 
then they can help our community. And we pushed 
for that, but I think very often if you aren't 
very careful, if you stay there a while you end 
up selling out a lot of your principles. I think 
you can work for a bureaucracy and advocate on 
behalf of your community, but you have to be very 
careful". 
The respondent pointed out the major problems and 
restrictions faced by ethnic professionals employed by the 
state or government authorities. A fundamental component of 
multiculturalism's policy has been the co-option of ethnic 
leadership into the state apparatuses in order to support 
conservative ethnic classes, or to neutralise progressive 
intellectuals. A consequence of that policy was that the 
migrant working class was denied of important leadership 
material in its struggle to improve its general welfare and 
political position. 
Despite these restrictions, the independent social 
workers regarded state welfare policies as responsible for 
the fragmentation of their communities. Although they were 
conscious of the intra-communal power struggles, the state 
was seen as encouraging the maintenance of conservative 
and inappropriate forms of welfare structures and seirvices. 
In the opinion of the Lebanese respondent from AWI: 
"The government policy towards the community has 
always been based on divisiveness. The politics 
of funding are a very political issue. When you 
give funds to a group, disregarding what effects 
this fund will have on the whole community, this 
policy then is very damaging. So if the 
government funds religious groups, it isn't the 
fault of their welfare services. They (the 
government) don't give a damn about the community 
as far as I'm concerned". 
The Greek respondent from Marrickville expressed 
similar views as the Lebanese respondent from AWI about the 
consequences of state funding: 
• • I think because of the fact that little money 
is given to us, and is thrown out there, 
everybody rashes for it, and try to scramble and 
tear and whatever to get the money. (And) I 
think the government wants to do that to put one 
group against the other, and can justify cuts in 
other things. But we're stupid enough to take 
that bite, and because of that a lot of group 
aren't really working together, they're not 
honest with each other and they're trying to 
discredit each other, so that they can get the 
money... instead of combining together on issues. 
Not only on issues, we have so much scope to get 
so much money from the government, if we all 
combined...We can do many big projects...". 
Throughout their statements both the Greek and 
Lebanese respondents used the concept of community in 
different contexts and levels, which invariably referred to 
the Greek, Lebanese, Arabic, Ethnic and Australian 
'communities'. However, at every 'community' level the 
respondents encountered ideological difficulties in 
articulating exactly what short of community they want to 
see, though they definitely saw the secular sector as the 
dominant one in any community structure. 
The employment of the community concept points out its 
conceptual shortcomings of analysis and interpretation of 
social relations, and the inability it poses in 
articulating clear alternative political and social 
strategies. 
8c.2: Identification of needs 
This part would deal with the specific welfare needs 
of Greeks and Lebanese as they were identified by the 
respondents themselves. In comparison to the parts on the 
identification of welfare needs by the ethno-specific 
organizations, this part is comparatively short. This 
discrepancy is not due to any indifference on behalf of the 
independent social workers about their communities, but 
rather it could be attributed to at least two reasons: 
a. In the previous part the independent respondents saw the 
establishment of a united community, as most of the 
respondents from the ethno-religious institutions, as the 
major prerequisite to address the welfare needs of the 
individual and the 'community'. The main concern of the 
independent social workers was the policies and services of 
the welfare state, as these were regarded as the primary 
distributors of welfare. These social workers, therefore, 
were bound to be more preoccupied with the implementation 
and effect of these policies and services. 
b. The other important reason was that not all independent 
social workers were involved specifically with their own 
ethnic communities. All respondents, with the exception of 
the one from AWI, were employed in organizations that 
did wider community work, so they were not necessarily 
aware of all social problems facing their communities, or 
the impact of these problems. 
For both Lebanese respondents unemployment was 
identified as the most important social problem facing the 
Lebanese at present. According to the respondent from 
Canterbury: 
"On the top of the list it would have to be 
unemployment. It's a serious problem in the 
Lebanese community, due to the decline of 
unskilled jobs available. This is a major 
factor". 
The other Lebanese respondent from AWI, saw the lack 
of unskilled occupations also as important factor for the 
high unemployment levels experienced by the Lebanese, but 
he did not offer any solutions to this: 
"Unemployment level is high...The whole economic 
picture is bad, so we suffer first because a lot 
of people are unskilled, and the unskilled market 
is bad...With Vietnamese is the same thing". 
Another way that the high unemployment levels of 
Lebanese workers can be seen is through their numbers in 
receipt of unemployment benefit in table [19]. Although 
these statistics do not give a complete picture of these 
people's actual unemployment levels, when compared with the 
Greeks, who are three and half times more than the 
Lebanese, then the magnitude of their plight is stri king. 
There was a high numbers of Greeks on unemployment 
benefit during the deep recession of 1983/84, but since 
then their numbers declined, not necessarily due to 
improved working employment conditions as some of them 
transferred on other benefits. In contrast the niimber of 
Lebanese persons on unemployment benefit jumped by nearly 
5,000 from 1982 to 1984 and continued to rise. In May 1987 
in the total percentage of overseas born beneficiaries the 
Lebanese had 6,2%, the Greeks 3,4%, the Indo-Chinese 12.4% 
and the Yugoslavs 4,4%. 
Table 19: Number of Persons on Unemployment Benefit by-
Country of Birth by Year. Total Population. 
Year Greeks Lebanese 
Nov. 1982 3,604 2,356 Nov. 1983 6,090 4,894 Nov. 1984 6,418 7,274 Nov. 1985 5,400 7,393 Nov. 1986 4,839 8.076 May 1987 4,510 8,339 
Source: Quarterly Survey of Unemployment Benefit Recipients, 
Department of Social Security. 
The respondent from AWI stated the immigration policy 
as another problem that needs to be addressed. Although for 
the Lebanese immigration issues are important, the AWI had 
also some vested interests in giving priority to this 
issue: 
"The Immigration issue is an emotional one, 
because families are split. The family reunion is 
bad. You're applying to bring your brother or 
sister here, and you're judged on the points 
system.The government doesn't realise that. The 
government uses the unemployment figures to 
justify its immigration policy. I strongly 
believe it isn't the community's fault". 
The Greek respondent from Marrickville identified 
unemployment as affecting the lives of Greek workers, 
though she did this diagnosis in the form of pathological 
symptoms that need therapy. The statement is typical in its 
use of pathological terminology employed by many social 
workers and psychologists, the respondent been the latter, 
to describe various conditions of the individual: 
"Income security; they can't provide for their 
children, their future is bleak...The syndrome of 
the failed migrant, the person who has come to 
work hard, to make something material, a 
family...This doesn't happen... They're in their 
middle age, unemployed and (it's) very difficult 
to understand and cope with that. The husband 
breaks down or gets ill, then the wife has to 
take up, then she breaks down, and the children 
have to take up. Families need therapy...the 
system hasn't got a remedy. There are very few 
Greek family counselors". 
This was the only Greek respondent who referred 
specifically to the middle aged group of unemployed Greeks, 
and the effects of unemployment in their families. 
Unemployment among Greek working class people is 
concentrated in the age groups 40's and 50's. As the 
majority of Greeks have been employed in unskilled 
occupations for a long time, the contraction of the 
availability of these occupations has meant that they are 
experiencing high rates of unemployment. Unfortunately, 
there are no recent studies on the levels and effects of 
unemployment on Greek people, but they ought to share the 
same effects as those experienced by the Lebanese. 
An indication of the comparative age of Greek and 
Lebanese unemployed, and their length of unemployment, can 
be found in the quarterly survey of Unemployment Benefit 
recipients of the Department of Social Security. In the 
May 1986 survey for unemployed persons over 50 years old 
the Lebanese had 44,2% unemployed for three years or more, 
while the Greeks 38,9%, table [20]. However, in this age 
group there were 27.2% of the total Greek unemployment 
benefit recipients as compared with 9.9% of the Lebanese. 
Table 20: Unemployment Benefit Recipients aged 50 years and 
over by Country of Birth by length of 
Unemployment 23 May 1986 (%) 
Birthplace 6 MON 1 YEAR 2 YEARS 3 YEARS 3 YEARS+ 
Greece 25,4 14,5 21,0 15,2 23,7 Lebanon 22,9 13,2 19,6 13,0 31,2 
Source: Quarterly Survey of Unemployment Benefit Recipients, 
Department of Social Security. 
The impact of ageing, incapacity to work, widowhood, 
marital breakdown and their socio-economic interrelations 
for Greeks can be seen in their nximber and proportion on 
various pensions. In June 1979 there were 20,700 Greek 
persons on pensions, while in April 1987 36,128 which 
represented an increase in relation to the total population 
from 1.1 to 1.7 (Demographic and other characteristics of 
pensioners and beneficiaries 1987, DSS). 
In April 1987 of the 36,128 Greek pensioners (who had 
9,744 dependent children) 40,7% were on Age pension, 48,1% 
on Invalid and 9,0% on Widow's and Supporting parents 
benefit [Loc.cit]. The last two groups of Widow's and SPB 
recipients had 29,2% of all children, and the Invalid 
pensioners ( of which 48,0% were in the age group 50-59) 
had 53,6%. Also 84,4% of the Greek pensioners were entitled 
to the full rate of pension. 
The Greek respondent from Rockdale saw Greeks' greater 
needs in two areas, youth and women: 
"Youth and aged are isolated...No social 
networks. Youth have to adopt into a society, or 
community really warped. I mean drugs, 
violence...Women are always the underdogs and 
missing out. Working class women having many-
problems because of their sex,...exploited at 
work, oppressed at home...Non working women are 
isolated, no social networks...Lack of 
information, lack of access to information...". 
While the Lebanese respondent from Canterbury-
indicated similar problems facing Lebanese women, mainly 
lack of networks, but the number of children many Lebanese 
women have was an additional obstacle for their social 
participation: 
"There are few networks, a lot of women are still 
isolated to participate through lack of 
transport, lack of money, through having a lot of 
children are stuck with them. But there are few 
networks, like the Muslim Women's Association, 
the Arabic Education Society, Arabic Women's 
Federation. So there's quite few women's 
organizations that women can link in 
with...However, the average woman will not 
participate in them with 2-3 children to look 
after...Most likely (women) with western 
ideas (are more likely to participate)...". 
From the respondent's statement can be assiimed that 
a number of Arabic speaking Women's organizations, like the 
Muslim Women's Association of the sample, are middle class 
oriented and can not really provide the networks and 
activities that are relevant to working class Arab women. 
It is also interesting to note that institutional 
organization among Greek women is very underdeveloped in 
Sydney and is confined mainly to Church benevolent groups. 
Some reasons for this may be the strong conservative 
influence of the Greek bourgeoisie, which was strengthened 
by the conservative attitudes found in NSW in the 50s and 
60s, and by the fact that many Greek working class women 
were drawn in the labour market almost immediately after 
their arrival. 
8c.3 Multiculturalism and Mainstreaming 
All respondents proved to be very critical on 
multiculturalism and mainstreaming. Like many respondents 
from the secular ethno-specific welfare organizations, the 
independent social workers accepted multiculturalism as an 
ideal model of social engineering, but regarded it as 
unworkable under the present political conditions. The same 
sentiment was also expressed about mainstreaming. 
Irrespective of the uniformity of opinion on the two 
policies by the independent social workers, various 
respondents offered different reasons for their criticisms, 
and sometimes contradictory in relation to some of their 
previous statements. For example, the Lebanese respondent 
from AWI commented: 
"It has become lately, unfortunately, a very 
political issue. If you want to win ethnic votes, 
just start talking about multiculturalism. It 
isn't, I believe, a genuine policy, not even of 
the ALP. I've raised that question after the ESL 
(cuts). If that happens it just gives you an 
indication of how non-genuine is the approach of 
multiculturalism, very superficial...Its has 
reached a dead end, and why?...Because it was 
used for political purposes by both 
governments...". 
This statement could be interpreted in terms of the 
independent social workers' attitude of not wanting to be 
seen as political. However, the same respondent in previous 
occasions had criticised government policies, and saw the 
use of ethnic political mobilisation as necessary to affect 
changes in state social policies. This contradiction serves 
to highlight the delicate relationship of social workers 
with the state. 
The Greek respondent from Canterbury treated 
multiculturalism as an ideological construct designed to 
achieve social control, while its attempts to achieve 
structural changes as superficial: 
"In practical things, interpreters, translators, 
training, etc., I think it's quite easy, that's 
viable. Nothing fancy about it...Now in terms of 
society I think multiculturalism glosses over a 
whole lot of other issues, like the other basic 
inequalities that we have...Like multiculturalism 
assumes that we all live harmoniously, we're all 
coping, there aren't any other divisions, whether 
it is social class divisions, between genders, it 
tends to gloss over these inequalities...". 
While the Lebanese respondent from Canterbury believed 
that multiculturalism is proving unworkable: 
"It's going down the drain...Well I think people 
felt there was a hope before, people felt it was 
a priority for the government. How far it's going 
to go, or how much cuts they're going to do, I 
don't know...". 
The issue of racial discrimination against the 
Lebanese, and Arabs in general, was brought up by two 
independent respondents as an implicit failure of 
multiculturalism to change racial attitudes. Discrimination 
is an experience that affects Arabic speaking people 
continuously in their daily lives, and this has been 
mentioned by respondents who identify closer to the new 
Lebanese arrivals, especially with the Muslims. In the 
words of the Lebanese respondent from Canterbury: 
"Another major issue for Lebanese, and the Arabs 
in general, is discrimination. Given the 
political situation in the Arab world, whenever 
the's something happening in the Arab world, 
people feel very tense about their existence here 
in Australia... People feel a bit threatened 
about this type of thing, that they're being 
watched, that they're not really trusted, treated 
like terrorists. It's an issue. It affects people 
and attitudes towards them". 
Humphrey has identified as the root of racial 
discrimination against the Lebanese and other new migrant 
arrivals, the inequalities they experience in the labour 
market, in the capitalist relations of production, and the 
ideologies they generate and encourage in periods of 
economic recession: 
"...increased competition for jobs in the 
secondary sector with the decline in jobs has 
resulted in increased discrimination in 
employment on the basis of ethnicity and explicit 
racist politics extreme right-wing parties and 
the main conservative party. The Lebanese have 
become one of the targets of the politics of 
racism". ['The Arabic Community: Realities and 
Challenges' op.cit:35] 
The Greek respondent from Rockdale also referred to the 
discrimination encountered by the Lebanese, by using as an 
example the inability of Muslims to get permission to 
estciblish their own schools, an issue that was raised by 
the Muslim respondent from the Muslim Welfare Association: 
"I think these short of schools that segregate 
children are not healthy, and need to be in the 
mainstream schools, etc. Now I don't agree with 
any private education whatsoever. But why pick at 
the Muslims and say: 'You can't have your own 
schools'. And yet Catholics can, and the Church 
of England people can, and even the Greek 
Orthodox now can. Why? Because you're stronger 
you have more power, so your word counts more. 
Your culture, your ethnicity is more important 
than that of Muslims', which are getting such a 
bashing in the newspapers about extremist 
religion. Because they're new settlers they don't 
have much say...". 
In relation to mainstreaming the respondents felt that 
it has been used by the government as a device to justify 
cuts in ethno-specific services, rather than to achieve 
equity, access and relevance in mainstream agencies. The 
Lebanese social worker from Canterbury thought that ethnic 
workers and communities were led by the government to 
believe differently about the real purpose of mainstreaming 
policy: 
"And a lot of bureaucrats who're selling it to 
people are really believing in that. Behind all 
that there•s a hidden agenda that's there to cut 
resources, not having ethno-specific services". 
The other Lebanese respondent from AWI saw 
mainstreaming too as a policy of denying ethno-specific 
organizations of welfare funds, as he regarded the services 
of these organizations as necessary for the time being: 
"Theoretically is very good. It's going to be a 
long way before mainstreaming policy is 
implemented. Is a matter of mentality as yet. 
It's a case that for the next 10 years you can't 
abolish the ethno-specific services, because the 
alternative has not been provided as yet in 
government departments". 
While the Greek respondent from Rockdale regarded the 
whole state apparatus as incapable to implement genuine 
mainstream policies and services, due to the existence of 
preconceived notions towards minorities: 
"The concept is good, but it's unrealistic, and 
there's no way our welfare system is geared to 
that short of thing. It's a copt-out by the 
government. My interpretation of mainstreaming 
policy is one of cutting funding from ethno-
specif ic services, and not setting up anything 
else for them. Racism always existed, and people 
always use a scapegoat and minorities always 
suffered. I mean how do you get rid of that with 
a policy statement, say with mainstreaming?" 
One final issue worth mentioning is the level of 
relevant qualifications of the social/welfare workers of 
the sample. All Greek professional respondents had tertiary-
qualifications on either social work or psychology, while 
the Lebanese had none, although some of the latter had 
other tertiary or technical qualifications in other fields. 
The reasons for this discrepancy appear to be two 
fold. On the one hand the Greeks are established longer in 
Australia and more second generation Greeks have gone 
through the educational system. In addition to that except 
the Greek respondent from Marrickville all other Greek 
professionals of the sample graduated in the early 80s, 
when ethnic welfare policies increased the demand for 
professionals. 
On the other hand the predominantly Christian Lebanese 
settlers of the 50s and 60s were not interested in human 
services sources, because of more emphasis on economic 
achievement and lack of demand for welfare practitioners. 
Only when the Lebanese started to arrive in large numbers 
in the last 15 years, their growing social problems and the 
policy of multiculturalism all combined to propel Lebanese 
educated persons in the welfare field as there were no 
available qualified social/welfare workers. 
This difference of qualifications between Greek and 
Lebanese does not necessarily mean that the latter are less 
capable of performing the duties. However, the possession 
of qualifications would make a difference as the 
involvement of Lebanese gets more complicated with the 
concepts and practices of the welfare state and welfare 
provision. This difference was to a certain extent evident 
between the more articulate, structured and technical 
comments of the Greek respondents, and the more descriptive 
ones of the Lebanese. 
8c.4: Conclusion 
The preoccupation of the independent social workers 
with the welfare policies and practices of the state, in 
reality pointed out their political awareness and 
involvement, which contradicted their stated apolitical 
position. Although these respondents ideologically belonged 
to diverse political spectrums, their structural positions 
and financial dependence on the state made it difficult to 
resist by themselves state social policies. 
It was obvious from the statements of the respondents 
that as welfare provision became more complicated, their 
superior technical knowledge of the operation of the 
welfare state brought them into conflict with the communal 
leadership. At present they could only forge with ethno-
specific institutions ad hoc alliances. 
Unlike the respondents from ethno-specific 
organizations, the independent ones were institutionally 
spread across the welfare sector, thus their perception of . 
particular welfare needs of their communities was rather 
limited, or influenced by the respective fields they were 
employed. 
The independent social workers' potential to act as 
agents of social change, individually or collectively, was 
counter balanced by their equally potential role to act as 
agents of social control. This latter point was manifested 
in their concern to deal more with the technicalities of 
the welfare state, rather than with policies that have 
larger impact on the general welfare of working class 




I began the study by suggesting that 'ethnic welfare' 
practices are significant in the reflection and support of 
particular definitions of social reality and social 
problems. I used the evidence from state welfare practices, 
and those of Greek and Lebanese institutions and 
professionals, to explore the socio-economic location of 
both groups in the labour market, and the role of women in 
the family. 
Greek and Lebanese immigrants have become an integral 
part of Australian society. An entrepreneurial oriented 
petit- bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie class has emerged among 
Greeks and Lebanese, with the latter been dominated by the 
Maronites. Overall though the majority of Greeks and 
Lebanese have remained industrial, unskilled workers. 
The major source of inequality for Lebanese and Greek 
working class migrants was located in the labour market, 
which was compounded by their period of arrival, age and 
racial discrimination. In general the predominantly 
unskilled occupational status of these workers, as well as 
that of other NES workers, has shown little improvement in 
the last 40 years. The main factors contributing to the 
perpetuation of this situation have been the important role 
of unskilled labour in the process of capital accumulation, 
and the lack of educational and technical qualifications 
and opportunities to these workers. 
The restructuring of the Australian industrial sector 
over the last 15 years has effected significant changes in 
the employment status of Greek and Lebanese workers, and 
thus to their financial security. This period has witnessed 
a decrease in the employment status of these workers, while 
unemployment rates continued to increase, particularly for 
the more recently arrived Lebanese to nearly four times 
higher than those of the total population. 
On the other side Greek married women for decades 
have retained very high workforce participation rates 
(around 50,0%), and at the same time had to fulfil their 
traditional female roles. In contrast Lebanese women have 
never achieved high labour market representation due to 
their entry in Australia during a period of high 
unemployment rates, and because of cultural pressures. 
The class analysis employed in the study argued that 
the apparent 'naturalness' of people's ideologies, of their 
consciousness, was in effect a social creation of their 
class and non-class relations. Gramsci's model of civil 
institutions and intellectuals was able to demonstrate the 
above role of ideology. This was shown in the construction 
of ethnicity and welfare concepts and practices of the 
Greek and Lebanese institutions and professionals, their 
relationships with the wider society, and the use of these 
ideologies by hegemonic classes to exercise social control. 
The intra-communal conflicts of Greeks and Lebanese 
over the definition of their primordial symbolizations were 
actually political conflicts that emerged due to opposing 
class, status, and material interests, and took place at 
the institutional level. These political struggles involved 
the process of cultural re-interpretation of the two 
groups' past experiences in a new socio-cultural 
environment. Despite the distortion of social reality 
created by these symbolizations, they were an integral part 
of people's new social existence and experience. 
De Lepervanche argued that the change from 
assimilation to multiculturalism represented a change at 
the ideological level, rather than a structural one [de 
Lepervanche in 'Australian Society' op.cit: 216]. By this 
she meant that under multiculturalism the dominant Anglo-
Australian institutions and class relations retained their 
basic characteristics, and were rather reinforced by the 
acceptance of conservative ethnic bourgeoisie elements in 
in their ranks. 
It was in the multicultural period, therefore, that 
the interplay between ethnicity and welfare assiimed a 
crucial role in the re-definition of migrants' social 
reality and problems. This emerged as the principal role of 
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Greek and Lebanese institutional and professional welfare 
practice, and generally of migrant welfare. 
The recognition by multiculturalism of NES migrants' 
inequalities as culturally derived, increased institutional 
fragmentation in ethnic communities, and made ethnic 
institutional activity independent of state intervention 
almost unattainable. The religious and regional 
fragmentation of the Lebanese served as good case to study 
the effects of multiculturalism funding policies. 
For instance, the experience of Lebanese secular 
institutions showed that state intervention in this mostly 
'new' ethnic community was initiating and supporting 
organizational growth and fragmentation, more than in that 
of the 'old' Greek community. The Lebanese organizational 
growth and fragmentation was taking place at a faster 
pace, because these structures had to fulfil the 
legitimation needs of both the state and of their own 
petit-bourgeoisie. Thus, the welfare needs of Lebanese 
working class people became the means in realising this 
process. 
V.George saw the significance of personal care 
services in their contribution of definition and support of 
social reality and particular social problems as fourfold: 
a. They provide individualised definitions and explanations 
of problems; b. They are seen as able to provide 
ameliorative solutions; c. They contribute to a segmented 
and fragmented view of problems; and d. They deradicalise 
political protest, [George op.cit: 199-201]. 
Thus, the role of the welfare practices of Greek and 
Lebanese institutions and professionals, and their 
consequences on the working class of both groups, could be 
summarised within the context of the above four points. 
The conservative ethno-specific institutions of the 
sample identified as the major source of inequality of 
their community members their ethnicity. For this reason 
the extensive use of casework by these institutions helped 
the preservation of primordial characteristics, which were 
used as a social control mechanism to maintain dominant 
social values. So, questions about the nature of the whole 
social structure were never raised. 
On the other hand the independent social workers saw 
the welfare state and its services as responsible for the 
inequalities of Greeks and Lebanese. Although this was a 
more progressive approach in comparison to that of the 
conservative ethno-religious institutions, it also left 
questions about the present social order unanswered. 
All conservative ethno-specific institutions saw as 
their primary ameliorative role the re-socialisation of 
their working class clientele to the dominant values of 
the welfare state and host society, and their services as a 
complement to this process. In particular for ethno-
religious institutions the only way they could address the 
material needs of the individual and the community, was 
through the improvement of the spiritual and moral 
condition of the latter. 
The independent social workers did not perceive the 
ameliorative ability of social work practice limited in 
casework, but also in the pursuit of social issues. The 
case of the Greek 'Conspiracy' showed that such action 
could have beneficial results for disadvantaged groups or 
individuals. 
However, these professionals saw the services of the 
welfare state as been able to provide solutions to the 
needs of the working class migrants, and consequently their 
social control role was significant. This was more evident 
with the Lebanese, whose increasing dependence on welfare 
services and benefits did very little to enhance the 
possibilities of greater and more equatable participation 
in the labour market. 
The existence of the progressive GOC showed that such 
community structures have a more holistic view of social 
problems, and therefore a greater potential to affect some 
degree of social change for the conditions of migrant 
workers. Despite the limited political influence of the GOC 
in the Greek community, its operation showed that 
conservative social and cultural domination in ethnic 
communities is not inevitable or totally acceptable. 
The institutional and ideological fragmentation of 
Greeks and Lebanese was not only a product of their 
primordial differences, but also of their class position in 
the Australian society and of the policy of 
multiculturalism. As a result of that the ideological 
interaction between primordial/socio-political definitions 
of social problems was fragmented and segmented. 
In this way the respondents of the study viewed one 
aspect of social inequality at the time - racial 
discrimination, religious intolerance, unresponsive state 
social services, the impact of unemployment, the condition 
of the family and the role of women in it - thus obscuring 
the totality of the needs of their working class 
populations and the causes of these problems. So, the role 
of Greek and Lebanese workers in the process of capital 
accumulation, and the ideological constructs that 
contributed to the enhancement of their socio-economic and 
cultural inequalities generated from this process, remained 
mystified. 
Although the welfare practices of Greek and Lebanese 
institutions and professionals contributed to the relative 
easing of immediate problems of their working class 
clientele, the causes of these problems were located at the 
individual, group, or community level, rather than the 
whole social structure. 
Thus, multiculturalism's role has been to legitimise 
the political mobilisation of the ethnic bourgeoisie, and 
co-opt them into the dominant class and institutional 
structures of Australian society. On the other hand, 
multiculturalism attempted to limit any potential 
political protest by migrant workers by segmenting their 
social organization, and by defusing and restricting their 
welfare needs in its arguments about the technicalities of 
the welfare state [Jakubowicz et al, op.cit: 101]. 
The Birrells have been correct in their observation of 
one of the major consequences of multiculturalism on the 
migrant working class: 
"The only other government response has been to 
support the ideals of cultural pluralism and 
ethnic consciousness and to aid some ethnic 
associations, but these efforts do nothing for 
the material conditions of Southern European 
migrants or their occupationally derived low 
status. Nor have there been efforts to provide 
additional opportunities and training for 
Southern European migrants wanting to move into 
other, more skilled, and better jobs".[Birrell 
and Birrell op.cit: 258] 
Multiculturalism has failed to provide policies and 
programs for migrant workers that could improve their 
living conditions, such as training and re-training, 
affordable housing, better educational opportunities and 
health services, child care services, and services for the 
aged. The ROMMPAS Report did not offer any new directions 
or initiatives towards these areas. 
The increasing reduction of industrial positions for 
NES migrant working class men and women is already creating 
great financial, familial, and emotional hardships for 
them. At the same time the increased competition for scarce 
job vacancies has increased racial/ethnic discrimination, 
especially towards new migrant groups like the Lebanese, 
and other non-Europeans. 
Under such circumstances the longer welfare provision 
for migrant workers remains a separate issue from the 
mainstream debates on social wage allocation, the greater 
are the possibilities that their welfare will remain a low 
state priority, and most likely would deteriorate. 
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